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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Rick Lewis
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2.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
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3.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
James Sterba
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In this article I argue that even a libertarian conception of morality leads to a right to welfare. I further argue that extending this right to welfare, particularly to future generations, as I claim we must, leads to the egalitarian requirement that as far as possible we should use up no more resources than are necessary to meet our basic needs, securing for ourselves a decent life, but no more. I further show how the egalitarian ethics I defend can be put into practice peacefully through a combination of individual and collective action.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Philip Badger
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5.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Simon Clarke
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Freedom is instrumentally necessary for individuality regarding the matter of life’s ending. We may worry that people in these situations may have hampered decision-making capacities, but this is a reason for caution rather than complete restriction. The person who is terminally ill is still often the one most likely to judge accurately the meaning and purpose of her present life – more accurately than others who could choose for her. By reflecting on that meaning and purpose, under certain conditions a terminally ill person may reasonably decide that her life is no longer worth living.
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6.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Michael A. Istvan
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7.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Seán Moran
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8.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Francisco Mejia
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9.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Ryan Andrews
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10.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Richard Oxenberg
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A sound democracy must be peopled by citizens who see concern for the dignity of others, and for the good of society as a whole, as integral to their own private good, such that private and public interest coincide. This requires a degree of moral and intellectual sophistication that can only be achieved through a robust program of value-oriented, ethical, broadly ‘philosophical’ education. The morally realized citizen-kings of Kant’s Kingdom of Ends can become such only as they approximate to Plato’s intellectually-realized philosopher-kings. So a value-oriented education is essential to the democratic form as such.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Stephen C. Small
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12.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
David Birch
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13.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Robert Newman
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14.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Fred Leavitt
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15.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Sally Latham
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16.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Toni Vogel Carey
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17.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Peter Adamson
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18.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
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19.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
David Taube
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20.
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Philosophy Now:
Volume >
110
Robin Davenport
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