Environmental Ethics

Science generates an image of nature as devoid of meaning or value. and this image makes moral limits on the human manipulation of nature appear irrational. In part. this results from the particular kind of abstraction that constitutes scientific activity. For both epistemological and practical reasons. this abstract ion should not be taken as the only reality of nature. Such mis-taking becomes increasingly Iikely-and dangerous-as science and technology are used in the construction of the world within which we experience nature and ourselves. Three alternative images of nature are discussed to indicate other possibilities. Imaging nature as an interconnected network. a view rooted in both ecology and Buddhism. is a more comprehensive and adcquate foundation for conceptualizing the practical and ethical dimensions of humanity’s relation with nature.

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsic value, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots them deeply in our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed.

The concept offreedom in Heidegger’s sense of truth or unconcealedness of beings may be applied to future generations without thereby reducing the status of other elements within the environment to mere means, since Da-sein’s approach as one who is a caring and concernful, anxious and aware of its own death in an authentic manner, does not place man in any sense “above” other things. This care (Sorge), concern, favor can be captured in Heidegger’s remark that man is not the lord of beings, but rather is “the Shepherd of Being.” Accordingly. we may be able to learn to moderate our ordering andcommanding attitude and learn to “listen” and free beings. letting them be what they truly are. If so, we might then require no special justification in order to extend toward earth, sky, and future persons the same understanding and freeing concern we normally give to, and wish for ourselves.

Despite the 300 years of philosophy separating them. Spinoza and Heidegger are committed to a unifying vision of the human and the natural. Such a perspective encourages a renewed understanding of the place of feelings in environmental studies. Neither untrustworthy reactions nor neutral readings of environmental stimuli, human feelings are the basic way in which we encounter the world. The primordial character of emotions in both Spinoza and Heidegger follows from their commitment to the unity of reality. An understanding of both thinkers opens up being. feeling. and environnlent as the proper subject matter of ecology. Environmental studies will begin to advance again when it dedicates itself to the potential riches of such a unitive vision.

Human awareness of natural beauty stimulates the formation of environmental ethics. I build from the insights of Jonathan Edwards, the American Puritan theologian. The experience of beauty creates and sustains relationships. Natural beauty is an aspect of that which holds things together, supporting life and individuation. Beauty joins experience to ethics. We experience beauty intuitively: it is an affecting experience which motivates thought and action. The experience of beauty gives us a stake in the existence of the beautiful. Ecology can explore the relationships of natural beauty scientifically: it may be a science of the beauty of the Earth. The beauty of the world is necessary to its survival. Beauty is manifest in the interplay of interdependence with individuality, yielding diversity. The most beautiful relationships are those which recognize diversity, support individuality, and empathetically span the distinctions between beings. The sense of beauty is not a luxury, but a distinctive human vocation.

Environmental holism and environmental individualism are based on incompatible notions of moral considerability, and yield incompatible results. For Schopenhauer, every intelligible character--every irreducible instance of formative nature---defines a distinct moral patient, and for hirn both holistic entities and the individual members of higher species have distinguishable intelligible characters. Schopenhauer’s neglected metaethics thus can be used to generate an environmental ethics which is complete in the sense of synthesizing holism and individualism while simultaneously meeting TomRegan’s (implicit) demand that an environmental ethics make moral patients of natural objects.

The medical treatment of wild animals is an accepted practice in our society. Those who take it upon themselves to treat wildlife are well-intentioned and genuinely concerned about their charges. However, the doctoring of sick animals is of extremely limited value and for the most part based on biological illiteracy. It wastes scarce resources and diverts attention from more worthwhile goals. While it is not wrong to minister to wildlife, it is not right either. The person who refuses to do so has not violated any moral duty and is not necessarily morally callous. The treatment of wildlife is based on the mistaken belief that value lies in individual wild animals rather than the entire ecosystern. The genuine concern of those who doctor wild animals should be channeled in to more constructive directions.

Holistic accounts of the natural environment in environmental ethics fail to stress the distinction between the concepts of comnlunity and organism. Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” adds to this confusion, for it can be interpreted as promoting either a community or an organic model of nature. The difference between the two concepts lies in the degree of autonomy possessed by constituent entities within the holistic system. Members within a community are autonomous, while the parts of an organism are not. Different moral conclusions and environmental policies may result from this theoretical distinction. Treating natural entities as parts of an organism downgrades their intrinsic value as individual natural beings, since the only relevant moral criterion in an organic environmental ethic is the instrumental value that each natural entity has for the system. This ethic allows instances of the “substitution problem”-the replacement of one entity in an ecosystem by another provided that the overall functioning of the system is notharmed. However, since substitution violates environmentalist principles, for example, calling for respect for the integrity of the entities in a natural system, an organic environmental ethic must be rejected. A community model focuses on both the functional value and the autonomous intrinsie value of natural entities in a system. A community environmental ethic thus avoids the substitution problem.