NTU Philosophical Review

近來兩岸雙邊文化對話或相互交流，不僅是量的增加，在質 方面也有進展。本文探討的重點並非是對這種工作做評估，而是 討論其中被隱藏或刻意迴避的課題:意識型態的衝突。我們將採 取以下的方式討論之:首先，文化對話或文化交流基本上是有益於邁向兩岸相互了 解的第一步O但是，這並不能解決實際的問題，因為，如果沒有 小心處理雙方對話的動機，則所獲得的所謂成果就是不充份的或 是偏見的O因此，我們必須討論動機的問題。其次，文化衝突永遠都可以反映出人類利益衝突的事實。意 識型態，如同文化一般，表達出一個人民、種族、類型的共通 性，但不同於文化的是，意識型態密切關係著人類上層建築( supra 叫ructure )的一致性;文化則有助於轉化能力與權力表 白，它可以維護利益，獲取或整合權力，而且與塑造社會中的 上、下層建築都有牽連。第三，意識型態的對話只有在全面性的觀念上討論人的生 活，以及試圖處理人類與生俱來的利益街突的導引下，才有可能 成功。為了證明這些論點，我們採取批判的與理性的進路，以及部 分黑格爾式的辯證O首先，我們要批判立基於差異( difference ) 和二元論( dualism) 的意識型態， 以顯示這些意識型態最多只 能產生一些單一的、局部的、非歷史的綜合O在陳述這樣一個為 差異或為錯誤的合一性差異性辯證後，我們接著討論真實的綜合 辯證'這種辯證可以去除局部的、非歷史的以及單一的綜合(錯 誤意識型態) ，以達致人類生命的真實性揚棄( authentical Aufhebung) 。 這篇論文包含三個部分: 第一部份處理非真實性 的差異辯証，第二部份分析去差異(de-differentiation) 的辯證 歷程，以及，最後提出一個解決意識型態衝突的途徑。

In this paper I discuss whether Lehrer' s theory of justification is able to overcome the isolation problem which purpots to show the internal relations do not guarantee truth about the world. Lehrer defends his coherence theory by claiming that our acceptance system contains not only what we accept about the external world but what we accept about our relationship to that world, including what we accept about the conditions under which we are reliable or trustworthy. This is to say that complete justification involves the reliability of the acceptance system and the acceptance of that reliability. I argue that Lehrer's defense is not successful.

What are Confucius' thoughts at his old age really like? This is a question which has been brought out for discussion ever since. In this paper the author has addressed himself to the relation between Chou-i and Confucius' thoughts in his later life in five chapters, that is1. Preface2. Development of Confucius' thoughts thru his whole life3. Discussion on the relation between Confucius and C'hou-i4. Speculation on Confucius' thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven at his late age5. Conclusion.As the author has acquired a new understanding of the implication in chapters relative to analect (5:12) and 'Hsu-Tuan Hsi-hsiang Shuo-Kuo Wen-Yen' of Shih Chi Kung-Tze-ShihChia, the I-Chuan in silk recently unearthed and the results of academic research over the past decade have further provided him with room for even more profound thinking as to make him realize that Confucius had once reorganized, researched, addressed and written about Chou-i. In his entire life, Confucius learned Chou-i when young but delighted in it during his later days. His attitude toward Chou-i had changed from “No prognostication" to “introducing prognostication" to moral teaching. All of these have shown that Confucius' lifelong thoughts had undergone a substantial change. In a word, Confucius did develop the thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven as recorded in “Ten Wngs." Futher more, I-Chuan of today's version was not entirely a work of Confucius', however, it did have some bearing on Confucius. For this reason, the author has refuted in the paper the arguments put forward in the past which completely denied the relation between Chou-i and Confucius and considered “Ten Wings" anything but a work full of Confucius' thoughts. The author believes that we cannot help focusing on the T'uan-Chuan with the aid of "Hien-y en Chuan, Hs'i-tz'u Chuan when we discuss theConfucius' thoughts at his old age to understand Confucius' thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven, order of Heaven and human nature.

The article is divided into four sections, i.e.,Section I: Traditional Metaphysics on TruthSection II: A Response from Gabriel MarcelSection III: Truth as Seen from the Perspective of LoveSection IV: The Interconnectedness between Love and TruthThomas Aquinas, as the representative of classical metaphysicians, proposes that truth is the adequation between one's intellect and its object. From the perspective of the object known, truth has its foundation in the intelligibility of the thing itself. Whereas, from the perspective of the knower, truth is the conformity of one's knowing, (especially one's judgment), to the actual content of the known object. Moreower, from the perspective of the Ultimate Being, truth has its highest manifestation in God's Noesis Noeseos.To such a thesis, Marcel has the following responses:1. Truth is not only an adequation between the intellect and the thing known, it is also a value I cherish so that I may even give up my life in order to bear witness to truth, as inthe case of Bruno's martyrdom.2. The intelligibility of the thing known can be regarded as its process of unconcealment, as explained by Martin Heidegger.3. As to the person who knows, the process of unconcealment also includes the courage to 'face' the truth on the part of the subject, as in the case of the parents' final willing to admit that their child is abnormal.4. From the perspective of the Divine Being, Marcel would be willing 10 emphasize that man's exigence for transcendence reveals the fact of God being the Ultimate Source of Truth and Light.If we reflect on the essence of truth from the eye of love, we may come to know that the more we love a being, the deeper we may penetrate into the core of her existence. Thelove from the part of the lover makes possible the beloved to manifest herself in a possitive manner. And, the love one has enables the lover to open his heart to the beloved so that he may allow himself to receive the revelation of the beloved to the fullest possible extent. Furthermore, from the inner life of the Divine, His Noesis Noeseos is no difference from His perfect love of Himself and of His creatures, since God is Truth and Love as such.Hence, we may conclude that the names of ' truth' and 'love' are convertible to one another; and, love can be regarded as a Transcendental Attribute on the par of the One, the True, the Good , and the Beautiful.

In this essay, I address a holistic account of the ontological commitment of Gadamer's conception of play. The analysis consists of three parts. The first is to point out that certain basic characteristics of play are in essence some characteristics of Being. On the basis of this observation, as I further argue, an approach to a preliminary view of Being can be figured out. Secondly, I show the relationship between Being and man in virtue of an analysis of the relation between play and man. And finally, I argue that the play of Being is in some sort of sense a language game; and Being and man are to be mediated as a phenomenological unity in a language game of this type. Details of this holistic account of the ontological commitment of Gadamer's conception of play are discussed.

自然演繹系統( ntural deduction systems) ，依其創始者G . Gentzen 之立意， 係指僅只由一組設定之推衍規則 (rules of inference) 所構成的邏輯系統。 而在此類系統中， 一個推衍之建構 (the construction of a derivation) 係由某些特定的假設出發， 利 用適當的規衍規則逐步推論出所要的結論。由於此類系統不預設 任何設基(axims) ，因而得以避免有關設基是否為真的哲學爭 論。復次，系統中每一規則的訂定，概皆依循相對應之邏輯連詞 (connectives) 之真值表， 如此一來， 推衍的運作可以「自然 地」按照吾人對於相對應之連詞之(真值表)理解而進行。例 如，若由假設P成立，可推知Q亦成立，吾人可斷盲P→ Q成 立。 此一推衍顯示結論中的「→」並沒有出現在前提人指P與 Q) 中， 因此， 欲由前提得知P →Q' 吾人需建立一規則可資 引進 (introduce) I → J 記號。職是吾人可設一「引進」→ 規則 (introduction rule for →) 來進行上述推衍O相對地，假設 (P → Q) 成立而且P成立，吾人可推衍出Q成立，此一推衍顯示 在提出現的→記號已不復出現在結論中。因此，吾人可設定一 「消去J→規則(Elimination rule for →)來進行上述推衍。 整 個自然演繹法的建立即在於將此一基本方法應用至所有之連詞。 若然對應於每一連詞都有一組「消去規則J與「引進規則 ˩ '吾 人可得以「自然地」進行任何語旬的推衍。由於上述優點，自然 演繹系統已成為一般認為最優雅的表現方式。然則，本文將指出，在一個滿足的自然演繹系統中，對於每 一個連詞而言，都應有一組自然的「消去規則」與「引進規 則˩ 。 而且， 更重要的， 此一組規則必需是局部完備的( Local complete) 。所謂一組規則是局部完備的系指所有的中效的句式 (Valid Sequents) ，若其只合此一組規則所關連之連詞。則此一句式可只藉由此一組規則推衍而得。很明顯地，在一般常見的自 然演繹系統中，對應對「 ˅ ˩ 與「 ˄ ˩ 的一組規則， 如Van Dalen d { ( ˄ I) , ( ˄ E) } 與 { ( ˅ I),( ˅ E) }， 即各其備此- 條 件。 更且， 所有中效的句式若其連詞只包含 ˄ 與˅ ， 則此的句式 可利用此兩組規則推衍而得O因此，若針對每一連詞，都有一組 完備的規則，則整個系統自然是完備的。就命題邏輯而育，吾人已知{ ¬， ˅ } 或 { ¬ ，˄ }是一組完 整的連詞，意謂任一命題皆可利用一只包括¬ 與˅的語式( formula) 來表現。 因此， 若對於¬而盲， 吾人亦可建立一組完備且自然的規則，則此一組規則加上對於「而育，另一組對於{¬ ˅ v} 或者{¬ ˅} 的規則都可組合成一個完備且自然的演繹系 統。然而，本文將討論並指出，目前所常見的否定記號之推衍規 則，有些雖是完備的但不夠自然，有此雖是自然的，但本身並非 完備，此一觀察顯示出自然演繹系統並非如一般所認為的優雅。就其「自然性」而吉似乎比樹枝法( tableau system) 要略遜一 籌。 就規則組之局部完備性而吉顯然又不如Sequent Calculi 。

The two objects of moral judgement are man and conduct. there are accordingly two kinds of rnoral judgement. In order to distinguish these two categories some ethicist introduce the two terms “moral goodness" and “moral rightness": “moral-goodness" for the judgement of man's morality; and “moral rightness" for describing the moral quality of conduct. Such distinction can be traced back to G. E. Moore's “Principia Ethica". German scholar B. Schuller also adopted it to his study of moral theology.These two terms are widely used by modern ethicists nowadays. Nevertheless, there are few systematic discussions about them, and some ethicists still doubt about their plausibility and even their necessity. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the issue in width and depth before we use them. To this purpose this artical is divided into three parts: firstly, historical background of the distinction; secondly, detailed clarification of the definitions of “moral goodness" and “moral rightness" and their relationship: lastly, the importance of this distinction in foundamental ethics.

Ronald Dworkin introduces a tripartite classification into political theories, viz., duty-based, goal-based, and right-based theories. J. L. Mackie extends this classification into moral theores. He argues that in addition to duty-based moral theories (e.g. , Kant's theory) and goal-based moral theories (e.g., Utilitarianism), a right-based moral theory is both conceptually possible and morally more desirable. This paper first attempts to analyze the characteristics of Mackie's right-based nioral theory in particular, and any right-'based moral theory in general. The present author then contends that there are three major weaknesses of such theories: (1) They over-simplify the relation between duties and rights;, (2) they fail to provide adequate guidance to moral life; (3) they cannot account for the true moral significance of supererogation and virtue. Accordingly, the present author agrees that a right-based moral theory is morally truncated and impoverished. It captures only a minimalist ethics. This is because there is a two-fold fundamental error of a right based moral theory, viz., it misplaces the moral subject, and it captures the point or object of morality only partially.The rejection of a right-based moral theory does not imply a rejection of rights. On the contrary, this paper continues to argue for the importance of rights in moral life, andthe priority of rights over duties in some cases. In other words, though rights cannot furnish the sufficient basis of morality, it does provide its necessary basis.

本篇文章題目為『馬里旦道德判斷方法論』。許多人認為馬里 旦 (Jacques Maritain) 是本世紀多瑪斯學派的權威。他治學過 人之處，是能以創新的方法，將現代哲學及科學的精華曳融合於 多瑪斯偉大的哲學和神學理論中。馬里旦的思想廣博，涵蓋的範 圍包括形上學、認識論、自然哲學、政治與社會哲學及人學與倫 理學。他的政治思想和社會倫理觀念，對歐洲及拉丁美洲影響深 遠。馬里旦希望教導現代人概念及判斷的正確觀念。他撰寫過多 篇文章概述「判斷」的問題，而其中著墨最多的部份便是「道德 判斷」。任何道德判斷方法論都必須面對一個基本問題:如何將 普遍的道德概念，融合於道德主體特定的其體判斷中?換吉之， 基於個人獨特的倫理主體性 (moral subjectivity) ，在一特定情 況下， 「 人類主體」 (human subject) 是如何決定要運用哪些 普通準則?要如何將這些準則付諸實現呢?為了解馬里且如何將客體的普遍道德觀與倫理主體性相結 合，我們將探討下列主題:其一，馬里且對其體道德判斷之架構 及其動態過程 (dynamism) 的看法。 其二， 實際運用普遍道德 原則時的困難。馬里且認為康德和齊克果 (Kierkegaard) 皆未 能解釋道德判斷;我們將利用他在這方面的研究做為例子。其三，馬里且如何運用其對自然道德律的認識，來嘗試解決普遍規 範和個人主體性間的衝突。根據他的說法，如果對自然道德律有 正確的認識，便不會做出被個人主體性視為「武斷J (arbitrary) 的道德判斷， 也可避免過於主觀， 使普遍規範無法引導道 德選擇。最後，基於對馬里且學說的分析，我們將提出幾項道德 判斷方法論須考量的因素。雖然上述各點並不構成完整的道德方 法論，但我希望本篇初探的內容，能遵循馬里且學說的精神，使 讀者認識一位本世紀偉大哲學家的基本思想。