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1. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Andrew Tallon Editor’s Page
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2. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Edith Wyschogrod Exemplary Individuals: Towards a Phenomenological Ethics
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To avoid the difficulties that follow from essentialism in ethics, a new account of generality is required. The first half of this paper develops such an account by considering the work of Levinas and of Merleau-Ponty who turn to the incarnate subject as expressing a mode of generality of which universals and essences are derivative types. I call this kind of generality “carnal generality” and the context-specific complexes that exhibit it “carnal generals.” In the second part I turn to paradigmatic lives both within and outside of religious tradition to show how such lives function as carnal generals. I examine some competing claims, Nelson Goodman’s account of samples and Alasdair MacIntyre’s view of the virtues as they bear on resolving ethical disputes, and suggest reasons for preferring a phenomenological view of paradigmatic lives.
3. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Thomas Sheehan Two Easter Legends
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How did faith in the resurrected Jesus arise? Can we reconstruct, or deconstruct, the original Easter story? What are the implications of the empty tomb, the women’s failure to believe, and the lack of appearances in Mark? These questions are raised and a proposal offered in this chapter from the author’s forthcoming book, The First Coming.
4. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Manfred Frings Max Scheler: The Human Person as Pure Temporality
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The central theme is a hitherto unknown explanation of the “temporality” of the person as proposed by the late Max Scheler. The first part deals with the meaning of “absolute time” in general. The second part shows how the temporality of the person is to be seen as “absolute” time on the basis of two opposing principles in man: the “life-center” or impulsion, and “mind” which, without the former, remains powerless, but conjoined with it “become” personal in absolute time.
5. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Christine Gudorf How Will I Recognize My Conscience When I Find It?
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In this article, the activity of conscience around abortion serves as an example to illustrate the thesis that adequate moral decisions require knowing our feelings. Coming to know how and why we feel as we do is a complicated process involving psychoanalytic exploration of the unconscious. In abortion it involves coming face to face with our feelings about our mothers, about motherhood, and about our own infancy and childhood. Failure to come to grips with such feelings allows our unconscious to disguise our feelings to ourselves, and thus to manipulate our moral decisions.
6. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Donald Hatcher Plantinga and Reformed Epistemology: A Critique
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After summarizing Plantinga’s critique of “classical foundationalism” and his substitute, Reformed epistemology, the paper argues that Reformed epistemology has so many problems that it is not an adequate substitute for classical foundationalism. Given Plantinga’s reformed epistemology, believers of any religion could have “knowledge of their God.” This is because Plantinga has not set forth the justifying conditions necessary to distinguish between “properly basic beliefs” as opposed to improperly basic beliefs. Given such problems, it is more reasonable to stick with classical foundationalism rather than Plantinga’s substitute.