Philosophy and Theology

My initial task in this essay is to identify precisely the original philosophical import of philosophical renections about religion. Next I outline their changing natures and interrelations in the works of exemplary figures from the history of Western religious thought. Finally I argue that the relative desuetude of the traditional forms of apology and speculalion is emblemalic of the present faring of philosophy as a form of cultural discourse.

This paper examines the notion of cultural universals and then seeks to identify what the author wishes to idenlify as “cultural fundamentals” in philosophy and philosophical debate. The paper then asses the extent to which such fundamentals are obstacles to the “birth” of potential philosophers. Lastly I suggest a solution to this problem.

The world-wide struggle for justice and peace between the developed and the undeveloped nations is also a struggle between different conceptions of humanity. This article outlines and defends two African concepts that could provide a deeper, more humane, conception of humanity than those currently dominant in American, European or Russian thinking. The notion of umuntu ngumuntu ngbantu stresses the peculiarly intersubjective character of personal life, while the notion of seriti presents us with an idea of power or energy that overcomes the dualism of mind and matter without being materialistic. The article finally indicates the relevance of such a conception of humanity for the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

This paper investigates the meaning of needs claims to determine conditions under which they can be falsified. Interpreting needs as necessary requirements, I consider two distinct versions of the statement “A needs X.” One is hypothetical: “If A is to do or obtain Y, then A needs X.” The other is categorical - “A needs X at hand” - and is derived from the hypothetical statement when A is in some manner to do Y. I argue that, despite some cases in which needs claims cannot be falsified, formal criteria can be adduced to falsify or, at least, challenge both versions of needs claims.

I offer an analysis of the notion of violence one of whose consequences may be that violence might be moral under some circumstances.

According to Alfred Schutz’s theory of signification, based as it is on Husserl’s theory of appresentation, through marks and indications we overcome the small transcendences of space and time, through signs the medium transcendences of the Other’s difference from us, and through symbols the great transcendences of other finite provinces of meaning. This paper examines the implicat ions of the correlations between these transcendences and significations, and argues that Schutz’s order of significations reveals the profound irony that the more signifier-users seek to tame and subdue transcendences through significations, the more they discover how transcendences escape their dominion.

I first examine Origen’s notion of nature as personal, and secondly a modern presentation of the same theme by Erazim Kohak. I then consider possible scientific support given to both these authors’ accounts by Lovejoy. I conclude that there are many strengths in viewing nature as a whole as both divine and personal.