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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4

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2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Anna Peterson

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Nature can be understood as socially constructed in two senses: in different cultures’ interpretations of the nonhuman world and in the physical ways that humans have shaped even areas that they think of as “natural.” Both understandings are important for environmental ethics insofar as they highlight the diversity of ways of viewing and living in nature. However, strong versions of the social constructionist argument contend that there is no “nature” apart from human discourse and practices. This claim is problematic both logically, insofar as it fails to deconstruct the notion of culture, and ethically, insofar as it categorically privileges human activities and traits.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Mick Smith

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The power and the promise of deep ecology is seen, by its supporters and detractors alike, to lie in its claims to speak on behalf of a natural world threatened by human excesses. Yet, to speak of trees as trees or nature as something worthy of respect in itself has appeared increasingly difficult in the light of social constructivist accounts of “nature.” Deep ecology has been loath to take constructivism’s insightsseriously, retreating into forms of biological objectivism and reductionism. Yet, deep ecology actually has much in common with, and much to gain from, some varieties of constructivism and can add a new dimension to constructivism’s own critique of current ideologies.

discussion papers

4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Eric Katz

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For much of its brief history, the field of environmental ethics has been critical of anthropocentrism. I here undertake a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism. In the first part of this essay, I explain what a pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism means. I differentiate two distinct pragmatic strategies, one substantive and one methodological, and I adopt methodological pragmatism as my guiding principle. In the second part of this essay, I examine a case study of environmental policy—the problem of beach replenishment on Fire Island, New York—as a pragmatic test of anthropocentrism. I conclude that the debate between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism needs to be expressed in non-absolutist terms, i.e., in a language that permits compromise, flexibility, and a pluralism of values. Thechoice between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism as the basis of both environmental policy and environmental ethics is highly contextual and thus requires a subtle examination of the concrete policy situation.
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Peter S. Wenz

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Bryan Norton advocates using the perspectives and methods of American pragmatism in environmental philosophy. J. Baird Callicott criticizes Norton’s view as unproductive anti-philosophy. I find worth and deficiencies in both sides. On the one hand, I support the pragmatic approach, illustrating its use in an argument for sustainable agriculture. On the other hand, I take issue with Norton’s claim that pragmatists should confine themselves to anthrpocentric arguments. Here I agree with Callicott’s inclusion of nonanthropocentric consideration. However, I reject Callicott’s moral monism. In sum, I support pragmatic moral pluralism that includes nonanthropocentric values.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Jennifer Welchman

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What virtues do good stewards typically have and can these virtues move people to be good stewards of nature? Why focus on the virtues of stewards rather than on trying to construct and defend morally obligatory rules to govern human behavior? I argue that benevolence and loyalty are crucial for good stewardship and these virtues can and do motivate people to act as good stewards of nature. Moreover,since it is a matter of dispute whether rational considerations can move us to perform a given act in the absence of disposition to do so, I argue we should try to determine which moral dispositions (if any) will motivate people to be concerned for the environment so that the development of environmentally sensitive character may be encouraged.

book reviews

7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Susan J. Armstrong

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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Chris J. Cuomo

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
David Schmidtz

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Sara Ebenreck

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4
Holmes Rolston, III

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referees

12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4

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13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 21 > Issue: 4

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