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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Eugene Hargrove
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Environmental Ethics:
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J. Baird Callicott
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A generalized traditional Western world view is compared with a generalized traditional American Indian world view in respect to the practical relations implied by either to nature. The Western tradition pictures nature as material, mechanical, and devoid of spirit (reserving that exclusively for humans), while the American Indian tradition pictures nature throughout as an extended family or society of living, ensouled beings. The former picture invites unrestrained exploitation of nonhuman nature, while the latter provides the foundations for ethical restraint in relation to nonhuman nature. This conclusion is defended against disclaimers by Calvin Martin and Tom Regan.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Bryan G. Norton
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Do appeals to rights and/or interests of the members of future generations provide an adequate basis for an environmental ethic? Assuming that rights and interests are, semantically, individualistic concepts, I present an argument following Derek Parfit which shows that a policy of depletion may harm no existing individuals, present or future. Although this argument has, initially, an air of paradox, I showthat the argument has two intuitive analogues-the problem ofgenerating a morally justified and environmentally sound population policy and the problem of temporal distance. These problems are shown both to resist solutions in individualistic terms and to embody difficulties similar to those raised by Parfit. Since utilitarianism and modem deontology are individualistic in nature, they cannot provide the basis for an adequate environmental ethic and they do not rule out policies such as that of depletion, which is clearly unacceptable environmentally. I dose with an exploratory but generally pessimistic assessment of the possibility that rights and interests can be reconstrued as nonindividualistic.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Donald C. Lee
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To the claim that Marx has no concept of human nature after 1845 and is not prescriptive, I reply that his work only makes sense in the light of his definition of the human being as creator and producer of himself through his own productive activity; otherwise, there is no reason that labor should “naturally” belong to the laborer, since other animals live from each other’s labor and exploitation is natural Marx’s rejection of exploitation is an ethical principle. On the other hand, I attack the narrow human chauvinism of Marxists which lacks environmental consciousness and concern for other species; I label it “eco-imperialism.” Marx had several important insights, but his work in general was not always free of the limitations of his age; I try to point to those insights most instructive in our time with regard to the problems of environment.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Steve F. Sapontzis
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Several philosophers opposed to animal rights have recently sought to justify their opposition by arguing that the epistemic differences between human and animal interests (often referred to as “taking an interest” vs. “having an interest”) constitute a morally significant difference. In this paper, I first detail the various forms ofhaving an interest and oftaking an interest. I then evaluate the moral significance of these differences from both utilitarian and deontological viewpoints. The conclusion of this analysis is that the epistemic differences between human and animal interests are not morally significant.
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Environmental Ethics:
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John B. Cobb, Jr.
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Environmental Ethics:
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K. S. Shrader-Frechette
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Environmental Ethics:
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J. Donald Hughes
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Environmental Ethics:
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Charles Dyke
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Environmental Ethics:
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Gene Namkoong
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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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Norman S. Care
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A motivation problem may arise when morally principled public policy calls for serious sacrifice, relative to ways of life and levels of well-being, on the part of the meInbers of a free society. Apart from legal or other forms of “external” coercion, what will, could, or should move people to make the sacrifices required by morality? I explore the motivation problem in the context of morally principled public policyconcerning our legacy for future generations. In this context the problem raises special moral-psychological difficulties. My inquiry suggests pessimism regarding our ability to solve the motivation problem relative to what morality requires on behalf of future generations.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Environmental Ethics:
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David Lamb
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l examine Singer’s analogy between human liberation movements and animal liberation movements. Two lines of criticism of animal liberation are rejected: (1) that animal-liberation is not as serious as human liberation since humans have interests which override those of animals; (2) that the concept of animal liberation blurs distinctions between what is appropriate for humans and what is appropriate foranimals. As an alternative I otfer a distinction between reform movements and liberation movements, arguing that while Singer meets the criterion for the former, a higher degree of autonomy and communicative competence is necessary for the latter. In the final section, objections to the possibility of an autonomous animal liberation movement are met by rejecting assumptions concerning the illogicality of interspecies communication.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Issue: 3
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