Roczniki Filozoficzne

The subject matter of the article is an idea of philosophy of history of J. Maritain, one of the most influential contemporary philosopher, inspired with Christian thought. In his interpretation of history, Jacques Maritain asks a question, if philosophy of history is possible and what is a genuine philosophy of history. French philosopher comes to believe that philosophical reflection upon history is important part of philosophy itself, but should be understand as practical philosophy. Also Maritain distances himself from historiosophical pessimism and catastrophe theories as well as naive optimism. He believe in progress, but as a personalist, he finds it as a synthesis of subjective and objective frames of human life. In his opinion, true progress is possible but it depends on human and personal activity.

The article presents the problem of freedom in Locke’s metaphysics and epistemology. The analysis of the source text shows, that he uses the concept of freedom in the three different meanings. The first one is voluntary that can be described as the power to do what the agent wants. Next is freedom of action which is the ability to do what the agent wants to do and also to stop doing this whenever he wants to. The last one is freedom of will that means the power to refrainfrom performing an action. After that the agent can think about his decision and make it more thoughtful and accurate.In order to characterize these kinds of freedom it is necessary to answer to following questions: Which kind of these three types of freedom presented by John Locke is compatible with determinism? And the second question is: what kind of freedom relates to moral responsibility?The final analysis shows that only voluntary can coexist with determinism. Therefore Locke should not be interpreted as compatibilist for all of three kinds of freedom in his theory. Answering to the second question, moral responsibility is connected with every kind of freedom. In each case an agent has the free choice and can realize his own desires.

The author of “Lectures on Religious Belief” significantly influenced the development of analytic philosophy of religion. His conception of religious belief is regarded by many commentators as controversial and radical. In this article I try to demonstrate that his remarks being the basis for this negative appraisal, are often unclear and inconclusive. I discuss critically, i.a., premises of so-called “Wittgensteinian fideism,” which consists of the following claims: (1) a lack of understanding between a theist and an atheist, (2) the autonomy of religious discourse (independence from a scientific and a common sense world view), (3) non-referential language of religion (it does not depict metaphysical reality), (4) an inability to criticize religion. Regarding the question of the autonomy of religious beliefs, I try to inquire whether, according to Wittgenstein, there are semantic “family resemblance” between the empirical and religious concepts, and also, what is the role of rational arguments in the field of faith: historical evidence, claims of natural science, arguments for the existence of God. As regards the problem of the reference and function of religious beliefs, I explain reasons why Wittgenstein’s position is classified as non-cognitivism.

The main goal of this paper is to explicate the meaning of such words as “reason”, ”knowledge” and “faith.” In addition, some relationships between these notions are analysed.Two attitudes can be distinguished: “faith — reason/knowledge” and “reason/knowledge — faith”. In the first case faith is initial, but a believer can take a rational (intellectual) effort to analyse what faith is. The second attitude is realised in the rational search to find faith.Many different types of arguments for the sentence “God exists” have been invented over years. These arguments have been the tools used in the cases of both attitudes. The arguments are analysed and discussed. The notion of argument is related to the notion of persuasion. Some different situations can be distinguished: a claim is rightly argued and somebody is persuaded by this claim; a claim is rightly argued, but somebody is not persuaded; a claim is not rightly argued, but somebody is persuaded by such a claim (e.g. by an influential leader); and a claim is not rightly argued and somebody is not persuaded.The attitude “faith — reason/knowledge” (a religious attitude) is existential and practical. It consists of some components. One of them is a religious knowledge (doctrine). If a believer confesses his or her faith using the official (institutional) text — called in Latin Credo (The Creed) — then really they believe and accept a set of rational religious beliefs, which belong to the religious knowledge (doctrine). A religious faith, understood as God’s influence, is acknowledged as the basis for such an act of believing and accepting.So the religious attitude consists of a religious faith, beliefs, emotions and also free choice (decision, acceptance). The act of an acceptance does not only concern beliefs. A believer also accepts moral and religious rules (principles). This is the type of morality motivated by religion. A religious attitude is the rational, theoretical and practical synthesis of all these components.

Zazwyczaj, najkrócej rzecz ujmujc, określa się cud jako „niezwykłe zdarzenie spowodowane przez Boga”. Bliższa analiza pojęcia niezwykłości prowadzi do wyróżnienia dwóch innych cech cudu – ponadnaturalności i naukowej niewyjaśnialności. Wyodrębnienie i przedstawienie dwóch podstawowych charakterystyk zdarzenia cudownego (ponadnaturalność i naukowa niewyjaśnialność), które występuj (choć nie zawsze w jednakowy sposób wyrażone) w definicjach i określeniach cudu proponowanych w literaturze przedmiotu, może posłużyć do wskazania zasadniczych kierunków, w których powinny być prowadzone dalsze analizy tytułowego zagadnienia. Warto także zasygnalizować główne problemy, jakie pojawiaj się w związku z przyjęciem wspomnianych określeń. Problemy te dotyczą różnorodnej treści podkładanej pod poszczególne rozumienia cudu i dlatego wymagają ponownego przemyślenia istotnego znaczenia tego pojęcia. W trakcie analizy określenia cudu jako „zdarzenia niezwykłego” zamierzam więc uzasadnić twierdzenie, że cud jako „zdarzenie niezwykłe” jest rozumiany na dwa sposoby: (1) jako zdarzenie ponadnaturalne i (2) jako zdarzenie naukowo niewyjaśnialne. Następnie będę starał się pokazać, że w przypadku (1) można mówić o zdarzeniu ponadnaturalnym jako o zdarzeniu cudownym tylko wtedy, gdy ma się na myśli to, że jest ono spowodowane ponadnaturalną przyczyną (za którą uznaje się Boga), a nie wtedy, gdy za ponadnaturalny uznaje się jego przebieg. Z kolei odnośnie do przypadku (2) proponuję przyjć pogląd, że mówienie o naukowej niewyjaśnialności zdarzenia cudownego nie ma sensu, gdyż twierdzenie to jest konsekwencją rozumienia cudu jako pogwałcenia prawidłowości przyrody, a tego nie można wykazać (i nie ma takiej potrzeby). Można natomiast utrzymywać, że zdarzenie cudowne to takie zdarzenie, które musi być niewyjaśnione naukowo w momencie, gdy zachodzi.

An axiomatic characterisation of the functor of sequential assertion is propsed here. By means of it the functor of sequential conjunction is defined. In the temporal interpretation these functors are respectively read as: next/then and and-next/and-then. It is proved that the proposed system (SAS) and its strenghtening (SAS*) comprise respectively von Wright’s And Next and And Then systems. The consistency and independence of axioms of the richer of the two proposed structures (SAS*) is settled by interpretation in the quadrivalent propositional calculus.

Some principles of general theory of being have their equivalents in laws of classical logic. For a long time this was not distinctly noticed, as logic was treated rather as technology of discussion, and not as a system of propositions stated in the objective language and concerning connections between facts. It may be generally said that some primary principles of being and some laws of logic state the same most fundamental connections between facts, between states of things. There are also principles of philosophy that do not have such equivalents in laws of logic. These include the principle of sufficient reason. The concept of intuitive truth of propositions that reappeared in modern logic first of all in connection with K. Gödel’s theorem of 1931 formed an intellectual climate that made it possible for classical logicians to accept also those principles of general theory of being that do not have equivalents in laws of standard logic. It may be said that these philosophical principles may be included in the outward basis of modern logic.