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List Ojca Świe˛ tego Jana Pawła II
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Stefan Swieżawski
Stefan Swieżawski
List gratulacyjny
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Stanisław Judycki
Stanisław Judycki
Antoni B. Stępień
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The article presents the philosopher A. B. Stępień (born 1931). In the first part, against the background of philosophical trends of the 20th century, the main components of A. B. Stępień’s philosophical standpoint are characterised. The author of the article includes among them: in epistemology − anti-sceptical, anti-relativist and realist views; in metaphysics − theism and stress on the possibility of rational argumentation for existence of God; in axiology − objectivist views, especially in the field of existence of moral values and norms derived from them. The next part of the article is devoted to a discussion of A. B. Stępień’s didactic activities with a special stress on his contribution to the development of Polish philosophy after World War II.
The article presents the philosopher A. B. Stępień (born 1931). In the first part, against the background of philosophical trends of the 20th century, the main components of A. B. Stępień’s philosophical standpoint are characterised. The author of the article includes among them: in epistemology − anti-sceptical, anti-relativist and realist views; in metaphysics − theism and stress on the possibility of rational argumentation for existence of God; in axiology − objectivist views, especially in the field of existence of moral values and norms derived from them. The next part of the article is devoted to a discussion of A. B. Stępień’s didactic activities with a special stress on his contribution to the development of Polish philosophy after World War II.
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Monika Dadia
Monika Dadia
Bibliografia prac Antoniego B. Stępnia
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Wojciech Chudy
Wojciech Chudy
The problem of truth in the work of art
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The text aims at considering from various points of view the presence of the value of truth in the work of art. The first step is a phenomenological analysis of epistemological,ontological and aesthetic phenomena connected with perception of the work of art. Its conclusion is the statement that truth belongs to the characteristics of both creation (contents, structure) and reception (cognition of various aspects) of the work. The very fact that the aesthetic value of the object claiming to be beautiful can be discussed proves the presence of the object on the rational-veritable plane.The next aspect undertaken in the article is concerned with the epistemological and methodological criticism of the view (represented here by R. Ingarden) that there is a radical difference between the objective domains of science and art. An attempt is made to show that the view is rooted rather in ideologically understood scientism and neo-positivism than in a realistic conception of cognition through art. In a completely realistic attitude the borderline between ’what is rationally cognised’ and ’what is beautiful’ (the sphere of quasi in Ingarden’s meaning) is not an absolute borderline. The domain of the work of art also contains cognitive elements, often existentially and morally essential for man’s life.As it appears, a similar position can be found in G. B. Vico’s texts that proclaim the unity of poetic and metaphysical perspective in ancient beginnings of anthropological thought about the human world. Nowadays a methodological tendency is observed on the philosophical plane that allows joining the veritable and aesthetic aspects, and hence exploring the objective domain of art in the cognitive aspect. This is expressed today, among others, in the increase of the significance of art in social, cultural and scientific life.
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Jan Czerkawski
Jan Czerkawski
The question of the existence of the material world in N. Malebranche’s philosophy
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In the article the evolution of Malebranche’s views on the existence of the material world has been presented. In the early period of his work he mainly dealt with epistemological and methodological issues. He did not attach much importance to the problem of the existence of the material world. In that period he seemed to completely accept the Cartesian proof of the existence of bodies. In the later period of his work, when he puts the issue in the centre of his reflection, first he subjects the Cartesian proof to criticism and then he justifies the thesis that a rational proof of the existence of the material world is not possible. In the article special attention was paid to the close relation between Malebranche’s theory of seeing in God and occasionalism on the one hand and criticism of the Cartesian proof and the method of justifying the thesis about impossibility of giving a rational proof of the existence of the material world.Although Malebranche announces the standpoint that will be later defended by G. Berkeley, but he does not accept it. He brought the certainty about the existence of the material world from the philosophical plane to the religious one: the Holy Writ teaches that God created the world.
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Włodzimierz Galewicz
Włodzimierz Galewicz
On the Aristotelian theory of practical cognition
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The article contains an analysis of Aristotle’s views concerning ethical cognition. The author considers, among others, the following questions: (1) Did Aristotle at all know something like, literally understood, ’cognition by feeling’, that is a kind of emotional defining values or normative features; and if so, then (2) Speaking of ethical aisthêsis, did he understand this kind of emotional intuition by it? The result of considerations is that although nature and contents of ethical perception do not appear in the texts of the author of Nikomachean Ethics too clearly, it can be stated that ethical perception is not common sensual perception, but it most reminds of an observation through which certain mathematical relations and truths are defined. Practical wisdom consists more in using this kind of ethical intuition than in cognition and in use of some general truths.
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Jerzy Gałkowski
Jerzy Gałkowski
The truth of freedom
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The article considers the problem of relations between freedom, intellect and will in the context of Christian philosophy, and especially in the sphere of Karol Wojtyła’s thought. The author comes to the following conclusions. Complete freedom is the so-called ’freedom to’, that is freedom to do good for other people. Good acts are acts consistent with the conscience of the acting person as well as with rational premises. ’Freedom to’ is different from ’freedom from’ that consists in gaining independence from ’pressures of evil’ (both outer and inner) that threaten man. In this way the author proclaims himself in favour of the intellectualist solution of the opposition will − intellect, that is of the Thomist solution, and against the standpoint of Duns Scotus (voluntarism).
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Mieczysław Gogacz
Mieczysław Gogacz
Remarks on the specificity of Polish culture in history
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The article is a sketch on the history of Polish culture. The author illustrates with examples from history of Poland the thesis that Catholicism is the most important component of Polish culture and gives reasons for it.
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Arkadiusz Gut
Arkadiusz Gut
On predicate logic
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This paper presents the central part of the contemporary logic: the predicate logic. By determining the types of primitive elements that make up the parts of the judgement the author tries to describe the structure (logical form) of atomic judgement that we meet in predicate logic. The main task is to find out the logical and philosophical fundaments of the asymmetry of the subject and predicate in the logic of quantification. This main aim was motivated by the assumption that if the current logic (predicate logic) has the significance, which we are inclined to attach to it, then it must reflect fundamental features of our thought about the world. Therefore the author of the paper analyses the logical and philosophical reasons that can be put forward for preferring the modern predicate logic to the traditional theory of general inferences which occur in syllogistic. To show the difference between the logical form of the basic proposition established in traditional logic and the logical form of atomic proposition in post-fregean logic some specific points were taken into consideration: the problem of reference; negation; existential import and others. At the end it was explicated that the crucial move – which was revealed in predicate logic – lay in extending the idea of function−argument analysis from mathematics to logic.
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Zygmunt Hajduk
Zygmunt Hajduk
Epistemic values
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The paper discusses naturalistic axiology of L. Laudan (normative naturalism) and social epistemology of H. Longino (contextual empiricism). Both standpoints are subjected to criticism. G. Doppelt, A. Rosenberg, and H. Siegel argue that Laudan’s axiology lacks any naturalistic foundation. K. Freedman shows that this objection is based on a misunderstanding of Laudan’s use of the term “naturalism”. He distinguishes two senses of this term running throughout Laudan’s work. Once those senses are made explicit the above objection dissappears.Next, the attention is drawn to the virtues of Longino’s epistemology as a viable alternative both to positivism and holism. The paper presents objections raised by Ph. Kitcher (the charge of relativism), F. Schmitt (the charge of incoherence) and M. Solomon (the charge of individualism) against Longino’s views and arguments defending her position developed by K. B. Wray.The paper claims that the discussions presented can be best understood within the framework of (epistemic) axiology initiated in the fifties of the XXth century – among others – by R. Rudner, C. W. Churchman, I. Levi.
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Józef Herbut
Józef Herbut
Über analoge Redeweise von Gott in philosophischer Sprache
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Weil zwischen Gott und Geschöpf die Beziehung partieller Ähnlichkeit besteht, läßt sich aus den Eigenschaften der Geschöpfe das Sein Gottes in analoger Weise erkennen. Die traditionelle natürliche Theologie hat hierfür dreifache Weg ausfindig gemacht: der Verneinung, der Bejahung und der Vervollkommnung. Auf diese Weise bekommene Erkenntnis von Gott ist im hohen Grade abstrakt, wenn sie in der Sprache traditioneller Metaphysik ausgedrückt wird.Die Begriffe der Eigenschaften Gottes, die in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie gebraucht werden, sind zwar nicht so abstrakt gedacht; aber meistens sind sie unklar. In der solchartigen Situation wäre es angebracht nicht zu vergessen, das daß Schließen das wesentliche Mittel ist, um uns klar zu werden über das, was wir sagen. In der Sprache natürlichen Theologie: das Schließen der Konsequenzen aus der unseren Aussagen über Gott.Am Ende des Artikels wird auch eine moderne Reformulierung der analogen Reden über Gott vorgestellt (die Proposition H. G. Hubbeling’s in: Einführung in die Religionsphilosophie, Göttingen 1981, S. 173-175).
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Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
Troubles with the truth
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The article consists of two parts.In the first one the author, referring to Alfred Tarski’s and Antoni B. Stępień’s views and contesting them, presents his own definition of ’truth’, changing his former views in thisrespect. The definition is constituted by the formula:(e 0) /\x [x is true º \/yεR (x states y)],which may be read in the following way:a sentence is true iff it states a certain real (occurring) state of things.The above definition is consistent with the so called (J)[adacki’s] convention that, contrary to the so called (T)[arski’s] convention avoids certain difficulties, e.g. possible entailing, through occurrence of an extra-linguistic state of things, existence of a respective true sentence. This definition also does not get entangled either in accepting purely intentional or negative state of things. Using the opportunity to do so the author proclaims himself in favour of the evidential criterion of truth, contradictory criterion of falsehood, and pragmatic criterion of faith.In the second part of the article the author replies to the questions concerning his theses that were put during the discussion ’in the company of Professor Stępień’s pupils and his pupils’ pupils. Especially he answers the charges and questions brought by Dr. Paweł Garbacz. They mainly focused on the problems of falsehood. The author admits two conceptions of falsehood: a false sentence does not state anything, or, a false sentence states a presented (fictitious) state of things.
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Stanisław Janeczek
Stanisław Janeczek
Epistemology in the teaching of physics by the Commission for National Education
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The subject of the article is defining the specificity of broadly understood epistemology (theory of cognition, methodology of science) that could be seen in the teaching of physics at secondary schools (and partly also at universities) run by the Commission for National Education. It was the first European „ministry” of education, which worked in Poland in the years 1773-1795. Its specificity was defined by a new model of school directed to scientific rather than linguistic-humanist, and on a higher level − also than philosophical education. On the level of syllabuses it meant replacing lecturing Aristotelian philosophy of nature with phenomenalistic-mathematical natural science (mechanists), oriented to technical-economic practice (utilitarianism). The syllabuses declared so radical a break up − in the spirit of pre-positivism of The French Encyclopaedia − with traditional education that at secondary schools practically all the philosophical subjects were removed, apart from logic and ethics, and at universities logic was cancelled too. However, the teaching practice differed from the syllabus and organisational radicalism that was incomparable with any other education system functioning in Europe. In it numerous handbooks written in the circle of the so-called philosophia recentiorum were used. It joined the Aristotelian philosophy of nature with elements of modern natural history. Introduced into the secondary and university education in the whole of Europe in the first half of the 18th century, it broke the framework of the traditional philosophy syllabus. Also the handbooks of the Commission for National Education − like all of the eclectic school physics of the Enlightenment era − still contained philosophical elements, with the idea of justifying them inductively. However, at the same time numerous troubles appeared resulting from putting into effect the empirical-mathematical ideal of natural history. This was the result of shortage of instruments necessary for performing experiments, even on the didactic level that dominated over research work in the Polish science of that time. Also doubts were expressed as to the possibilities and range of applying the language of mathematics for defining the data obtained in experiments. This resulted from a low methodological level of natural science of that time that still had a describing-systematising character (natural history, partly also physics). Hence doubts appeared in defining the mathematical status of natural science, still treated as applied mathematics, or as an integral − sometimes even first-rate − element of physics. Especially development of mathematically defined mechanics and the possibilities of applying it in technology gave a higher prestige to reflection over technical-economic activity, which led to general acceptance of the ideal of applied science preferred at those times.
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Stanisław Judycki
Stanisław Judycki
Introspection as a philosophical problem
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In its first half the article presents the main assumptions of the traditional (so-called Cartesian) theory of introspection. Among others (1) privileged access, (2) undoubtfulness of introspective data, (3) privacy of introspective data, (4) proposition that introspection is a separate act of consciousness, (5) proposition that introspection is a kind of inner perception, (6) proposition that introspection is concerned with what is going on in the consciousness at the moment, (7) proposition that introspective data may be the basis for knowledge about the outer world (fundationalism) belong to them. In the part concerned with behaviourism the main assumptions of scientific (methodological) behaviourism and of philosophical (logical) behaviourism are presented. The author accepts the main point of the criticism directed at the project of G. Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism. He maintains the charge that the behaviourist approach to mentality does not allow one to talk about various kinds of mental states. In the part concerning the structure of introspection stress is laid on the role of attention. With the help of the idea of modification of attention the author tries to dismiss the charge that performing a definite act and at the same time introspectively defining it is impossible. With the use of the idea of attention he also shows how it is possible to oppose the objection of continuing acts of introspection into infinity and the charge that introspection modifies its object. Also the issues of infallibility and of completeness of introspective data in the light of certain experimental data and theoretical hypotheses (e.g. blindsight, psychoanalysis, N. Chomsky’s theory of the language) are discussed. The last part concerns the problem of the relation between the ideas of introspection and unconsciousness. ’Unconsciousness’ in the strong sense means a certain kind of conditioning to which human mind may be subjected. This conditioning is not only actually unconscious, but by its nature is unrealisable in the normal introspective way. Various ideas of unconsciousness are analysed: unconsciousness as what can be called to mind, unconscious habitual knowledge, unconsciousness in the psychoanalytical interpretation, unconsciousness as conditioning by the so-called computative mind. The author shows that the autonomy of the ’I’ given in introspection is something peculiar and as such cannot be reduced to any kind of unconscious conditioning.
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Stanisław Kiczuk
Stanisław Kiczuk
Laws of natural sciences and propositions of formal logic and metaphysics
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In the first part of the article remarks are made concerning the laws of natural sciences. First of all the field of analyses of modern natural sciences is presented.The second part of the article is devoted to a characteristic of the laws of formal logic, and especially of the laws of classical sentential calculus. The view that logical propositions state certain objective relations between states of things is explicated. After other authors, it is stressed that learning logic we not only train the art of correct thinking, but we also learn about certain relations between facts that constitute the logical structure of the world.In the third part of the article propositions of the general theory of being, i.e. the first principles of being and propositions concerning entity compositions are characterised; also numerous comparative analyses are made. The article tries to show similarities and differences between natural sciences laws, laws of logic and theses of the general theory of being. First of all attention is drawn to relations occurring between some laws of logic of sentences and the first principles of being.
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Henryk Kiereś
Henryk Kiereś
What is happening to aesthetics?
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In order to answer the question ’What is happening to aesthetics?’ in the title of the article one has to decide what the problem of aesthetics consists in. The discipline is in a crisis, and sometimes its ’death’ is announced and the rule of anti-aesthetics is proclaimed whereas the debate ’Aesthetics or anti-aesthetics?’ ends up in a cognitive stalemate: aesthetics is tainted with the error of normativism and reductionism; and anti-aesthetics finishes in relativism. Hence a return is necessary to the classical philosophy (metaphysics) of art (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas) that avoids errors of the aesthetic tradition and works out a universal and neutral criterion for evaluating purposefulness in art, and also does not interfere with the competence of humanities or of art criticism.
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Leon Koj
Leon Koj
The ways of practising philosophy
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In the article the question is considered if in the domain of philosophy it is possible to use methods that meet the postulates of repeatability and inter-subjective accessibility. The author analyses the very idea of method, as it functions outside philosophical disciplines and he states that in the very domain of philosophy it is difficult to separate subjective theses put forward by philosophers from the very methods of philosophising. He is rather in favour of the conclusion that in philosophy formulating repeatable and inter-subjectively accessible methods is very difficult, but at the same time he stresses that such a possibility should not be given up.
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Jan Krokos
Jan Krokos
Frage und Erkenntnis in den Anfängen der Philosophie
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Dieser Artikel skizziert die Bedeutung der Fragestellung in der Erkenntnis, wie sie sich in den Anfänger der griechischen Philosophie darstellt: bei den drei Milesiern (Thales, Anaximander und Anaximenes), in den sokratischen und platonischen Dialogen sowie bei Aristoteles. Die griechische Philosophie war von Anfang an mit der Fragestellung an sich verbunden. Die erste philosophische Frage war die Frage nach dem άρχή. Sie diente der Entmythologisierung und hatte Erkenntnischarakter. Die Bedeutung der Frage nach dem άρχή wurde unterschieden je nach Bedeutung des Terminus άρχή. Jedoch unabhängig von diesen Unterschieden zielte die Frage auf die Klärung der ganzen Wirklichkeit ab, und diese Klärung mußte außerhalb der Fakten, dem Verstande nach, gesucht werden. Während wir es bei den Milesiern mit dem “Faktum“ der Fragestellung zu tun haben, wurde die Frage bei Sokrates und später bei Plato deutlich in die Methode, zur Fragestellung zu gelangen, eingebaut. Die Dialektik, jenes “Spiel“ von Frage und Antwort, war bei Sokrates und später bei Plato eine Konfrontation zwischen der einen und der anderen Seele und diente zunächst der gemeinsamen Wahrheitsfindung, der das Verhalten folgt. Im Bereich der Elenktik spielte die Frage eine therapeutische, dagegen im Bereich der Maieutik eine stimulierende Rolle. Die sokratische Dialektik betraf nicht die materielle Wirklichkeit, sondern des menschliche Vorstellungsvermögen von der Wirklichkeit und führte zu neuem Wissen, das rein intellektuell war. Gemäß der Lehre Platos war die Frage ein Mittel, um zu dem vorzudringen, was intelligibel ist, d.h. zur Idee. Erkenntnis wurde zur Erinnerung, zur Anamnese, und der Impuls für die Erinnerung an die Idee war unter anderem die Frage. Den Beginn der Theorie der Frage finden wir schon in den Logikschriften des Aristoteles. Er tat dies im Kontext des Syllogismus und der Theorie der Lehre. Die Frage betrachtete er als Baumaterial für jegliche Diskussion. Er unterschied vier Arten von Fragen, je nachdem, wonach wir fragen, sowie vier Arten von Fragen, je nachdem, welches Wissen wir erreichen, das sich auf das Wissen von ὄτι und διότι zurückführen läßt. Voraussetzung für jede dieser Fragestellungen ist das fehlende Wissen. Aristoteles bringt in das Phänomen der Bedeutung von Fragen im Erkenntnisablauf einige neue Elemente ein: er zeigt die logische Ordnung der Fragestellung auf; das Stellen von Fragen siedelt er im Bereich praktischer Fähigkeiten an, die der Wissensaneignung dienen, und er weist darauf hin, daß von der Art der Fragestellung der inhaltliche Gehalt der Antwort sowie die Art des erlangten Wissens abhängen.
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Stanisław Majdański
Stanisław Majdański
Między „ontologia˛”, „metafizyką” i „realizmem”
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