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Studia Neoaristotelica

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Volume 4, Issue 1, 2007

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Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents


articles

1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák

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2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta

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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta

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The authors evaluate the soundness of the ontological argument they developed in their 1991 paper. They focus on Anselm’s first premise, which asserts that there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. After casting doubt on the argument Anselm uses in support of this premise, the authors show that there is a formal reading on which it is true. Such a reading can be used in a sound reconstruction of the argument. After this reconstruction is developed in precise detail, the authors show that the conclusion, a reading of the claim “God exists”, does not quite achieve the end Anselm desired.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD

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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).

translations

5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Peter Hoenen SJ

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discussions

6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák

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7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD

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reviews

8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík

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9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Rastislav Nemec

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10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Machula

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11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík

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