Philosophy and Theology

In this essay, I criticize John Caputo’s deconstructive analysis of the nature of mystical union. Using the works of St. John of the Cross, I show that the notion of mystical union does not belong to “the metaphysics of presence.” I also discuss the true significance of deconstruction for the study of mysticism.

During the course of his lengthy career, Edward Schillebeeckx has developed a series of epistemological frameworks which inform his theology. Using the metaphor of “circle” to describe these frameworks, the article will argue that Schillebeeckx in his earlier theology describes experience and knowledge within the framework of an ontological circle of subject and object. In his later work, Schillebeeckx develops a second, hermeneutical circle and finally a critical circle of theory and praxis. Later developments in his thought both depend upon and radically re-interpret the earlier circles of epistemology. Since all theological language and practice must originate within the boundaries of human knowledge and experience, only by this reinterpretation of epistemology, Schillebeeckx argues, can Christian theology begin to meet the challenge of the understanding of faith in the modern and postmodern world.

The theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, which is deeply rooted in classical Christology and Lutheran orthodoxy, has close affinities with views about the nature of God and God’s relationship with the world that has recently been labeled “open theism.” Bonhoeffer’s concepts of God, freedom, providence and ethics provide relational views of God with firm theological credentials and exemplify a strong integration of philosophy and theology.

Tribalism transforms otherwise benefi cent forms of particularity—blood, soil, language, shared memories, cultural specificities, etc.—into forces for destruction, by endowing them with an inappropriate transcendental signifi cance. Ultimately this impedes rather than fosters intercultural likemindedness and communication. This essay explores how some forms of multiculturalism-friendly Christological thought seem to either end up in, or lead to, the very tribalism they likely are seeking to avoid. This kind of multiculturalism is more of a disguised form of monoculturalism. The essay ends with a sketch of three choices: an archaic egalitarian utopianism which ignores religiocultural differences; the moral nihilism of which Nietzsche warned us; and an incarnational historical consciousness which trusts that history itself can teach us the humility, tolerance, need for doctrinal minimalism and contemplative maximalism which nourishes genuine difference in union.

An early and persistent criticism of Rahner was his use of transcendental philosophy and his emphasis on human subjectivity, with an attendant loss of concrete historicity and human embodiment. By finding connections between Rahner’s concept of the transcendental and philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s treatment of language and its uses, the article highlights Rahner’s own often-overlooked treatment of human embodiment and concrete historicity. The argument here focuses on the priority of being over appearance, and the necessary connection between intentions and actions, important themes in both men’s thought.

Far from being left mute by the linguistic turn in philosophy, Transcendental Thomism is uniquely capable of profitable dialogue with it, as exemplified in this juxtaposition of the work of Karl Rahner and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The key insight of Transcendental Thomism is not to concentrate upon the affirmations which our concepts might produce about God, but rather the recognition that language itself, the ability to grasp even the provisional essence in a known object, is only possible because that object reveals itself against an infinite horizon. Conversely, Wittgenstein’s insight that meaning is not a rider to language but rather a function of language helps to explain the necessity of categorical revelation in the thought of Rahner.

Throughout his career as an academic theologian, Karl Rahner never explicitly set himself the task of working out a theory of language. Nonetheless, the seminal insights for such a theory were formulated in his extensive corpus as functions of other, more properly theological concerns. These consist chiefly of the development of religious doctrine and the cult of the Sacred Heart (See DD, BH, ST, TM, ULM). Other important insights appear in his treatment of the hermeneutics of eschatological statements and the relation between Christianity and poetry (See HES, PC, PP). All these theological concerns have received scholarly attention (See Barnes 1994, Bonsor 1987, Callahan 1985, Corduan 1978, Doud 1983, Hines 1989, Phan 1988, Thompson 1992, Walsh 1977). As for Rahner’s theory of language, scholarship has shown how a coherent system can be constructed from the disparate sources that contain it (See Masson 1979, 224–33; and 1980, 266–72). In developing this previous work, the present article will ex plain how Rahner’s theory is derived from his distinctive meta physics of the symbol. Scholarship is only beginning this discussion, although the centrality of symbolism in Rahner’s thought has been well treated. [See Callahan 1982, Fields 2000 (esp. 6–16, 92–97), Motzko 1976, H. Rahner 1964, Wong 1984.] In addition, this paper will also suggest that an origin of Rahner’s symbolic view of language lies in Heidegger’s aesthetics. Bringing this origin to the fore will lead to a concluding discussion about the debt that Rahner owes his mentor at Freiburg University.

This paper brings Karl Rahner’s understanding of human ex-sistence (L. ex ‘out, forth’ and sistere ‘to stand’)—that is, human ‘standing forth’—to bear upon the phenomenon of black rage in the United States. The reason for this application is the emancipatory potential of Rahner’s transcendental realism, which basically understands human life as a dynamism at once rooted ‘in the world’ and yet called, in obediential potency, to the qualitative ‘more’. Rahner’s anthropological understanding allows for an investigation of the existential struc ture and possibilities of black rage which may benefit black ex-sistence by showing how the dynamism of human life accounts for and justifies this rage as well as what liberating possibilities open up for the enraged.

In the aftermath of the racial disturbances that rocked the United States during the summer of 1967, the official government commission formed to investigate its causes noted: “…certain fundamental matters are clear. Of these, the most fundamental is the racial attitude and behavior of white Americans toward black Americans. Race prejudice has shaped our history decisively; it now threatens to affect our future” (U.S. Riot Commission, 1968, 203; emphasis added). Given the indisputable influence of racism and the ideology of white supremacy upon our national character, Carmichael Peters has done the theological guild a great service in bringing the insights of Karl Rahner to bear upon one of the manifestations of this tragic legacy: the existence of “black rage.” In doing so, Peters seeks to demonstrate the relevance of Rahner’s thought—specifically, what he calls “the emancipatory potential of Rahner’s transcendental realism”—to one of the most neuralgic issues of U.S. public life. This response to Peter’s paper will further this discussion by examining four questions: What is “black rage?” What does Rahner add to our understanding and/or assessment of black rage? What does black rage offer to our understanding of Rahner? What does the phenomenon of black rage tell us regarding the adequacy of the Rahnerian project?

Jean Porter, a noted moral theologian, has argued that Karl Rahner’s influential theory of the fundamental option is of little practical use in actually attempting to live a holy and virtuous life. Thomas Aquinas’ account of the infused virtue of charity, she claims, offers a richer account of the Christian moral life and so is of greater practical use. This essay challenges this assertion by placing Rahner’s notion of fundamental option into dialogue with Thomistic caritas. It argues that the actions that Porter takes to be characteristic of charity—itself a controversial proposition—are themselves in need of greater specification and so not as “concrete” as Porter would have one believe. Beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction must be interpreted in light of diverse historical and cultural circumstances. Rahner recognizes this problem and so is legitimately hesitant to over-specify the demands of neighbor love. Further the Thomistic account of virtues with its commitment to the unity of the virtues is not able to resolve the problem of the “flawed saint” or the virtuous non-believer’s prospects for salvation in the way Rahner’s account can. Thus the Thomistic program is far less detailed than Porter suggests and it involves considerable theological and pastoral costs.