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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 36
鄧小 虎
Siu-Fu Tang
The Multi-layered Structure of the Concepts of Nature (xing) and Artifice (wei) in the Xunzi
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本文首先釐清「性」和「偽」在《荀子》中的定義和用法。本文 將指出,「性」和「偽」都各自有兩個定義,並且對於這兩個概念來說,相對應的兩個定義構成一種兩重的結構──即相關的兩個定義並不僅 僅指向該概定的兩個面向,同時彼此之間具有一種遞進的、有層序的 關係。本文將進一步論證,「性」的兩重結構和「偽」的兩重結構可以重疊構成一種三重結構──即人天生的質具,人天生質具的表現和轉 化,以及因此成就的完善人格和文化秩序。這種三重結構不但能澄清 「人之性惡,其善者偽也」的意義,並且印證了《荀子》所說的「性 者、本始材朴也;偽者、文理隆盛也。……性偽合而天下治」。本文亦 將說明,「偽」強調的是人類思慮、反省的能力;「性」、「偽」結合而成的三重結構,描述了人通過思慮、反省的過程,以達致自我轉化和 自我實現。同時,正正是通過這種三重結構,《荀子》證立儒家禮樂的 合理性──禮樂代表了人類的自我規範,而這種自我規範必須通過思 慮和反省才能達成。
This paper analyses the usage of the two concepts of nature (xing) and artifice (wei) in the Xunzi. It will be suggested that each of the two concepts is given two definitions in the Xunzi and that in each case the two definitions form into a two-tier structure. That is, each concept has not only two aspects but the two aspects are also of two stages, one acting as the basis of the other. The two concepts could be further combined and gives us a three-tier structure of human agency. According to such an understanding, the natural endowment of human beings is the target of reflection and transformation. Human beings reflect upon our natural endowment and give it a form of expression, the result of which is human action. Through the accumulation of human action we could construct out of it some normative principles and form human culture. On the one hand, such a three-tier structure of human agency explains why Xunzi thinks that nature of humans is bad and that any good comes from artifice. It is because nature by itself does not have a proper form of expression and will only disrupt agency and give rise to bad consequences. A good form of expression and consequently good action could only be the result of artifice, which consists of perception, reflection and deliberation. On the other hand, such a three-tier structure also explains why Xunzi emphasizes nonetheless that nature and artifice must be joined together to accomplish order and flourishing. For without nature, there is nothing to be reflected upon and to be transformed. The three-tier structure of human agency discloses Xunzi’s vision that human beings are not the slave of our natural endowment but could deliberate and reflect upon our nature so as to bring about self-transformation and self-realisation. It is also through such a structure that Xunzi justifies Confucian rituals, for rituals are self-imposed normsand represent the best form of expression of our nature.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2008 >
Issue: 36
王曉 波
Hsiao-Po Wang
Incorporating Confucianism & Mohism, Combining Min & Fa: “Shi Zi's” Philosophical Thoughts and His Contentions
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劉向《別綠》曰:「楚有尸子,疑謂其在蜀,今按《尸子》書,晉 人也,名佼,秦相衛鞅客也。衛鞅商君謀事畫計,立法理民,未嘗不 與佼規之也。商君被刑,佼恐並誅,乃亡逃入蜀。自為造此二十篇書,凡六萬餘。卒,因葬蜀。」自一九七三年長沙馬王堆出土《黃帝四經》以來,學者漸認識先 秦及漢初所謂「黃老之學」的全貌,才漸理解太史公所謂「道家」為 「因陰陽之大順,采儒墨之善,撮名法之要」,其實是戰國時代興起了 一般整合春秋以來各家學術思想的學風。《尸子》書正如班固所言「兼 儒墨,合名法」,其實還包括了老子哲學和脫離不了陰陽思想,是一本戰國時代的著作,班固無以歸類而歸類之於「雜家」。老子的「道」是一種抽象普遍的原理原則或規律,並不是人的感 官感覺所能認識的,也不是人的主觀意志所能改變的。所以,老子強 調「無為」、「自然」,而「輔萬物之自然而不敢為」、「為之於未有,治 之於未亂」。故《尸子》亦言:「執一之道,去智與巧。」(〈分〉)「(愛 民、好士,力於朝)三者雖異,道一也。是故曰:審一之經,百事乃 成;審一之紀,百事乃理。」(〈發蒙〉)「年老者使塗隙戒突,故終身 無失火之而不知德。」(〈貴言〉)「不出戶而知天下,不下其堂而治四 方,知反之於己者也。」((處道))「明君不用長耳目,不間諜,不強 劉向《別綠》曰:「楚有尸子,疑謂其在蜀,今按《尸子》書,晉 人也,名佼,秦相衛鞅客也。衛鞅商君謀事畫計,立法理民,未嘗不 與佼規之也。商君被刑,佼恐並誅,乃亡逃入蜀。自為造此二十篇書,凡六萬餘。卒,因葬蜀。」 自一九七三年長沙馬王堆出土《黃帝四經》以來,學者漸認識先 秦及漢初所謂「黃老之學」的全貌,才漸理解太史公所謂「道家」為 「因陰陽之大順,采儒墨之善,撮名法之要」,其實是戰國時代興起了 一般整合春秋以來各家學術思想的學風。《尸子》書正如班固所言「兼儒墨,合名法」,其實還包括了老子哲學和脫離不了陰陽思想,是一本 戰國時代的著作,班固無以歸類而歸類之於「雜家」。老子的「道」是一種抽象普遍的原理原則或規律,並不是人的感 官感覺所能認識的,也不是人的主觀意志所能改變的。所以,老子強 調「無為」、「自然」,而「輔萬物之自然而不敢為」、「為之於未有,治 之於未亂」。故《尸子》亦言:「執一之道,去智與巧。」(〈分〉)「(愛 民、好士,力於朝)三者雖異,道一也。是故曰:審一之經,百事乃 成;審一之紀,百事乃理。」(〈發蒙〉)「年老者使塗隙戒突,故終身 無失火之而不知德。」(〈貴言〉)「不出戶而知天下,不下其堂而治四 方,知反之於己者也。」((處道))「明君不用長耳目,不間諜,不強
In Liu Xiang's “Other Records”, it is said: “Shi Zi was in the State of Chu, but probably in (Shu) Sichuan. Now according to the book 'Shi Zi', he has the name 'Jiao' and originally from the State of Jin. He became an adviser to Wei Yang, the prime minister of Qin. He was always consulted in the administration and legislation that Wei Yang (Lord Shang) contemplated and implemented. Later, When Lord Shang was executed, Jiao fearing complicity in and fled to Sichuan. Since then, he completed this book containing 60,000 words in 20 chapters. He died in Sichuan."Since the excavation of Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor at Ma Wang Dui in Chang Sha in 1973, scholars have come to understand the full aspect of the"School of Huang Lao" from the period before Qin to the beginning of Han. What the Royal Historian, Tai Shi Gong had characterized about "Daoism"as " bending to the alternation of Yin and Yang, adopting the positive aspects of Confucianism and Mohism, summing up the essentials of the school of Min(Names) and Fa (Legalist)," the scholars have come to appreciate this being essentially an integration of thoughts at the time of the Warring States from allprevious schools since the period of Spring and Autumn. As Ban Gu said about "Shi Zi", it "incorporates Confucianism and Mohism, combining Min andFa." In fact, it also includes the thoughts of Lao Zi and Yin Yang, and is a work from the Warring States period. Ban Gu classified it as one of the "Miscellaneous Schools."Lao Zi's "Dao" is an abstraction of prevalent principles and laws. It is not something that could be understood through sensory perception or that could be altered subjectively. Thus, Lao Zi emphasizes "non-intervention", "natural", "not to go against the nature of things", "cause over effect". Hence, "Shi Zi" also says in the chapter "Feng": "Once on the right track, no longer need wisdom and techniques." : "(care for the people, appreciate advisers, govern diligently) may appear different, but really belong to the same principle. And thus, in chapter "Fa Mung" :"Once the right analysis is made, it is applicable to every matter; once the right regulation is established, everything is so regulated." In the chapter "Qui Yan": “The old lived in a house without chimney and crack knows no fire alarm all his life.” In the chapter " Chu Dao": "Know the world without setting foot outdoor, govern the world without descending his court, for the principles are the same." In the chapter "Fa Mung": "An aware Lord does not need to enhance his hearing and sight, does not need espionage, does not expressly find out; for he observes when formations appears, listens when sound arrives and reacts when events transpire." "Shi Zi" assume the objectivity and universality of these principles and laws in order to distill and describe the thoughts of the different schools so as to establish its own school of thought. So it is in the study of "Shi Zi", one must grasp what in the original text and then proceed to compare it with Daoism, Confucianism, Mohism and Fa in order to fully interpret its thoughts and contentions.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2008 >
Issue: 36
陳平 坤
Ping-Kun Chen
On the True Reality Doctrine Connotation Revealed by Chi-tsang’s Commentary on The Middle Treatise
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本文的主旨是在探討吉藏疏解龍樹造頌、青目注釋的《中論》文 義時,透過諸如「顛倒」與「非顛倒」、「我」與「無我」、「生滅」與 「無生滅」、乃至「俗諦」與「真諦」等相對概念的往復論議,而嘗試 為我們所開設的「入實相門」,到底涵蘊怎樣的哲學思考。作者希望藉 由本文所從事的思想分析、以及其相關義理的闡發,顯示吉藏佛學中用以回應「所謂『真實』是什麼」、「怎樣才能觀見『真實』」此項重要 議題的一個側面。本文的文獻依據,主要是《中觀論疏》,同時旁及吉藏的其他論著。而所採取的研究進路,則為義理闡釋之進路。至於方法,主要通過對 其概念意涵的解析、問題背景的回復、以及義理涵蘊的追究,來達成 展示吉藏所建「實相」法門之哲學思考的論文目的。本文的主要論點,略可總括如下:(1) 吉藏認為站在「畢竟空」的諸法實相之上,由於「有」、「無」 乃至「一」、「異」等概念皆不可得其真實的建立依據,因此,經論或說「有我」、或說「無我」,乃至或說「常」、或說「無 常」,雖然並非沒有相對的教化意義,但是,施設它們的根本 意趣,卻只在於指歸心遊一切法而皆「無所得」的聖智境界。(2) 吉藏指出眾因緣所生的假相或幻有之法,是不離於「實相之 體」的「實相之用」;而徹底來說,它們「亦是實相」。因此,如果了解幻有或假相的存在本質,即是緣起;進而不住著在 這樣或那樣的幻有、假相之上,便可開啟「實相之門」。(3) 在吉藏論說中,用以引導我們開啟「實相之門」的基本理路,乃是掌握住不離於「因緣」之義的「二諦」教說,來分析、辯明諸如「有」與「無」、「常」與「斷」、乃至「生」與「滅」、「顛倒」與「不顛倒」等法目,根本乃是「二(而)不二」、「不二(而)二」的因緣假說,因此,如果想要逼近真實,就得卸除足以形成虛妄表象的心識運作模式,亦即熄滅那些 不能正觀諸法性相的「異想分別」。
This thesis is aimed to study the approach when Chi-tsang composed verses of commentary on the Nagarjuna founded and Pivgala annotated Middle Treatise(Chung-lun), how, through back and forth debating on the relativistic concepts such as “delusion” and “non-delusion”, “selfness” and “selflessness”, “arising/ceasing” and “non-arising /ceasing”, and finally summing-up to “mundane truth” and “noble truth”, he tried to bring up the notion of the “True Reality of AllDharmas”, and established the philosophical contents of Buddhist teaching. With argumentative analysis and elucidation done in this thesis the author expects to assist fellow scholars to understand and grasp a sideway viewpoint in Chi-tsang’s Buddhist thinking, so as to reflect on the essential philosophical issues of “by what it means to see ‘True Reality’ ”, and/or “what the so-called ‘True Reality’ is.”The bibliography of this thesis mainly consists the Commentary on The Middle Treatise (Chung-kuan-lun Su) and other Buddhist writings and commentary works by Chi-tsang. An Argumentative Explanation Approach is adapted as the study approach; as for the methodology, through conceptual connotation analyzing, subject backgrounds reestablishing, and multilayered probing and summarizing of the dogma, it achieves the goal of illustrating the objective that Chi-tsang set to establish the debates on the True Reality philosophy.The key argumentative points of this article are briefly summarized as follows:Chi-tsang suggests, based on the “Ultimate Emptiness” notion of the true reality of all dharmas dogma, since it is not possible to establish any ideas such as “being” or “non-being” or even “oneness” or “multiplicity”, therefore, when sutras and commentaries write about “selfness” or “selflessness”, or even “permanence” or “impermanence”, although some relativistic pedagogical meanings might exist, nevertheless, in essence the dogma is established with theonly intention to relate all phenomenon to the virtuous status of “nonattainment”. In addition, Chi-tsang points out that every causal dharma of falsephenomenon or illusory existence, at its heart “is real too.” Therefore, if we understand the existence nature of the illusory or false phenomenon dharma, knowing that it is dependent on arising, and furthermore cease to abide by illusory existence or false phenomenon, we then will be able to open the “Door of True Reality”.By the verses of commentary Chi-tsang teaches us the basic conceptual approach to opening the “Door of True Reality”, which is by griping without parting the “Causation” theory of “Two Truths” doctrine, to carry out analyzing and differentiating issues such as “being” and “non-being”, “permanency” and “non-permanency”, and even “arising” and “ceasing”, “delusion” and “non-delusion”, knowing that basically they are no more than causal hypothesis of “duality but non-duality” or “non-duality but duality”, therefore, in order to approximate the truth, we must liberate ourselves from the mental processing style which forms illusory external phenomena, that is to say, we need to extinguish “differential false thinking” which stops us from observing correctly the genuine truth of dharmas.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2008 >
Issue: 36
蔡龍 九
Lung-Chiu Tsai
Some Observations on Chen Chien’s The Clarification of the Veiled Theories (Hsueh-Pu-Tung-Pien): It’s Merits and Flaws
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本文探究《學蔀通辨》對於《朱子晚年定論》、《道一編》等傾向 於朱陸調和之作品,所提出的批評內容。分別探討《學蔀通辨》中的 合理處與失誤處,並說明理由,以及此書批評效果。最後,衡定《學 蔀通辨》,並總結此書的貢獻及失誤,依此反省「朱陸異同」之爭論,是否有更清晰的處理方式。
This paper aims to explore Chen Chien’s The Clarification of the Veiled Theories (Hsueh-Pu-Tung-Pien), specifically his comments on Wang Yang-ming’s The Later Chu Hsi: The Conclusion (Chu-Tzu-Wan-Nien-Ting-Lun) and Cheng Min-cheng’s The Way Is One(Tao-I-Pien), which, according to Chen, suffer from the same fault of reconciling and combining Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan. I will begin with a thorough investigation on Chen’s comments, sorting out as well as explaining the book’s merits and flaws, and weigh its intended effect. I endeavor to reevaluate this book in the hope of bring out a more constructive perspective on the issues concerning the reflections on the similarities and dissimilarities between Chu and Lu.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 36
吳澤 玫
Tse-Mei Wu
On Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason
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本文的目的在於闡明羅爾斯的公共理性觀念,並對之提出分析與 批判。對羅爾斯而言,公共理性是民主公民身份的一種理想,它要求 人們只能根據所有公民都能合理接受的理由來進行基本政治問題的討 論。於是,公共理性可以在當代自由社會具合理多元的既定事實下,促成政治共識的產生。在這篇文章裡,筆者首先檢視羅爾斯提出的公共理性觀念。其次,筆者將討論四種對公共理性的批評。第三,筆者將分析羅爾斯晚期對 公共理性觀念的修正是否、以及如何能夠對這些批評做出回應。在結 論中筆者將指出,若缺乏具良好素養的公民,則羅爾斯依然無法解決 群眾理性的問題。
The aim of this essay is to elucidate John Rawls’s idea of public reason and its limits. According to Rawls, public reason is an ideal of democratic citizenship,which requires that the public discussion of fundamental political questions should be conducted solely in terms of reasons all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. Public reason can therefore produce a political consensus given the fact of reasonable pluralism of a liberal society.In this essay, I will begin by examining the idea of public reason proposed by Rawls. Next, I will consider four objections to this idea. Third, I will critically analyze whether and how the modified view of Rawls’s latest thoughts on public reason can reply to these objections. In conclusion, I point out that, without well-educated citizens, Rawls cannot resolve the problem of plebiscitory reason.
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