Radical Philosophy Review

This paper critically examines violence, and our shared responsibility for it. Drawing on insights from Jean-Paul Sartre, I develop the correlation between scarcity and violence, emphasizing scarcity as agential lack that results from conditions of oppression and domination. In order to develop this correlation between scarcity and violence, I examine the racial dimension of violence in the U.S. Following this analysis, I claim that we all share responsibility for the social structural processes in which we participate that produce scarcity. On these grounds, I argue for the imperative of democratic equality, i.e., conditions for the self-development and self-determination of all.

We argue that violent political protest is justified in a generally just society when violence is required to send a message about the nature of the injustice at issue, and when it is not ruled out by moral or pragmatic considerations. Focusing on protest as a mode of public address, we argue that its communicative function can sometimes justify or require the use of violence. The injustice at the heart of the Baltimore protests—police brutality against black Americans—is a paradigmatic case of this sort, because of the rela­tionship of the police to the injustice and the protests against it.

In this article I tease out a conception of reason in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s writings that is both decoupled from Enlightenment notions of human nature, progress, and transcendental truth, as well as auto-critically engaged with the anti-authoritarian Enlightenment ethos of anarchist thought. In so doing, I hope to reveal how the Proudhonian deployment of reason retained a healthy skepticism of foundationalism, philosophical systems-building, and the intellectualism bred of its dogmatic excesses as well as reconsider Proudhon’s relation to our most privileged faculty.

In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges. Although I concur that same-sex couples should have the right to marry if anyone does, I argue that civil marriage is an unjust institution. By examining the claims employed in the majority opinion, I expose the Court’s romanticized, patriarchal view of marriage. I critique four central claims: (1) that marriage is central to individual autonomy and liberty; (2) that civil marriage is uniquely valuable; (3) that marriage “safeguards” children and families; and (4) that marriage is fundamental to civil society.