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articulos
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Dan López de Sa Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough)
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Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Xabier de Donato Rodríguez, Marek Polanski Superveniencia, propiedades maximales y teoría de modelos (Supervenience, Maximal Properties, and Model Theory)
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En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Dan López de Sa The Case against Evaluative Realism
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In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Henrik Zinkernagel The Philosophy behind Quantum Gravity
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This paper investigates some of the philosophical and conceptual issues raised by the search for a quantum theory of gravity. It is critically discussed whether such a theory is necessary in the first place, and how much would be accomplished if it is eventually constructed. I argue that the motivations behind, and expectations to, a theory of quantum gravity are entangled with central themes in the philosophy of science, in particular unification, reductionism, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. I further argue that there are —contrary to claims made on behalf of string theory— no good reasons to think that a quantum theory of gravity, if constructed, will provide a theory of everything, that is, a fundamental theory from which all physics in principle can be derived.
estado de la cuestion
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Josep L. Prades Filosofía de la mente: el estado de la cuestión (Philosophy of Mind: the State of the Art)
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recensiones
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Alejandro Martín Maldonado, Gabriel Painceyra Obras Escogidas
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
David Teira The Methodology of Experimental Economics
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
David Teira Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Andoni Eizagirre Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study of Science
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sumario
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO DEL VOL. 21 / CONTENTS OF VOL. 21
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seccion monografica
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Tobies Grimaltos, Carlos Moya Presentation
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Olga Fernández Prat Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception
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A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in diverse ways) is not. This paper reconstructs the argumentative context in which these views are put forward, and, after mentioning some drawbacks of both views, as these have been advanced to date, suggests a new view that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Jordi Fernández Memory and Perception: Remembering Snowflake
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If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I propose a notion of mnemonic Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs.
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Manuel Liz Camouflaged Physical Objects: The Intentionality of Perception
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This paper is about perception and its objects. My aim is to suggest a new way to articulate some of the central ideas of direct realism. Sections 1 and 2 offer from different perspectives a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception. Section 3 introduces the notion of “camouflage” as an interesting and promising alternative in order to explain the nature of the intentional objects of perception. Finally, section 4 makes use of this new notion in the analysis of the relationships between the intentionality of perception, the intentionality of thought, and the intentionality of language.
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Murali Ramachandran How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
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This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge-by way of more basic, non-circular concepts-it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.
articulos
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Robert G. Hudson The Relevance of History to Philosophy of Science
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My task in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the philosophic study of science that takes seriously case studies drawn from the practice of science. Historicistphilosophy of science suffers from what I call the ’evidence problem’. The worry is that case studies cannot qualify as rigorous evidence for the adjudication of philosophic theories. I explore the reasons why one might deny to historical cases a probative value, then reply to these reasons on behalf of historicism. The main proponents of the view I am criticizing are Pitt (2001) and Rasmussen (2001).
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Manuel Pérez Otero Aspectos particularistas en el discurso modal (particularist traits in modal discourse)
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EI debate entre la concepción descriptivista de los nombres propios y la teoría de la referencia directa concierne -principalmente- a esta cuestión: (es la función referencial de los nombres propios reduciblemediante la función descriptiva y las funciones logicas? Una tesis distintiva central de Kripke es 10 que denominamos particularismo semántico modal: la función referencial es irredueible, incluso cuando los nombre propios aparecen en enunciados modales. Se presenta aquí una exégesis de las críticas de Kripke contra cierta interpretacion metafóriea de los mundos posibles (que los considera como Iugares lejanos observados con telescopios) interpretándolas como elementos cruciales en su defensa del particularismo semántieo modal.Tbe debate between the description theory of proper names and direct reference is -mainly- a debale on whether or not the referential function of proper names is reducible in term of descriptive and logical functions. A central distinctive thesis in Kripke’s work is what I call modal semantic particularism: the referential function is irreducible even when proper names appear in modal contexts. I present all exegesis of Kripke’s comments against a certain metaphorical understanding of possible worlds (as distant countries discovered through teleseopes) according to which these comments are crucial claims in hisdefense of modal semantic particularism.
recensiones
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Lucía Lewowicz Pensar la ciencia: Estudios criticos sobre obras filosóficas (1950-2000)
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sumario
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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