Roczniki Filozoficzne

In this article, the author attempts to answer the questions: 1. Is traditional natural philosophy really an intermediary science? 2. What is the source of the difference in views on the place of natural philosophy among other philosophic disciplines?On the basis of texts from St. Thomas Aquinas, chiefly from. In librum Boethii de, Trinitale and from the Commentary to the Physics of Aristotle, the author demonstrates that from the historical point of view, traditional natural philosophy cannot be regarded as an intermediary science as Ph. Selvaggi believes. In antiquity and in the Middle Ages, the intermediary sciences were, above all, astronomy, geometrical optics and music. Aristotle himself and St. Thomas Aquinas never treated traditional physics as an intermediary science.The reason why some neoscholastics put natural philosophy in the first degree and others place it in the third degree of abstraction is that the difference between the Stagirite and Aquinas—as regards the description of material beings in normal language and the explanation of the structure and changes in these beings bÿ mèans of a metaphysical system of concepts — has not been fully realized. Those who find the centre of gravity of natural philosophy in a description of the material world including matter knowable by the senses; put natural philosophy in the first degree of abstraction, and those who emphatize the explanation of material reality with help of metaphysics place it in the third degree of abstraction.Although traditional natural philosophy employs metaphysical terms, it should be placed in the first degree of abstraction, since it differs from metaphysics in its method of defining concepts.

On peut assembler de cette façon les conceptions de l’objet de la philosophie de la nature qui se trouvent en dehors du mouvement néo-scolastique, en les groupant par les courants qui sont le plus éloignés dans leur contenu des concepts de la néo-scolastique: a) les conceptions, selon lesquelles la philosophie de la nature doit constituer la représentation synthétique des résultats les plus généraux à laquelle arrivent les sciences naturelles (Erich Becher, Bernhard Bavink dans la première phase de ses opinions, Adam Schaff et les autres marxistes, Raymond Ruyer);b) les conceptions de la philosophie de la nature, qui en dehors de la fonction de la représentation synthétique de plus généraux résultats des sciences naturelles lui accordent encore une analyse épistémologique et méthodologique de la connaissance scientifique (Wilhelm Ostwald, Wladislas Biegański);c) les conceptions de la philosophie de la nature qui la réduisent entièrement à une analyse épistémologique et méthodologique de la connaissance scientifique (E. W. Beth, Auguste Guzzo);d) les conceptions de la philosophie de la nature qui englobent dans une certaine mesure lès questions qui se trouvent en dehors des recherches d’un naturaliste et d’un théoricien des connaissances scientifiques (Bavink dans la période plus tardive de sa vie, Boleslas Gawęcki, Joachim Metallman, Nicolai Hartmann).Quelles sont les remarques au sujet de ces conceptions si nous les prennons séparément?Aujourd’hui, nous pouvons apercevoir, sans difficultés, ce qu’on n’a pas vu auparavant à cause de certaines circonstances historiques qu’il y a un autre objet de la recherche scientifique quand pour le but des considérations philosophiques* nous prennons les sciences naturelles — et un autre quand ce but est formé par les méditations philosophiques au sujet de la nature.D’où, contrairement à ce que prétendait Bavink dans Die Hauptfragen der heutigen Naturphilosophie (Berlin 1928) nous ne pouvons pas découvrir dans la théorie générale de la connaissance, appliquée d’habitude à des sciences naturelles et de la méthodologie générale des sciences, aucune partie intégrale de la philosophie de la nature. Gomme a remarqué Gawęcki, „la dénomination de la philosophie ou de la théorie des sciences naturelles et non pas des sciences tout court, semble être plus juste pour la critique des notions élémentaires et des principes [des sciences avant tout naturelles].“ Dans la littérature philosophique polonaise, Henri Struve remarquait déjà que „la philosophie de la nature et la philosophie des sciences naturelles — ce sont deux branches tout à fait distinctes qui se complètent réciproquement mais on ne doit pas les confondre“.Puis, il faut dire au sujet de la conception de la philosophie de la nature comme d’une synthèse des résultats des sciences naturelles que si une telle synthèse aurait été réalisée, elle serait „quelque chose de neuf ce qu’on ne trouve pas encore dans les résultats mêmes des sciences spéciales“, mais, pourtant, on ne pourrait pas appeler la philosophie de la nature une science qui représenterait une telle synthèse, car elle ne s’occuperait pas des problèmes d’autre ordre en comparaison avec les problèmes des sciences naturelles. On ne peut pas oublier les difficultés qu’on trouve en liaison avec les perceptions du but de la philosophie de la nature dans la réalisation de la synthèse des résultats des sciences naturelles. Metallman connaissait bien ces difficultés. Il voit une difficulté en ce que cette synthèse devrait se faire avec le facteur de la sélection, liée avec certains points de vue conducteurs; cependant, les sciences naturelles ne nous montreront pas ces points de vue et c’est pourquoi „elles ne nous amèneront pas ni à l’une ni à l’autre synthèse“, qui est possible seulement quand on fixe l’objet à la philosophie de la nature. Metallman voit une autre difficulté dans l’union des résultats des sciences naturelles en une image incontestable, dont la formation est seulement possible après l’éloignement de certaines hypothèses des sciences naturelles, par conséquent de tout cela ce que dans les sciences de la nature suscite de nouveaux problèmes et pousse à résoudre. Enfin, si la dite synthèse doit lier dans sa trame des hypothèses, même si ces hypothèses en prennent la première place, c’est ainsi, affirme Metallman, la philosophie de la nature, concentrée à la formation de cette synthèse „serait une fonction non seulement des sciences naturelles comme une science positive de la nature, mais en même temps une fonction des hypothèses particulières physiques, biologiques ou cosmologiques. Elle dépenderait de leur sort, du succès des certaines méthodes de la recherche“.

The article is a philosophical attempt to solve the problem of quantum space. The problem has not been solved by experiment nor by arithmetical formalism so that the author makes use of analogy. The starting-point is the electromagnetic wave (EM). Hitherto, our ideas about the EM wave are the result of macroscopic mathematical operations. The EM wave should be subjected to logical analysis and abstraction if we wish to grasp its essential features. The essential features may be considered as: 1. the dualism of the energie natures E and H, 2. the perpendicular relation E ┴ H, 3. the impossibility of determining the priority of E or H (electromagnetic unidentifity), 4. the most generally accepted symmetry E = h (E = not H) and H = Ē (H = not E), 5. the passage is made from E to H and from H to E by reflection and turning in another plane, 6. the passage is made through „electromagnetic zero“, 7. an element of the EM wave is E ┴ W ┴ H, where W is the vector of propagation, 8. an element of the EM wave realizes tetradic geometry, generally quadrupol (fig. 1 and 2).The elementary unit of space also probably realizes tetradic geometry. We shall continue to call the hypothetical quantum of electromagnetic space a magnel (abbrev. mgl.). It corresponds to a quadrupol. The author analyses the constructive geometry of a tetrahedron. Two polar sections, perpendicular to each other, at a distance W, give the tetrahedron of forces, in other words the quadrupol. The construction of a tetrahedron is an example of the passage from one dimension to space.What type of geometry is there in matter? For the appraisal of crystalline bodies the right tetrahedron is generally accepted (fig. 3). In certain conditions matter is always crystalline. Many crystalochemical substances have a tetradic configuration (table 1). At least 90% of matter has tetradic geometry. The spaces between the maximum close — packing of atoms are also tetrahedrons (fig. 4).Within the atomic nucleus we find tetradic geometry on the basis of the quadrupol electric moment. Complete atoms also give out quadrupol radiation. The form of the system is concluded from the radiation. Matter in quantities increasing from the atomic nucleus up to the crystalochemical groups, uses tetradic geometry. Similarly it can be assumed that the same geometry is in force within the scale of a quantum of space — a magnel — just as on a megascopic scale. A ray of light does not go round the Universe on the inner side of a sphere, as Einstein held, but on the inner plane of a tetrahedron (fig. 5) and thus in a closed system of 3 hyperbola.The arisal of a photon depends on the zero movement of a vacuum (the interior movement of a magnel). It polarizes neighbouring magnels. In view of the symmetry of matter and the tetradic geometry of matter, there ought to exist magnels (fig. 6a) and antimagnels (fig. 6b). The antimagnel is an ideal figure of infinitely thin walls separating 4 negative hyperboidal planes. Polarisation is transferred as a fluctuation of the vacuum. With interference and superposition of fluctuation energetic condensation may arise. The springy deformation of the magnel gives the quantum of radiation EM. The photon moves like the recombination wave of the magnel. The return to the normal granularity of space is linked with the emission of the photon. The laws of condensation of energy and geometrical contraction are general laws of matter from the magnel through elementary particles (the arisal of pairs and annihilation), atomic nuclei, atoms, to nebulae inclusive. The effect is the same — the emission of a quantum of light.The author discusses the method of analogy which he has used. It is based on three principles: abstraction, proper analogy, interpolation. By abstraction essential elements, in this case the EM wave, are comprehended. By analogy, the results of abstraction are applied to matter of another order of size. Interpolation fills in the missing elements in some level (fig. 7). A philosophical method so conceived, for investigating physical phenomena, may be useful in cases where it is not possible to use the experimental method, or where a formal method is missing.

St. Thomas is considered the author of the doctrine of the unity of the substantial form. The question arises: did St. Thomas accept this doctrine from the first days of his scholarly work at the University of Paris, or did he evolve from the traditional pluralistic doctrine to the thesis of the unity of the substantial form? Many historians of philosophy, such as M. Wittmann, M. de Wulf, R. Zavalloni, on the basis of texts from the Commentary to the „Sententia“ (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, and In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1) concerning corporeal form, hold that there was a significant evolution in the views of St. Thomas. In their opinion, at the commencement of his scholastic career, St. Thomas allowed a plurality of substantial forms in being. Matter would first receive a corporeal form which is its basic definition, and by means of it would be prepared for the reception of other, higher forms. An analysis of the texts containing the expression „forma corporei- tatis“ carried out chronologically and with regard to the declarations of Thomas concerning the unity of form, coming from the same period as the controversial texts from the Commentary to the „Sententia“ allows us to state that there was no essential evolution in the views of Aquinas. The controversial texts can also be interpreted in the spirit of the unity of substantial form. St. Thomas very early worked out a philosophical synthesis and excluded the plurality of substantial forms. The acceptance of a form of corporeality necessarily leads to pluralism of forms in being. It is possible to speak of a significant evolution in the doctrine of St. Thomas if we acknowledge the little work De natura materiae as authentic. But, as J. M. Wyss demonstrated, St. Thomas could not be the author of that work.

Aristotle distinguished three kinds of categories of quantity: continuum, con- tiguum and consequenter se habens. The Stagyrite also gives their definitions. In this note it was shown that the Aristotelian division of quantity and7the definitions themselves are no longer adequate today. In modern mathematics there are known sets which cannot be included in any of the kinds of quantities distinguished by Aristotle. In addition, the definitions themselves are not, in view of known concepts in settheoretical topology, sufficiently accurate and precise. In this note the distinction is proposed between a unified quantity in the integral and local sense. Definitions of the concepts mentioned are also given.

We find no clear definition of determinism in the works of Bohm. He distinguishes between complete and incomplete determinism. The idea of complete determinism was quantitatively expressed by Newton’s law which enables us to determine the state of a system in a given situation at any moment t and the velocity of the system at the moment t0. This type of determinism was queried by quantum mechanics, since, in accordance with the principle of non-determination, the inconstants of a system cannot be established with accuracy. In quantum mechanics, statistical laws govern: they take the place of deterministic laws and are the expression of incomplete determinism.Bohm very clearly distinguishes the concept of determinism from the concept of causality. There are three groups of views, at present, on the question of the mutual relation of the concepts of causality and determinism. In the first group of views it is held that the concept of causality is superior to the concept of determinism (L. de Broglie, F. S. G. Northrop). Those authors (A. S. Eddington, H. Reichenbach) in the second group do not usually distinguish causality from determinism, and for them a major part of the Concept of Causality is the concept of foreseeing. Those authors (D. Bohm, M. Bunge, J. Metallmann) who can be included in a third group accept the relationship of the superiority of the concept of determinism over the concept of causality. The principal thesis of this view-point is: there are various kinds of laws of nature, e. g. causal laws, statistical laws. The concept of causality cannot be identified with the concept of determinism since it is equally possible to speak of causal determinism depending on what kind of laws are distinguished. Each new kind of laws of nature significantly enriches determinism.

The article presents the essential ideas of the steady-state theory of the Universe together with an attempt at an appraisal of the criticisms which have been levelled against it. The hypothesis of the „continual creation of matter“ is objected to as metaphysical and foreign to the spirit of the natural sciences. However, an analysis of steady-state cosmology as a physical theory indicates that it does not lose its place among the natural sciences so long as it is not demonstrated that 1. nothing can be foreseen from it which is capable of experimental verification (the cosmological indeterminancy principle of Mc Créa), or 2. that what can be foressen from it is contrary to the present state of things.

Everything that exists (every being) in philosophical considerations, should, in Ingarden’s opinion be seen from three different points of view: a) the means of existence, b) the form, c) the material possessions. It then appears that a critical analysis of the solutions of Ingarden on the structure of reality ought to be preceded by a clear realization of the substance which is contained within these three concepts. The aim of the present article is to examine the question from the viewpoints of matter and form.It is necessary primarily to state clearly that the concepts of matter and form, in the conception discussed, have nothing in common as regards meaning with analogical concepts of Aristotle; in connection with this, Ingarden speaks of catégorial matter and form, or of matter and form in the sense of formal ontology. Matter, according to Ingarden, is everything in being which possesses a qualitative character (all qualities), while form is here a collection of functions which are filled by the various „moments“ of qualitative character. Qualities which are matter should be understood in the broadest sense; so here belong, e. g. redness, smoothness, spatial form etc. Formal moments are such „functions“ as defining something, being an subject, being a property, filling the role of constitutive nature or of the essence (both terms with a special meaning), acting in some manner or being acted upon, unambiguous defiriition or heving something missing from one’s attributes etc. Differences in formal structure allow us to segregate reality into certain groups while form is like a schemat occurring in all identities belonging to a given group. Ingarden’s concept of form appears therefore to be similar in content to the Peripatetic concept of category. It is also possible to observe a certain analogy to that understanding of the term „form“ which we find in contemporary logic.Among various formal moments, a particularly important one is that of subject of property — property. These belong closely together, forming one „basic form for every object“. In addition to objective form, in beings there are yet other formal structures with analogical contrast, and the necessary complementary moments, such as: subject of action — action (process), whole — part, sphere or class — element of the sphere or class. Analysis of the various formal structures shows, however that they are all in some way based upon individual objects, which may be the basis for other entities in a two-fold manner: as „carriers“ of processes and as „part“ of objects of o higher orders. At first there seems to be a certain analogy to the Aristotelian differentiation between substantial and affective beings. Closer comparison of the two conceptions of „basic form“, however, shows essential differences.Matter and form, for Ingarden, are two „sides'" of the same entity and as such are existentially non-independent and indivisible. Material attribute (especially of a constitutive nature) is always basic to being, and it, in some way, determines formal structure. A more exact explanation of the connection between the two factors is very difficult.In his conception of matter and form Ingarden deliberately and directly refers to Aristotle and combines the exposition of his own views with a critique of the standpoint of the Stagirite. The essence of this is a demonstration of contradictions in Aristotle’s concept of matter. It appears, however, that the whole of this critique is based on a misunderstanding and is the result of making non-independent „elements“ of being into „rei“, treating first matter as a „concrete object“. But in Aristotle’s view, matter is an „element“ of its nature non-independent, only real in real existence. The cause of these misunderstandings appears to lie in the specific structure of the language, not adapted to the conceptual grasping of non-independent states of being.