Roczniki Filozoficzne

Because of the terminological confusion in the field of human development the article deals with: 1° — the history of the learning on the developmental factors (opinions of Aristotle, Rousseau, Beneke, the nativism and empirism, theory of convergence), 2° — the criticism of old opinions about convergence and with the originating of the four factors theory: organic makings, environment, the child’s own activity, as well as teaching and education at school (S. Szuman), 3° — discussion with the four factors theory, stating that: a) it resolves into two factors, the endogenous and the exogenous ones, as in the convergence, b) one cannot replace the cooperation of the factors by the dialectical interaction between them, c) the interaction between the factors of development does not consist in their hierarchisation in such a way that the environment moulds the organic makings, i.e. changes them through its own activity, and the latter is directed by teaching and education at school, d) school does not play a decisive role in development, because the efficacy of its influence depends on the voluntary collaboration of the pupils with the school, e) none of the four factors determines decisively the collaboration between pupil and school, f) one should not add factors of development, (e.g. those of fate or stress), for each of the factors varies divalently, either positively or negatively, g) finally the four factors theory does not take into consideration the impact of the fate lot, which changes by superior authority the action of the remaining factors. These statements lead to the consideration 4° — of the possibility of an improvement of the learning on the development factors. The question is here is one of the determination of the third development factor, which breaks down the convergence of the endo- and exogenous factors. This third factor ean be neither man’s own activity (S. Szuman), as a manifestation of the aspiration to independence, nor the „factor of stability” (J. Piaget) as ’’maximum of individual activity”. Instead the third factor appraises the tendences of the first and second factor and develops the personality on a higher level of a creative self-improvement (K. Dąbrowski). Therefore we can call it the personality or persogenous factor. To end with the author formulates some conclusions from the effected discussion about the four factors theory of human development.

This article is am outline of the development of the konwledge about the relation of the psychic phenomena to the bodily ones from Antiquity to the Enlightenment. Already communities of the primitive cultures disposed of a certain knowledge. One ascribed life on human pattern to all creatures which revealed strength had influence upon man.When in Greece in the VI c. appeared the rudiments of learning, also the problem we are concerned with, was put on a new plane. Particulary important was the then created concept of nature. It was namely an expression of the conviction that all the properties of every being, and particularly of a human being, result from its own inner structure, which lets it self examine and describe in a rational way. The classic Greek culture created many variants of the solution of the problem concerning the relation of the psyche to the matter, and they all exerted influence on the modern conceptions.The development of the modern natural science, mathematized in the XVII and XVIII c. brought an increased knowledge of the build and the functions of human body, and particulary of the nervous system. The relation between the psyche and the nervous system, which was already known in the antiquity, has become now obvious, while the definition of the essence of this relation was still a problem. It was approached from the theoretical side and hypotheses were created, from which the following are worth noticing: the Cartesian dualism, the psychophysical parallelism, the hypothesis of „sympathy”, the vitalism, the brow- nism. At the same timy any experiments ware being made, which demonstrated i.a. the fact of the coexistence of feeling with the action of the stimulus on the nerve (v. Haller), also the appearance of definite psychic troubles in case of an injury of the brain (Mofgagni). The monistic solutions as well as the utmost dualistic ones — as the history of learning shows — did not stand the test of time. The purely theoretical speculations, which took no account of experiments and scientific facts, did not survive either.

In the paper five different approaches to the problems of research into the psychology of thinking are presented. Two of them are basic: the learning and cognitive theories, and the three additional ones are: the developmental, structural and simulation ones by computers. All approaches have empirical character and they are not in opposition to each other although the most disputable is the relation between the learning and the cognitive approach. The paper tries to show ways to find bases for common terminology and perspectives for research. All approaches have been evaluated in the paper from the point of view of their experimental possibilities. Stress is put on the idea that progress in the research about thinking process is possible only by many different experimental and theoretical approaches.

With reference to the actual discussion among psychologists (particularly between the Sovietic psychologists and those of the Piaget school) on the subject of the possibility to accelerate the intellectual development of children by teaching — the participants of the seminary on the psychology of thinking in the Catholic University of Lublin took up collective investigations, the aim of which was the verification, if, and to what extent, the children who have not yet developed a logical ability of classification will, by suitable teaching, make progress, in comparison with children who have not been trained and are on the same level of ability to classification. 241 children have been subjected to the experiment. In this, 196 normal children in the age from 4 to 7, and 45 mentally deficient ones from the I and II grade of a special school. Two almost identical groups have been selected: a basic group, which was to be taught and a control group, which was not to be taught. All the children, the taught and the not taught ones, have been tested three times: at the beginning of the experiment (in order to select the groups), at the end of the teaching in order to ascertain and a month later (in order to verify the reliability of the results of the progress achieved). The children have been taught in groups of 4—5 during 6 successive days, with two lessons of 20 minutes each dayly. 7 persons were testing and teaching, who had been prepared very carefully. The teaching material had been so selected, as to refer to the same operations as the diagnostic material, but to differ from it in all the other respects.After completion of the teaching, it has been found, that all the children of the basic group (the taught ones), the normal as well as those subnormal, had made a progress, statistically significant (P < 0,001 or 0,01). On the other hand the children who had been taught showed almost no difference between the first and the second examination.The results of the investigation of the ability to classification, a month after the completion of the teaching, have showed a lack of statistically significant differences, which testifies that the effect of teaching proved sufficiently stable. Differences statistically significant have not appeared either in the children who had not been taught. It is interesting that the mentally deficient children from the basic group (the taught ones) acquired in that time a progress in the conceptual classification up to the mark of confidence 0,05, which would indicate that the teaching had stimulated their retarded development. Certain minimal differences to disadvantage appeared among the four — year — old children, which one can explain by lack of sufficient maturity. In this connection one can consider their learning as one which is superficial, not based on the comprehension of activities, and therefore easily vanishing. One can also explain by lack of maturity the differences in the acquired progress according to the age of the children. In the notionel classification, e.g. 50% of the four years old children have not made any progress, and the remaining 50% have not the made the highest progress (3 substages).Where as among the seven-year-old children 50% have acquired the highest progress (3 substages) and of the remaining 50% no child has a zero result.What role is played in the development by maturation, and what by teaching — may by proved by further investigations. Our investigations proved undeniably, that by planned exercising of the children in logical activities we can accelerate the development of those faculties and this in a sifficiently lasting manner: of course with an appropriate degree of mental maturity.

The paper presents the results of investigations into the relationship between religious attitudes and personality characteristics. Intensity is to be understood in this study as the characteristic of religious attitude expressing the strength and determination with which the individual concerned stands by this attitude.The degree of intensity was measured by means of the religious attitude scale constructed by the author. Personality was investigated with the R. B. Cattells’s 16-factor personality questionnaire, in its Polish version by M. Choynowski and M. Nowakowska, standardized on Polish population. The investigations were anonymous; the testees consisted of individuals aged 23—35, university graduates or approaching graduation. 60% were students of Arts; the others (40%) represented ’’sciences”. As to their social background, the population investigated represented, more or less equally, three environments: intelligentsia, workmen, rural.The answer to the query was sought in the way of emphasizing the differences in the personality traits of the individuals differing as to the intensity of religious attitude. With that view, three experimental groups were formed: positive high intensity (30 women, 20 men), low intensity (30 women, 20 men), and negative high intensity (N = 16). The groups were then investigated from the point of view of personality.The answer to the query was sought in the way of emphasizing the differences between the intensity of religious attitude, and personality. This is revealed by the level of the differences noted between the mean personality traits in individuals with high religious intensity, and in those showing low religious intensity. Significant differences (pu = 0.05) appeared in 11 (out of 16) personality factors, and concerned: the level of emotional maturity (C), the degree of desurgency (F—), super-ego level (G+), sensitivity level (I+), suspiciousness level (L), degree of unconventionality in thought and deed (M+), mode of contact with the environment (N—), self-assurance (0+), degree of radicalism (Qi + ), degree of self-control (Q3—) and psychic tension level (Q4+). Assuming as a basis the factors of the second degree, intergroup differences were observed regarding the level of introversion, that of anxiety, and the degree of personality integration.The observed data show the high positive religious intensity group to possess, on an average, more emotional maturity, stronger and more markedly stressed super-ego, greater self-control, introspectiveness, higher sensitivity and self-possession in the contacts with the environment. The low intensity group is characterized by opposite features, in particular by deeper anxiety, lesser self-assurance, higher nervous tension (ergic) - and less personality integration. The high negative intensity group shows characteristics similar to the high positive intensity group as regards the factors indicating the level of anxiety and personality integration; they differ, on the other hand, in the characteristics connected with certain attitudes (the negative group evinces less conventionalism and conservatism).Lastly, it must be emphasized that the differences ascertained appeared only in the traits etiologically considered as acquired — environmental —, while no difference was found in the constitutional ones (A, E; H, Q2). This allows the conclusion that the intensity of religious attitudes is not dependent on constitutional traits, but is connected with the development of the environmental traits of personality.

Differential diagnostic problems based on the data derived from MMPI data have been discussed. The group of 1180 psychiatric cases and 200 normals served as a validity samples. Special attention has been paid to the malingering group composed of mental patients with psychiatric diagnosis ’simulation’, prisoners and control experimental fakers. The objective devices consisting of different profiles’s characteristics have been evaluated as to their value in differential diagnosis.

The author has carried out investigations on the reliability and validity of the Psyche Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale for the testing of normal and retarded children.The investigations carried out so far among children with normal mental development show a low stability of the I.Q. in children, of 2—7 months of age (M. Cavanaugh et al., A. Pakulska-Podstolak), moderate in children of 8—12 months (A. Pakulska-Podstolak, see Table 1), 12—18, and 18—24 months (Cavanaugh et al.). This concerns conventional I.Q.;- revised I.Q. has not yet been investigated. The dependability of the scale is not known either. The Psyche Cattell Scale is a homogenic method.The author’s own investigations comprised a sample of 52 children, aged 8 months — 7 years, slightly, moderately, markedly and deeply' mentally retarded, due to developing L. Down’s disease. The results show a relatively high stability of revised I.Q. at the end of one year (0.843±0.034; P< 0.001), also at the end of two years (0.715±0.089; P< 0.001). Hence the conclusion the that Psyche Cattell Scale is a stable instrument for testing mentally retarded children.The investigations revealed that the Psyche Cattell Scale possess a high diagnostic validity for the diagnosis of mental deficiency in infants. Earlier investigations on the prognostic validity of the method showed that in infants with normal, or little different from normal, mental development, it is not possible to determine, before they are one year of age, the I.Q. which they will obtain later in the Stanford-Binet Scale, 1937; starting from 14 months of age, the infants’ further development can be foreseen to some extent, which is suggested by either moderate (P. Cattell, M. Cavanaugh et al.) or high coefficients of correlation (P. Cattell). The author’s investigations show a high prognostic validity of the Psyche Cattell Scale when applied to mentally dificient children. This is revealed by high coefficients of correlation of the revised I.Q. in Psyche Cattell and Stan- for-Binet Scale, 1937, obtained in the course of investigations carried out in intervals of 30 months (0.877+0.043) and six years (0.870+0.046). These investigations also show a large agreement of diagnoses established after three years and 11 months, with the first diagnosis in the case of mentally deficient infants.

The article presents the results of investigations on the factors causing invalids to be satisfied with their work. The population tested consisted of members of blind’s work-cooperatives. Nine factors were found to affect the invalids’ attitudes towards their professional work: 1) duration of work, 2) degree of monotony, 3) certainty of work, 4) salary, 5) relations with fellow-workers, 6) relations with employers and superiors, 7) share in the management of the cooperative, 8) recognition and esteem by those possessing normal sight, 9) increasing professional qualifications. In order to ascertain the hierarchy of these in the invalids’ motivations, a questionnaire was used, based on the principle that each factor was confronted in turn with all the others, and the testee placed in the situation of compulsory choice between opposed alternative factors. Each choice of a given factor by the teste was given a point. The total of the points won by a factor ranged from 0 to 8, and was a measure of its importance as compared with- the remaining factors. The testee had at his disposal 36 points, corresponding to the number of choices he had to make in answering the questionnaire. The investigations revealed the following scale of preference: 1) certainty of work, 2) good relations with fellow-workers, 3) possibility of acquiring further qualifications, 4) recognition and esteem by those possessing normal sight, 5) good relations with superiors, 6) good salary, 7) share in the management of the cooperative, 8) little monotony of work, 9) short worktime. Certain differences appeared in the choices, due to the age, degree of education, civil status of the testees. The top rank given to the factors: certainty of work, good relations with fellow-workers, acquiring further qualifications, and acquiring the recognition and esteem from the seeing, appears in all age- and education-groups among the testees. These factors are decisive for the professional rehabilitation of the blind, and therefore, they should be taken into account in the process of employing them and organizing their work.

Motion, which St Thomas Aquinas made the starting point of his "first way”, is so universal and obvious that when Aristotle comes to discuss it in his two books of Metaphysics, and even more in his six books of Physics, he does not attempt to prove its reality. But, bearing in mind what Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Heraclite s, and Plato in particular had told of motion, he tries to determine it with a strict definition, then to divide it into genera, among which he puts the local movement to the foreground. That is why, the present article, dealing with the Stagirite’s position in that regard, is divided in three essential parts.In part I the author attempts to show the difference — as seen by Aristotle — between "change” and "motion”, then to submit to thorough analysis the only Aristotelian definition of motion as "act” of being existent in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality, (III Phys., 1,201 a 10 ff.). There he remarks that the subject of motion belongs to the essence thereof so that the act cannot be as much as thought of without an object. It is, however, an unfinished act, remaining, as regards its destination point, in the relation of potentiality to actuality. From the definition of motion derive some of its properties, first of all that of its sequential continuity, enclosed between two extremes (a quo and ad quem), in the relation of contrariness to one another. This implies that motion must take place in time.In part II it is emphasised that movement, thus defined, divides-according to Aristotle, in three basic genera: motion belonging to the category of quantity (increase and loss), to that of quality (arising and destruction of accidental sensuous qualities), and that of location (local movement). In doing so, the author shows that what Aristotle calls "arising” and "destruction” in his Phys. III ch. 1, is not substantive arising and destruction, but those of accidental physical qualities, the so-called ’’varieties” in the general acceptation of the word. On the other hand, the ’’variety” referred to by Aristotle earlier in the same text, is variety in the narrow sense (i. e. augmentation or diminution of a type of motion). Variety is, in fact, described as motion not only as of something which is capable of changing, but "insofar as it is variable”. We then have here a fresh attempt at eliminating the apparent contradiction between the definition of motion and what Aristotle says of its genera in Bk. III, c. 1, and next between these and his statements on the essence and genera in Bk. V and the following.Part III, using the Stagirite’s own words- shows the primacy of local motion on quantitative as well as qualitative motion, primacy regarding nature, time and perfection. Consequently, and on the basis of contemporary natural science, Aristotle comes to the acceptance of one continuous movement which, being eternal, requires the existence of an eternal first mover, Motor, who, while remaining immobile itself, sets the whole world into motion.

Natural philosophy follows the method of physical abstraction which Thomas Aquinas conceives as an intellectual operation through which, separating "form from matter” we break off t(or become independent of) matter in isome way. The application of different abstracting operations leads to the distinction of various proper objects or aspects of the study of reality. These may remain in diverse dependence on matter, on concrete bodies. The diversity of the methods used in making objects dependent on — or distant from — matter serves, according to St Thomas, as a basis for the distinction among different philosophical disciplines.Thomas makes the abstracting methods dependent on the structure of the object which undergoes the intellectual operation. Abstraction is carried out on integral objects, the elements of which are in organic relation to one another. In the process of abstraction, the intellect separates the elements from one another. This operation is not carried out arbitrarily but it depends on the structure of things. It is true that the intellect can create fictitious, hypothetical objects, as well as substantialize or hypostasize accidents, but then it does not perform the function of abstraction stricto sensu.Abstraction consists in a number of diverse intellectual activities, which permit to distinguish in objects between essential and inessential factors, substance and accidents, matter and form, and to create the concepts of genus and species, of specific and interspecific properties. Abstraction results in definitions. The different ways of defining concepts are, at the same time, a criterion of the distinctness of one discipline of learnning from another. Thus, for instance, traditional mathematics does not treat its objects as real accidents of bodies. In the abstracting process it stops at intelligible matter, hence on matter not falling under sense cognition (i. ę. beyond the reach of external senses). Indeed, the philosopher of nature abstracts from individual matter and reaches the knowledge of the essence of the most general properties, but he considers these as real attributes of bodies. In cosmological definitions appears the concept of sensuous matter.Between cosmology and traditional mathematics there exist differences in particular as to the idea of quantity (extension). The philosopher of nature deals with quantity as a be sic real property of bodies, beside other attributes as space, time, and variability. In mathematic considerations extension is a quantity geôme- trically differentiated, detached from concrete manifestations of material beings. However, according to Thomas, mathematics does not abstract from the substance of the body qua metaphysical substratum. Such a view may be explained by the fact that Thomas wishes to dissociate himself from Pythagoras’ and Plato’s doctrines which held the creations of geometry and arithmetic to be ideally existing, and not as abstracted.Physical abstraction comprises different intellectual operations which lead to really different results. In fact, Cosmology once abstracts quantity from the metaphysical substratum of bodies, and, another time, from concrete properties in order to attain the concept of specific and interspecific properties, and again considers the essence of general properties, defines the conditions that make non- -contradictory the possibility of their existence, and establishes the existence of structures in which one individual forms a separate species; moreover, cosmology applies also abstraction in the question of motion, time and space. The common link connecting all the ways of abstraction in cosmology is that they lead to such concepts as are not possessed by the definitions of other philosophical disciplines: properly cosmological definitions contain the concept of sensuous matter. Abstraction is not a set of operations intellectually identical, homogenous, which are gradually applied to concrete objects, then to sensuous in general and to immaterial ones, since each particular type of abstraction consists in many differentiated operations, resulting in different concepts, even within the limits of one philosophical discipline. The three types of abstracting operations are not to be identified with the three degrees of abstraction, introduced into the methodology of traditional philosophy by D. Bannez and accepted by many a neo-Thoimist. It cannot be established that in the process of abstraction the intellect passes through different degrees, i. e. successive intellectual operations. This is so because one type of abstraction does not depend on another no does one contain another. That there exists analogy between these distinct operations is another matter.The idea of the three degrees of abstraction on which allegedly, the tripartite division of philosophical disciplines is based, brings in confusion to the methodology of philosophy, and should, therefore, be discarded. While it is to be admitted that one of the criteria differentiating the philosophy of nature from other philosophical disciplines is the characteristic set of abstracting operations, the result of which is the knowledge of the essence of the properties of bodies, the formation of general concepts and statements dealing ultimately with sensuous matter according to Thomas Aquinas’s methodological remark: In Physicis omnia terminantur ad sensum. To the term „abstraction” correspond different modes (operations) of abstraction — applied in the philosophy of nature, traditional mathematics, and metaphysics — which cannot be reduced to one single group.

1. The structure and evolution of our universe are sometimes spoken of as being the subject oif modem cosmology. The problem, when a certain cosmological theory may be called evolutionary, is considered.Definition 1: A physical theory T describing a system U of physical objects u1, u2, ... un, ... is evolutionary, if theory T represents a system U as variable in time and if one can define a constant direction of this variability. A condition demanding that the system U must develop from simpler to more perfect forms (as sometimes postulated in biology) is in physics meaningless.According to def. 1. all relativistic world models satisfying the perfect cosmological principle, so called stationary models, ipso facto are not evolutionary. Oscillating models may .be regarded as evolutionary only in limited time intervals: from R-minimum to R-maximum and from R-maximum to R-iminimuim. Considering longer time intervals, one cannot indicate a constant direction of world’s variability. All other nonstationary models are evolutionary ones.2. A chief ideas of SMW-theory (first published in this Journal, XV (1967) fasc. 3, p. 73—88) are briefly presented. The possibility of influence of extragravita- tional factors on cosmic structure and evolution once admitted by SMW, there exists a definite probability that the universe will pass (’’passages hypothesis”) from the state defined by one model to the state defined by another one. SMW then replaces deterministic evolution of singular relativistic model into a 'kind of cosmological indétermination of model series. Owing to this fact, in SMW one cannot define a constant direction of world variability.Definition 2: We shall call a physical theory T describing a system U of physical objects u1, u2, ... un, ... an evolutionary theory in a probabilistic sense, if this theory represents a system U as variable in time and if one can define the probable direction of this variability.SMW-theory can be considered as evolutionary in the sense of def. 2 only.3. The moment, from which starting, we can speak of the world evolution in the direction, that it is holding up to day, we shall call "the beginning” of the universe. According to Lemaître, the same deterministic laws, which could predict the future (by deduction from initial conditions describing "the beginning”), could as well be used for computing some more distant conditions, from which ’’the beginning” might have been evolved. But, as we know, in relativistic cosmology such ’’predictions” backwards beyond the point of "beginning” (the point, which mathematically speaking forms a singularity in space-time) is quite impossible. This is a modern formulation of one of Kant’s famous antinomies. In SMW this antinomy disapears entirely. The universe is described as an assembly of potential states, which can be, or not, occupied. Now ”the beginning” is not a singular point but it is as ’’good” a state as other states of the universe. Only observational tests can indicate the real moment (if such existed) from which the cosmic evolution had begun.

The present days witness a steady progress of the sciences connected with, and using cybernetics. One of these is mathematical linguistics. It may be considered as equivalent (in an appropriate sense of the word) with the theory of mathematical machines or that of automata. Provided we give philosophy a sufficiently large acception — such as suggested by W. Tatarkiewicz or G. E. Moore — a relationship between it and mathematical linguistics may be sought. The paper reports four "applications” of theoretical linguistics in philosophy: 1. theoretical linguistics applied to philosophical problems, 2. mathematical linguistics applied to philosophical methods, 3. mathematical linguistics applied to philosophy in general, 4. mathematical linguistics as means to increase and strengthen clear thinking. A number of illustrations are given to substantiate these views.It should be emphasized that the applications mentioned above are by no means comprehensive; the development of that field of cybernetics makes it, in fact, difficult to make out an overall list of these. However, such as enumerated, the problems seem interesting and may well stimulate further research. The development of cybernetics land its significance from the philosophical viewpoint offer promising prospects for a deeper study of the problems discussed. In the literature of the subject, more and more contributions appear dealing with this new style of philosophizing and stressing the importance of mathematical and cybernetic methods in philosophy.

The paper studies some of the aspects of explanation discussed in recent literature. In the introduction various contexts are presented to answers to requests for an explanation, i. e. to the question: „Why is it so and so?” The register of the answers to that question, though not exhaustive, allows however to distinguish a few essential types of scientific explanation, namely: 1. deductive explanation, 2. probabilistic, 3. functional (teleological), and, 4. genetic. The distinction is based on the different logical relations between the explanatory premises and the statement requiring explanation.The request for explanation does not appear in natural sciences only, or at the level of philosophical knowledge, but also in everyday language. However, the considerations here presented are primarily concerned with the aspects of explanation as found in physical sciences. And again the paper distinguishes: 1. structural explanations, 2. systematic, 3. pragmatic, and, 4. canonic. Structural explanation seeks to find out the essence of things, the various modes of explanation being stages leading to that aim. Explanation itself consists in bringing out the inner nature (elements) of the object investigated and defining the coexistence of these elements. Systemic (contextual) explanation formes a sui generis transposition of the empirism, holistically interpreted. A given fact or law is considered explained when a sufficient knowledge has been reached of the system into which the sentence explained has been introduced; this knowledge allows the interpretation of the sentence as a coherent member of the system. In that aspect, a certain set of characteristics with which we enter into cognitive contact is not understandable by itself, but becomes explained once its relationship with other sets of characteristics has been shown. The basic statement by means of which we express 'the pragmatic (3) aspect can be phrased as follows: a person A explains X to a person B by means of Y. To explain someone something means to make understood to him what he does not understand. The explanatory value of a set of sentences Y regarding the sentence explained X, for the person B, depends not only on X and Y, but also on personal conviction, intelligence, education, criticism and so on. In that sense pragmatic explanation is relative. The canonic model (4) takes into consideration these logical relationships mainly as occur between the explanatory sentences and the explained ones, explanation being treated here not so much as a process as as a result. According to the type of relationship, explanation is a) de- ductive-nomological, b) statistic-inductive, or c) deductive-statistic. The sentences describing the explained events (explanation at the first level of scientific syste- misation) are explained by means of the schemes a and to, while at higher levels schemes a and c are applied.

The starting point chosen by the author is that of minimal consciousness: information received and acknowledged.1. Evolution of information in semiconductor systems. The semiconductor model is the one that allows the best observation of information and its transformation into electric effects, summating processes and semiconducting memory. Electromagnetic information, jointly with the chemical one (acceptor and donor atoms) may modify the substantial contents of the semiconductor, and, in the process, give the latter one a higher degree of order and anisotropic. A semiconductor may perform manifold functions simultaneously, even though possessing a very simple system. Generally speaking, there exists a semiconducting "consciousness”.2. Evolution of information in biological systems. Life with its characteristic feature — consciousness — appears to have evolved out of semiconductive properties. The substantial content was replaced by an organic one, while the basic semiconductive functions were preserved. The evolution affected the quantity and efficiency of information received. The reception itself of information stimulates the development of the system. On the whole one can speak of a philogenesis of information. In the evolution described here, a new element appeared when the reception of information was made dependent on metabolism. The next stage in the development was reached with the appearance of information canals within the biological system. Parallelly, there exists another system of information based on field principles. Field steering is certainly important in old functions of the organism such as morphogenesis and regeneration.The general property of semiconductors — reception »of information and its translation into electric effects — found optimal possibilities in nerves. Ranvier’s choke works on the principle of semiconductive current — voltage junction. Myelin is certainly a waveguide steering the weak electromagnetic wave one way to the choke. The impulsive currents picture should give rise to a wave. The functioning of the nerves without any losses and with minimal self-noise and little stimulating energy required, and action currents with a characteristic spike prove the existence of a current voltage process at the p-n junction. One has to take into account a small électrostriction of the nerve. Hodgkin’s soda pump may not be the cause of nerve stimulation but its result and a necessary condition of depolarisation.3. Evolutive preparation of consciousness. In archaic animal groups, loosely dispersed sensitive cells gather in an anisotropic system terminated with brain. At an earlier stage, nerve cells gathered larger quantities of DNA and RNA. Parallelly, the circulation system develops. The oxygen effect, important for semiconductors, continues to be obligatory in the reception of information by the brain. The archaic field code is apparently respected in brains activity since pigments such as melanin and lipofuscin are found. Pigments are good transformers of electromagnetic energy. Here they may exist either as association against excessive overenergizing of the brain by radiation from outside, or as maximal utilization of weak self-radiations.Another evolutive direction is the increase and differentiation of the cerebral surface. The superficial density of electrons, known from semiconductor physics was apparently necessary for a subtle reception of information and production of consciousness. The development of cerebral cortex is associated with postnatal ontogenesis in man. The cortex is potentiality developing parallelly to reception of information. It is to be supposed that the electrostasis ECS of the brain increases parallel, which is testified by the normalization of the EEG.The action potentials of the brain, the semiconducting properties of DNA and RNA and nerves, electrostasis, the oxygen effect (the blood flow in the brain being 25 times higher than in any other tissue), the presence of melanin and lipofuscin, the reception of all information in the form of electric effect — all this proves that the semiconductor model was the starting point for the reception of information in the brain. The archaic field code also was included in the functioning of the brains. Reflexive consciousness is certainly connected with field reflection from ECS and the reception of the wave reflected by one of the layers of the cerebral cortex.

En tant qu’une partie inséparable de la philosophie, l’éthique participe nécessairement aussi bien à ses comjonctures qu’à ses crises. La crise de la pensée philosophique moderine et contemporaine se manifeste par une séparation particulièrement profonde entre les tendances empiristes et les tendances aprioristes. Dans le domaine de l’éthique, cette séparation s’exprime, d’un côté, par la proposition de fonder une science empiirique de la morale — la seule autorisée — d’autre côté, par la proposition de construire des systemes de normes ou d’appréciations morales résolubles à priori. La première de ces tendances perd le caractère normatif, inséparable de la morale et de l’éthique, l’autre rompt par contrę tout lien de la "logique des normes” avec les réels drames moraux des hommes concrets. En conséquence, toutes les deux tendances — pour des raisons différentes — égarent les authemtiques problèmes éthiques et l’ethique elle-même. Ces raisonis-là, l’auteur les volt dans le choix d’un mauvais point de départ de l’éthique par toutes les deux tendances. II essaie d’homogénéiser les problèmes éthiques, désignant une expérience de la morale, convenablement conçue, comma le juste point de départ de l’éthique, libre aussi bien des erreurs d’un empirisme extrême que de celles d’un apriorisme.Les thèses proposees par l’auteur peuvent parfois paraitre peu fondées. Ceci s’explique par le fait que l’article présenté sert de chapitre d’introduction à une étude plus vaste sous le titre: "Conception et méthodologie de l’éthique”. Dans les parties suivantes de cette étude, les thèses avancées trouveront des cadres plus larges et une justification plus approfondie.

L’auteur analyse la Constitution pastorale sur la présence de l’Église dans le monde contemporain, Gaudium et Spes du II-ème concile du Vatican, relativement au problème de développement de la personne humaine et de l’humanité. A la lumière de l'enseigmement cionciliaire, le progrès est um devoir moral pour l’homme et pour l’humanité, en tant qu’un ordre de la participation à l’oeuvre de la Providence, de la participation à la création de Dieu, en tant qu’un ordre du perfectionnememt personnel de l’homme.En conséquence de l'unité de la nature humaine, le progrès personnel doit être intégral, doit embrasser l’ensemble de l’aspect spirituel et physique de Thomme. La supériorité de l’élément spirituel dans la nature humaine décide pourtant de ce que le progrès spirituel domine le progrès matériel et conditionne le développement général de l’homme et de l’humanité. L’auteur signale ici une convergence de la pensée conciliaire et de la tendance contemporaine de la théorie du développement économique aussi bien chez les économistes que chez les sociologues. On a cité les références des savants suivamts: W. W. Rostow, W. A. Lewis, M. Ginsberg, T. Parsons, D. Riesman, B. F. Hoselitz, R. W. Goldsmith, R. Barre, K. Samuelson, J. L. Lehret, C. S. Belshaw et F. A. Westphalen. Tous ces auteurs attribuent un rôle décisif pour le développement économique, aux facteurs moraux et culturels.Le Il-èrne concile du Vatican reconnait les biens économiques de même que le travail humain la propriété de l’humanité entière. Le progrès, pour être vrai et équitable, doit être universel et embrasser toute l’humanité. La personne humaine est la source des lois morales gouvernant le progrès, aussi bien dans le domaine de la culture que dans celui de l’économie. La seule voie du progrès, ouverte à l'humanité c’est le progrès au service de la personne humaine. L’Église catholique, désire aider l’humanité dans ce progrès, en lui donnant à sa disposition des moyens naturels — les norm es de la loi naturelle, et surnaturels — les sources de la grâce.

L’auteur constate que la notion du bien commun, qui parait très souvent dans les écrits de saint Thomas et qui joue un rôle fondamental dans la totalité de son système social et moral, possède dans les textes du philosophe d’Aquin de multiples significations. Une fois eile apparaït en tant que bonum commune totius universi, une autre en tant que bonum commune universitatis humanae, une autre encore en tant que bonum commune societatis — cette dernière signification se rapportant aux communautés de différents genres et de différents rangs: de la familie jusqu’à l’État. II faut aussi distinguer dans les énonciations de Thomas entre le bien commun extérieur (separatum) et intérieur (immanens). Tous les auteurs ne remarquent cependant pas ces différences et c’est pourquoi il y a dans leurs analyses des malentendus. L’auteur propose, en suivant une suggestion de Maritain, et conformément à la manière de comprendre cette notion, consacrée déjà par l’usage dans les ency cliques et admise dans la Constitution Gaudium et Spes, de la réserver pour déterminer le bien commun des différentes communatés (de la familie jusqu’à la communauté de tous les hommes) et de la définir à l’avenir ainsi. L’auteur polémise en particulier avec les arguments de A. F. Utz dans sa Sozialethik et avec ceux du milieu qu’il représente. Ces arguments et la manière d’analyser le bien commun, ont cause, selon l’auteur, un nou'vel obscurcissement du problème entier.