Cover of Phenomenology 2005

Phenomenology 2005

Selected Essays from Asia Part 2
2007, ISBN 978-973-88632-3-1
Editors: Cheung Chan-Fai, Yu Chung-chi

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Displaying: 1-18 of 18 documents


1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Kwok-ying Lau

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This essay retraces the essentials of Derrida’s hermeneutics of friendship. It concerns a conception of friendship which is oriented towards the future, something which is to come. It requires us not to understand friendship from the model of brotherhood, a mode of relation which priorities blood and kinship, i.e. a relation which is always already familiar and familial, even androcentric. At the time of globalization we should prepare ourselves for the encounter of foreigners and strangers who, different from us, incarnate figures of the unforeseen and the unexpected. This novel conception of friendship promises to provide the basis for a new politics of international relations.

2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Nam-In Lee

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It is the aim of this essay to flesh out the claim that Husserl’s phenomenology is not merely a neutral method, but has metaphysics as one of its constitutive parts. What I will show is that Husserl has the same view of metaphysics from the Logical Investigations to his later phenomenology. More specifically, he makes a distinction between a false metaphysics and a true one, and considers it to be the aim of his phenomenology to cope with the limitations of false metaphysics and to establish a true metaphysics on a genuinely phenomenological foundation.

3. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Sung Tae Lee

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Put in the perspective of diff erences and identities, culture matters for any attempts to seek ways to “live together, equal yet different” in the age of globalization. WATSUJI Tetsuro, decades ago, had a kin image of globalization when he understands that the “International transportation has become remarkably easier” and, as a result, “all kinds of culture are mutually blending dyeing, echoing.” This essay is an attempt to approach the question of culture in the age of globalization focusing on how WATSUJI interpreted cultural “blending, dyeing, echoing” and what his or his Japanese contemporaries’ responses to the Westernization meant or still mean to Asian Others.

4. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Wei-Lun Lee

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The local healing modes in Taiwan for psychological suffering can be called as “ethical care,” i.e., they emphasize people’s suffering in their ethical predicaments and, therefore, find ways to re-order the interpersonal constellations. In accordance with ethical care, psychotherapy practiced in Taiwan should focus on the “self for being ethical,” the acting agent concerned mostly with the interpersonal ordering in its life. To advance the significance of ethical care, the assumption of the individuality of the most dominant theories of psychotherapy, which mostly target on ego functioning, is discussed, and an illustration of psychotherapy as ethical care is also provided.

5. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Ping-Keung Lui

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The idea of the Other is mainly a phenomenological invention. Its significance in ontology, ethics, and political philosophy has come to be recognized generally. In theoretical sociology, such recognition is yet to be established. As a first attempt, the paper treats social structure as an otherness. Bayesian duality and Simmelian formalism will be invoked in the course of argument. It is hoped that the sociological demand for technicalities does not suffocate an appreciation of its phenomenological comportment.

6. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Shoichi Matsuba

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It is clear that the philosophy of Bergson influenced Merleau-Ponty. In fact, Merleau-Ponty refers consistently to Bergson from his initial book review until the last drafts. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of the influence of Bergson’s philosophy: from which part, how much, and in which way was it carried out? We will examine the influence of Bergson’s philosophy on Merleau-Ponty, and affirm the following suggestions:First, Merleau-Ponty consistently took an ambivalent position towards Bergson. In other words, his evaluation did not change from positive to negative, or from negative to positive. Nevertheless, he changed the balance of evaluation in Bergson’s work. In his early period, a few comments on Bergson were critical. In contrast, after his middle period, the comments increased and he started to take a more positive position. The peak can be found in “Bergson in the Making,” though still there are some negative estimates.Second, there are surely consistent themes to be picked up: the theory of perception, that of duration, and that of intuition. But the way of picking them up differs in each period. In the early period, he mainly took the theory of perception and body. In the middle period, he considered the theory of history and language. In the latter period, again he took up the theory of intuition and deepened it.Finally, in the early period, the criterion depends on phenomenology whether the evaluation is positive or negative. The point of the critique is that Bergson took the naturalistic attitude, that he did not mention the intentionality, and that he confuses consciousness with the object of consciousness. The point of appreciation is that Bergson was no longer biased and intended the “immediately given things for consciousness,” that he tried to overcome the ready-made conflict between realism and idealism, and that he was meaning to go back to the “lived world.”

7. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Yusuke Miyazaki

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One cannot make a judgment without following any law. Nevertheless, or for this very reason, it is essential that all judgments must be made in the absence of their law. For, in order to follow the law in a proper sense, a judgment needs the absence of law as its own constitutive moment, that is, the freedom which makes this act possible at the very moment that it relates itself to the law in the first place. Faced with this absence, therefore, one must make a judgment by inventing at the same time, as it were, (the relation to) the law which the same judgment is to follow. In “Force of Law,” Derrida (re)opened the ethico-political thinking of deconstruction by taking his departure from this aporetic structure of judgment. The aim of this essay is to recast the question of this aporetic structure of judgment by inquiring into the problematic of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, with which Derrida has not been suffi ciently concerned, and to carve out the aesthetico-political problematic of deconstruction.

8. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Norio Murata

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The concept of the habituality is to consider in reference of the temporality, as far as it is acquired in the course of the time. On the one hand the habit is not the unique being in the time like event or fact, but it lasts for a while. On the other hand, the habit is not valid supertemporally or omnitemporally like the ideal objectivity, but it has the beginning and the end in the time. In this article it is tried to relate the habituality to the temporality. At first, the difficulty to determinate the habituality is clarified in reference of the temporality. To avoid this difficulty Husserl pays attention to the intentional relation to the past. Secondly, in the analysis of the horizontal network of intentions the habituality will be investigated in reference of the past as sedimentation and future as anticipation. At last it is shown that in Husserl’s late years the habituality bases on the instinct. There we try to interpret the instinct not as inherent ability but as pure activity.

9. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Tatsuya Nishiyama

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In the 1978 essay “Le retrait de la metaphore” – a text that constitutes a part of his well-known debate on the notion of metaphor with Paul Ricoeur – Jacques Derrida discusses the peculiar translatability of the French word “retrait.” It is a word that plays an important role in the French reception of Heidegger's thought, not only as a translation for “Entzug” (withdrawal, removal), but also as an indicator of the very translatability of Heidegger’s thought. This paper discusses the challenge proposed by Derrida to Heidegger’s thought on translation, on the basis of a reflection – and translation – of the word “retrait.” Derrida adopts a strategy of re-translating and counter-translating the word “retrait.” Such a praxis of (re- and counter-) translation is profoundly related to the movement of the “retrait” itself, which opens up a space for the general transformability in language and in the history of metaphysics.

10. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Musubu Ohtaki

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From The Structure of Behavior to his later philosophy, Merleau-Ponty reflected on the unconscious. This paper first points out the topological concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. Then, the paper traces how Merleau-Ponty defines the unconscious. In this regard, concepts concerning “negativity” plays an important role in his topological way of thinking. Freud’s and Heidegger’s ideas will also be examined with regard to this negativity. We will recognize that the key concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy such as flesh, hinge, and hollowness result from the topological structures created by reversibility between negation and non-negation. Finally, the paper confirms that the structures found in the unconscious and dreams should be understood based on structural ontology in Merleau-Ponty’s last writings.

11. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Cheng-yun Tsai

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Th is paper is to discuss the idea of genealogical phenomenology by analyzing Taiwanese works of phenomenological psychology, which was brought out by an interdisciplinary project of a group of scholars from both theoretical and practical fields. In contrast to its transcendental turn or hermeneutical turn, phenomenology turns its focus of description from consciousness, or phenomenon, to material condition in the constitution of objective knowledge. And its objectivity becomes genealogical, insofar as the universal form of phenomenology is considered with cultural diversity.

12. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Wen-Sheng Wang

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In this article, I will discuss, regarding the concept of intentionality, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s conception of “natural” and “man-made” parallel to the conception of ethos and techne, and the way from techne to ethos as art. The concept of art in Husserl will be shown in relation to Kant’s conception of “Reflective Judgment.” I have applied this thesis to my research in a mental institution in Taiwan. Heidegger’s position the phenomenological meaning of healing and nursing as ethos, and the way of recovery of ethos from techne, especially from technology, as art are explicated.

13. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Kazunori Watanabe

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In the decline of Heidegger’s life, he said that his early interest in the problem of category already suggested “the question of being (Seinsfrage)”. This paper deals with Heidegger’s interpretation about the category. I want to demonstrate two sources which permit him to accept that category in his own particular interpretation: that is to say Aristotle and Dilthey. Heidegger learned Dilthey’s “category of life (Lebenskategorie)” from which he read that category is life itself, has as its nature an articulation of its own self and a tendency toward the world. In addition, he reads about the “logos”-character of the category in Aristotle: namely, category means to speak about the world. The world is spoken, but it is our respective lives that express the world as such. In other words, the world at the same time speaks and is spoken by its self. This structure is analogical to the structure of “the question of being” because Being (Being of Dasein) is questioned and the same Being questions itself. Herein we can find a starting point of Heidegger’s thought.

14. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Ichiro Yamaguchi

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This paper disputes the claim that the so-called soul-body dualism finds its solution in the analysis of the intersubjectivity from the viewpoint of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and in the concept of selflessness in the philosophy of Mahayana-Buddhism. The intentionality of instinctual drive as the passive synthesis provides the reason for Husserl’s intersubjectivity and the possibility of Buber’s I-Thou relation. The selflessness in this relation is the concept of Buber’s thou and in Husserl’s intersubjectivity lies in the interesting connection with the non-egological dimension of Buddhism.

15. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Zhihua Yao

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Dharmakīrti’s theory of negative judgments grew out of extensive discussions and debates on the cognition of nonexistent objects (asad-ālambana-vijnāna) among various Buddhist and Indian philosophical schools. As is well-known, a similar debate on the objectless presentations (gegenstandslose Vorstellungen) happened in the early development of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Among various opinions on this controversial issue, I find that Dharmakīrti and Husserl hold similar views. Both of them have less interest in redefining the ontological status of non-existent objects than Russell and Meinong. Rather they engage themselves in analyzing the experiential structure of negative cognition and come up with a similar conclusion that negative judgments presuppose affirmative perceptions. This study will enrich our understanding of both thinkers.

16. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Chung-Chi Yu

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Schutz read Husserl and used the latter’s concepts to deal with problems that concerned him. In this essay the questions are raised of how his phenomenology is to be characterized and what is his position in the phenomenological movement? One interpretation views the Schutzian position as contrasting with that of Husserl, while another holds the mundane phenomenology may have nothing to do with Husserl and can only founded on social interaction. According to the second point of view Schutz has more enterprising philosophical anthropology than a phenomenology. Dissatisfied with both directions I turn to Husserl’s phenomenological psychology as a clue to deal with this problem.

17. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2

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18. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 2
Kwok-ying Lau, Jung-Sun Han Heuer, Toru Tani

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