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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1

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from the editor

2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1

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features

3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
Thomas Heyd

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Present environmental degradation has led some to argue that only an appeal to selfishness will “save the environment,” allegedly because appeals to “morality” necessarily are ineffective, while others have suggested that we need a “new, environmental ethic.” If we are interested in countering the degradation of the natural environment, we need to reconsider actual morality, how it is developed, and how it may take into account human activities affecting the natural world. Ultimately, we need to develop ways of knowing that recognize the autonomy of nature.
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
C. A. Bowers

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Environmentally oriented philosophers and educational theorists are now attempting to clarify how the ideas of John Dewey can be used as the basis for changing cultural practices that contribute to the ecological crisis. Although Dewey can be interpreted as a nonanthropocentric thinker and his method of experimental inquiry can be used in eco-management projects, Dewey should not be regarded as an environmental and eco-justice philosopher—and by extension, his followers should not be regarded in this light. (1) Dewey’s emphasis on an experimental mode of inquiry did not take account of the knowledge systems of other cultures—particularly cultures that are more ecologically centered. (2) Dewey’s understanding of language prevented him from recognizing how the root metaphors (meta-cognitive schemata) he took for granted were also the basis, with several exceptions, of the Industrial Revolution. (3) Dewey’s failure to understand the complex nature of tradition, including the different ways in which intergenerational knowledge is shared and renewed, makes it difficult for his followers to address a central eco-justice issue—which is to regenerate within diverse cultural communities the non-commodified forms of knowledge, skills, and relationships that enable individuals and communities to have a smaller ecological footprint.

discussion papers

5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
John L. Paterson

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The concept of stewardship as resource development and conservation, a shallow environmental ethic, arises out of a domination framework. Stewardship as earthkeeping arises out of a keeping framework and falls somewhere between an intermediate and deep environmental ethic. A notion of agricultural stewardship, based on earthkeeping principles, can be used as a normative standard by whichto judge a range of agricultural economies and practices.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
Hugo Fjelsted Alrøe, Erik Steen Kristensen

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There are many different meanings of sustainability and precaution and no evident connection between the new normative concepts and the traditional moral theories. We seek an ethical basis for sustainability and precaution—a common framework that can serve as a means of resolving the conceptual ambiguities of the new normative concepts and the conflicts between new and traditional moralconcepts and theories. We employ a systemic approach to analyze the past and possible future extension of ethics and establish an inclusive framework of ethical extension. This framework forms the basis for what we call a systemic ethic.
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
Andrew R. Murphy

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I explore the main features and historical pedigree of antimodern environmental declinism, a prominent family of contemporary critiques that ascribes responsibility for environmental ills to the legacy of the Scientific revolution or “modernity” more generally. I argue that each of its three central oppositions (to the human/nature dichotomy, the dominance of scientific method, and industrialism and technology) are part of a long-standing rhetorical tradition, and are neither unique nor unprecedented. I stress the communicative, narrative, persuasive, and political nature of the environmental project, rather than its claims to have arrived at an objective description of unprecedented ecological damage in late modernity. This view is perhaps less convincing to an audience looking for certainty in an age of science, but it is more faithful to the attenuated, mediated ways in which we experience and make sense of the world around us.

book reviews

8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
David Schmidtz, Matt Zwolinski

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
Steve Best

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
Andrew Biro

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 25 > Issue: 1
Melissa Clarke

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