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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4

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features

2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
Jay McDaniel

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With the emergence of quantum theory, the Newtonian idea that matter is inert, devoid of creativity and sentience, becomes questionable. Yet, physicists have by no means agreed upon an alternative understanding that can replace the Newtonian paradigm. Henry Stapp and others argue that Whitehead’s thought provides a peculiarly appropriate framework for a new understanding of matter in light ofquantum theory. The implications for a theology ofecology are manifold. No longer are matter and mind utterly discontinuous, nor is matter devoid of value until assigned value by humans or by God. Even the divine reality is, in a certain sense, “material.” This calls for a new sensitivity within Western religion, in which religion itself becomes openness to, and appreciation for, physical matter.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
Peter Miller

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The conclusion of animal liberationists that the underlying assumptions of modern egalitarian humanism can be construed to imply an equal moral desert for the higher nonhuman animals has recently been challenged by R. G. Frey on the grounds that linguistic incompetence and lack of self-consciousness on the part of animals preclude them from having desires, beliefs, interests, and rights. AlthoughFrey’s arguments fail, they challenge us to provide alternative accounts of these descriptive and normative categories of human and animal psychology. Phenomenological and behavioral analyses demonstrate both the meaningfulness and the truthfulness ofattributing desires, beliefs, and interests to many nonhuman animals. Principles ofaxiology and ethics prescribe that animal interests ought to be objects of our moral concern, but do not vindicate an egalitarian interpretation of animal liberation. A fundamental challenge of the anima1liberation debate is how to frame a nonegalitarian ethic that can nevertheless preserve the moral gains of various liberation movements inspired by principles of equality.

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4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4

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discussion papers

5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
Po-Keung Ip

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I show how the Taoist philosophy, as examplified by both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, is capable of providing a metaphysical foundation for environmental ethics. The Taoist concept of nature, the notions of ontological equality and axiological equality of beings, together with the doctrine of Wu Wei can fulfil, at least in a preliminary way, our purpose. The notion of a minimally coherent ethics is introduced and is shown to be pertinent to the construction of an ethics which bears a close relationship to science.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
Lawrence E. Johnson

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The human race is an ongoing entity, not just a collection of individuals. It has interests which are not just the aggregated interests of individual humans. These interests are morally significant and have important implications for environmental ethics.

book reviews

7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
William Godfrey-Smith

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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
Jay L. Garfield

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
Frederick Ferré

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index

10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4

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referees

12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4

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13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3

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14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Peter Wenz

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Conflicts can arise between energy policies pursued in the interests of present people and the needs of future people for environmental and social conditions conducive to human well-being. This paper is addressed primarily to those who believe that we have moral obligations toward people of the distant future, and who consider these obligations to affect the range of energy policies which we are morally entitled to pursue. l examine utilitarian, contractarian, and formalist ethical theories to determine which provide adequate ethical bases for this moral conviction. I argue that utilitarian theories lead to bizarre prescriptions concerning energy policies that affect people of the distant future. Contractarian theories, on one interpretation, fail to support any moral concern at all for such people and, on another, exclude some relevant dimensions of moral concern, i.e., beneficence, and provide policy planners with inadequate guidance in the face of moral dilemmas. Only formalism, for example, that of W. D. Ross, supports a moral concern for people of the distant future, and yields reasonable prescriptions concerning energy policies that affect such people.
15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

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The moral significance of preserving natural environments is not entirely an issue of rights and social utility, for a person’s attitude toward nature may be importantly connected with virtues or human excellences. The question is, “What sort of person would destroy the natural environment--or even see its value solely in cost/benefit terms?” The answer I suggest is that willingness to do so may well reveal the absence of traits which are a natural basis for a proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude, and appreciation of the good in others.

discussion papers

16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Susan Power Bratton

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The popular press has claimed that Secretary of the Interior James Watt bases his philosophy of environmental management on his religious views as a charismatic Christian. An examination of Watt’s published statements indicates: (1) his philosophy of environmental management sterns largely from economic and political considerations; (2) he has a relatively simple ecotheology based on concepts such as God providing creation as a blessing for mankind, and mankind having a stewardship responsibility to use resources to provide for people; (3) his ecotheology does not incorporate any characteristically charismatic ideas; and (4) his ecotheology does not strongly parallel that of conservative Christian theologians who have written on environmental issues. This analysis suggests that for the new “Christianpolitic” as a whole, there is a danger of confusing the scriptural with the cultural and political in the area of environmental ethics. If a Christian ecotheology is going to be used for environmental decision making, it should be developed fully and represent scripture accurately and completely.
17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Paul W. Taylor

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Gene Spitler has raised certain objections to my views on the biocentric outlook: (1) that a factual error is involved in the assertion that organisms pursue their own good, (2) that there is an inconsistency in the biocentric outlook, (3) that it is impossible for anyone to adopt that outlook, and (4) that the outlook entails unacceptable moral judgments, for example, that killing insects and wildfiowers is as morally reprehensible as killing humans. I reply to each of these points, showing that the biocentric outlook on nature is not only a possible, but also a reasonable world view.
18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Richard A. Watson

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Ame Naess, John Rodman, George Sessions, and others, designated herein as ecosophers, propose an egalitarian anti-anthropocentric biocentrism as a basis for a new environmental ethic. I outline their “hands-off-nature” position and show it to be based on setting man apart. The ecosophic position is thus neither egalitarian nor fully biocentric. A fully egalitarian biocentric ethic would place no more restrictions on the behavior of human beings than on the behavior of any other animals. Uncontrolled human behavior might lead to the destruction ofthe environment and thus to the extinction of human beings. I thus conclude that human interest in survival is the best ground on which to argue for an ecological balance which is good both for human beings and for the whole biological community.
19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Louis G. Lombardi

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Paul W. Taylor has defended a life-centered ethics that considers the inherent worth of all living things to be the same. l examine reasons for ascribing inherent worth to all living beings, but argue that there can be various levels of inherent worth. Differences in capacities among types of life are used to justify such levels. I argue that once levels of inherent worth are distinguished, it becomes reasonable torestrict rights to human beings.

book reviews

20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Allen V. Kneese

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