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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2014 >
Issue: 47
陳政 揚
Cheng-Yang Chen
A Study of Wang Zhi’s Criticisms of the Deification in the Commentary of the Zhengmeng by an Analysis of the Three Aspectsin the Idea of “Ultimate Voidness (Taixu 太虛)”
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設若研讀哲學家的代表著作,是吾人探究其思想的必要條件之一,則逐句 解析張載思想論述的明清《正蒙》注,顯然是研究橫渠思想在明清哲學之發展 時,所無可忽視的一環。尤其歷來注解《正蒙》者,不乏高攀龍,王夫之等望 重士林,或在哲學史上具有獨創見解者。然而在當代張載學研究中,相關議題 似乎仍較少引起學者間的討論興趣。基於此,本文以清代《正蒙》學研究為論 述起點,旨在澄清李光地在《注解正蒙》中對張載神化觀的詮釋,以及王植在 《正蒙初義》中如何由釐清「太虛」概念,批判李《注》之非。全文共分為四 項研究環節:首先,由於王植以澄清「太虛」概念為解讀《正蒙》與衡定諸注 之關鍵,本文先扼要說明「太虛」之三層義。其次,本文將指出李《注》對「太 虛」之詮釋,以及王植對李《注》太虛義之批判。再者,由於李《注》不僅嘗 試解消「太虛」之本體義,而且以理氣二分的理論架構,詮釋橫渠虛氣一體之 神化觀。本文將指出李《注》對橫渠神化觀之新詮。最後,本文將藉太虛三層 義,指出《正蒙初義》的洞見以及李《注》神化觀的侷限。
In order to understand the content and significance of Zhan Zai’ thought, commentarial works on the Zhengmeng during the Ming and Qing period areindispensable because these works present detailed explications on every conceptual terms. Compared to those commentarial works on the Zhang Zai’s thought by Gao Panlong and Wang Fuzhi who have been regarded as rather creative thinkers, other commentarial works during the Qing period have not drawn sufficient scholarly attention. Bearing this in mind, this article aims to explore the two topics: Firstly, it analyzes Li Guangdi’s interpretation on Zhang Zai’s idea of “deification” through Li’s Commentary of the Zhengmeng. And secondly, it also traces Wang Zhi’s elucidation of the concept of “Ultimate Voidness” (Taixu) in his commentarial work, the Basic Meanings of the Zhengmeng, as well as Wang’s correction of initial mistakes in aforementioned Li Guangdi’s commentary.The discussion of this article consists of the following four sub-topics: (1) Wang Zhi’s exposition of three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness”; (2) Li Guangdi’s interpretation of the term “Ultimate Voidness” and Wang Zhi’s repudiation against it; (3) Li’s argument that the ontological significance of the concept of “Ulitmate Voidness” should be dissolved, and that Zhang Zai’s idea of deification of continuity between vital breath and voidness should be understood by the dualistic framework between principle and vital breath; and (4) Highlighting of Wang’s insight and Li’s limitation of his conception of deification by means of our analysis of the three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness.”
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 47
Cheng-Hung Tsai
蔡政 宏
技藝與理解
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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
人是如何獲得「理解」?德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中,作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱,並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視,作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2014 >
Issue: 47
傅皓 政
Hao-Cheng Fu
Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Defaults: On Rott’s Counterexamples
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此篇論文旨在以萊特於1980 年所提出的預建邏輯系統,消除洛特對 AGM 理論的單調性原則提出的反例。相較於古典邏輯,雖然AGM 理論主張 知識狀態具備均衡性,並建構基本函映的預設說明信念變遷,但是許多哲學 家認為該理論有某些基本原則值得質疑,洛特即指出AGM 理論主張原有知 識狀態的某個信念弱化之後,並不會影響原知識狀態的單調性並不成立。然 而,洛特的反例之所以成立,在於可能出現相同語句卻具有不同資訊價值的 情況,不過,洛特也並未提出適當的方式說明處理非單調的信念變遷過程。 因此,我在這篇論文中要以AGM 理論結合預建邏輯的方法消除洛特提出的 反例,亦即主張在AGM 理論中加入預建邏輯的推論規則,可以適當地處理 非單調的信念變遷過程。
This paper aims to dissolve Rott’s counterexamples in terms of default logic proposed by Reiter in 1980. In his counterexample, Rott pointed out that some fundamental principles in AGM theory which meet the property of monotonicity are implausible because it seems unable to handle the processes of nonmonotonic reasoning which are common in our ordinary reasoning. In contrast to classical logic, AGM theory indeed developed a prominent way to deal with belief change, whereas many philosophers still casted doubts on the fundamental principles in AGM theory. For example, there might be some sentences in one’s belief set which are of the same form but different in information value and AGM theory does not commit it. Nevertheless, Rott failed to suggest a plausible way to fix the defect of AGM theory, so I aim to propose a suitable way to dissolve the problem of the processes of nonmontonic reasoning in virtue of the association of AGM theory with default logic.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 47
Caleb Liang
梁益 堉
知覺的反個體主義與視覺科學
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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.
本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質,並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」(perceptual anti-individualism)為研究對象。根據這一理論,知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張:視覺科學(vision science)預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點,並 企圖從三方面來論證:「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先,我討論「體內恆定」(homeostasis)的概念,並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」(perceptual norms)產生質疑。第二,我以論證指出:許多視覺科學所研究的現象,可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」(veridicality)和「單一表徵」(singular representation)也能得到解釋。第三,我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證:許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是:「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。
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