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seccion monografica
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Tobies Grimaltos, Carlos Moya Presentation
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Olga Fernández Prat Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception
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A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in diverse ways) is not. This paper reconstructs the argumentative context in which these views are put forward, and, after mentioning some drawbacks of both views, as these have been advanced to date, suggests a new view that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Jordi Fernández Memory and Perception: Remembering Snowflake
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If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I propose a notion of mnemonic Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Manuel Liz Camouflaged Physical Objects: The Intentionality of Perception
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This paper is about perception and its objects. My aim is to suggest a new way to articulate some of the central ideas of direct realism. Sections 1 and 2 offer from different perspectives a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception. Section 3 introduces the notion of “camouflage” as an interesting and promising alternative in order to explain the nature of the intentional objects of perception. Finally, section 4 makes use of this new notion in the analysis of the relationships between the intentionality of perception, the intentionality of thought, and the intentionality of language.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Murali Ramachandran How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
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This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge-by way of more basic, non-circular concepts-it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.
articulos
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Robert G. Hudson The Relevance of History to Philosophy of Science
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My task in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the philosophic study of science that takes seriously case studies drawn from the practice of science. Historicistphilosophy of science suffers from what I call the ’evidence problem’. The worry is that case studies cannot qualify as rigorous evidence for the adjudication of philosophic theories. I explore the reasons why one might deny to historical cases a probative value, then reply to these reasons on behalf of historicism. The main proponents of the view I am criticizing are Pitt (2001) and Rasmussen (2001).
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Manuel Pérez Otero Aspectos particularistas en el discurso modal (particularist traits in modal discourse)
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EI debate entre la concepción descriptivista de los nombres propios y la teoría de la referencia directa concierne -principalmente- a esta cuestión: (es la función referencial de los nombres propios reduciblemediante la función descriptiva y las funciones logicas? Una tesis distintiva central de Kripke es 10 que denominamos particularismo semántico modal: la función referencial es irredueible, incluso cuando los nombre propios aparecen en enunciados modales. Se presenta aquí una exégesis de las críticas de Kripke contra cierta interpretacion metafóriea de los mundos posibles (que los considera como Iugares lejanos observados con telescopios) interpretándolas como elementos cruciales en su defensa del particularismo semántieo modal.Tbe debate between the description theory of proper names and direct reference is -mainly- a debale on whether or not the referential function of proper names is reducible in term of descriptive and logical functions. A central distinctive thesis in Kripke’s work is what I call modal semantic particularism: the referential function is irreducible even when proper names appear in modal contexts. I present all exegesis of Kripke’s comments against a certain metaphorical understanding of possible worlds (as distant countries discovered through teleseopes) according to which these comments are crucial claims in hisdefense of modal semantic particularism.
recensiones
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Lucía Lewowicz Pensar la ciencia: Estudios criticos sobre obras filosóficas (1950-2000)
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sumario
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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sumario analitico / summary
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Sumario Analitico / Summary
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Sumario Analitico / Summary
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