NTU Philosophical Review

This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number of interpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false.Moreover, in this article I will point out that by putting forward the Third Man Argument, Plato does not really intend to raise a criticism of his own theory. Rather, the two versions of the Third Man Argument, which are set out in Parmenides 132a1-b2 and 132d1-133a7 respectively, should be considered as his warnings against the possible misunderstandings concerning the relationship between Forms and particulars, i.e. the relationship of “participation.” In other words, if we mistakenly interpret the conception of participation in a materialistic manner, the Theory of Forms will inevitably be caught in the “Largeness Regress”; and if we comprehend the relationship of participation in terms of the “likeness” between Forms and particulars, and consider the later to be a symmetrical relation, then the Theory of Forms must fall into the “Likeness Regress.”

This paper argues against grounding the normativity of the judgment of taste on morality, and argues that the uniqueness of aesthetic normativity can beclarified through the distinctive status and function of the modality of the judgment of taste, and that the normative content of the judgment of taste constitutes the content of the judgment itself. Two distinct notions of sensus communis－pure sensus communis and ideal sensus communis—are strictly discriminated by applying the constitutive/regulative distinction, which can be seen in the following two contexts: the distinction between law of understanding and principle of reason, and the distinction between mathematical law and dynamic law. ‘Pure sensus communis’ is the effect of the free play of imagination and understanding; it is not only a feeling, but also a capacity for feeling (taste) and a constitutive norm and principle of the judgment. ‘Ideal sensus communis’ is the a priori connection between pure sensus communis and moral feeling; it is the effect of the harmony among imagination, understanding and reason. With respect to the normative force, pure sensus communis is analogous to dynamic law of understanding (for example, the law of causality); nevertheless, ideal sensus communis is regulative for the judgment of taste, just as principle of reason is regulative for empirical judgment. Beauty can symbolize morality precisely because the pleasure of taste is pure, but not vice versa; otherwise the autonomy of taste would be violated. Taste can be guided in its purposive self-sharpening and self-purifying by ideal sensus communis to enhance humanity, so that it becomes “pragmatically” possible to ground a world in concordance with moral ideal through the enhancement of humanity. In the end, this paper argues that the reason why Kant seems to ground beauty on morality lies in the pragmatic significance of his critical natural teleology.

The discussion in this article is about the criticism to Hu Hong in The doubt of Zhi yan Proposed by Zhu Hsi. The author is aiming to clear the dissimilar wayof thinking between the two philosophers to the effect that both their significant theory could be appeared. Hu Hong’s philosophical announcement alwaysintegrates the ontological and practical theory, which results to the ambiguity and give rise to the criticism from Zhu Hsi. Zhu Hsi possessed the position of thegoodness of nature to query Hu Hong about his no good and no evil opinion toward the theory of the human nature. In the definition of the mind and nature,master Zhu Hsi proposed the mind comprise the nature and the felling and argued with Hu Hong’s different opining. Concerning about the practical procedure theory, Zhu Hsi insist the cultivation should be built on daily life, and critic Hu Hong’s philosophy being short of this understanding. In this article the author will use the interpretational structure of the practical theory and the theory of being to analyze the different consciousness in these two systems and suggest that there exist no real conflict between them so as to explain both their philosophical thinking.

Most of the Western philosophers regard self-consciousness as a problem of theoretical philosophy, and conscience as a problem of practical philosophy.Both of them belong to different areas of philosophy. In contrast with this, some philosophers in the tradition of Confucianism tend to ascribe both concepts topractical philosophy. This tendency reaches its highest point in the writings of Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), the most important representative of ContemporaryNeo-Confucianism. Fichte (1762-1814) is one of few Western philosophers, who regard both concepts as the problems of practical philosophy. It’s worthy tonotice that both Mou Zongsan and Fichte come to this conclusion by criticizing Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. I argue in this paper the following two points: (1) Mou Zongsan and Fichte have similar idea of practical self-consciousness. (2) Mou Zongsan identifies practical self-consciousness with conscience; on the contrary, Fichte holds them to be heterogeneous, the former is pure thinking and the latter sensible feeling.