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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4

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from the editor

2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4

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features

3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Alastair S. Gunn

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Humans have largely transformed the natural environment and there is scarcely an area of the world which has not been affected by human activity. Human domination of the environment, in particular by the creation of infrastructure, urbanization, and conversion to agriculture, has mostly proceeded in an unplanned and frequently destructive manner. Almost fifty percent of humans already live in cities and this proportion will continue to grow. However, issues of urbanization are little addressed in the environmental philosophical literature. I explore community and sustainability in an urban context, drawing on the work of the landscape architect Ian McHarg who, I argue, may have more to offer an urbanized world than iconic figures such as Aldo Leopold.
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
James P. Sterba

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Biocentrists are criticized (1) for being biased in favor of the human species, (2) for basing their view on an ecology that is now widely challenged, and (3) for failing to reasonably distinguish the life that they claim has intrinsic value from the animate and inanimate things that they claim lack intrinsic value. In this paper, I show how biocentrism can be defended against these three criticisms, thus permitting biocentrists to justifiably appropriate the salutation, “Let the life force (or better the ethical demands of life) be with you.”

discussion papers

5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Roy W. Perrett

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The modern environmental movement has a tradition of respect for indigenous cultures and many environmentalists believe that there are important ecological lessons to be learned from studying the traditional life styles of indigenous peoples. More recently, however, some environmentalists have become more sceptical. This scepticism has been sharpened by current concerns with the cause of indigenous rights. Indigenous peoples have repeatedly insisted on their rights to pursue traditional practices or to develop their lands, even when the exercise of these rights has implications in conflict with environmentalist values. These conflicts highlight some important questions in environmental ethics, particularly about the degree to which global environmental justice should be constrained by therecognition of indigenous rights. I explore some of these issues and argue for the relevance of the “capability approach” to environmental justice.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Sandra B. Rosenthal, Rogene A. Buchhholz

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In the last few years, some attempts have been made to overcome the disparity between environmental ethics and business ethics. However, as the situation now stands the various positions in business ethics have not incorporated any well-developed theoretical foundation for environmental issues, and conversely, environmental ethics is failing to capture an audience that could profit greatly from utilizing its theoretical insights and research. In this paper, we attempt to provide a unified conceptual framework for business ethics and environmental ethics that can further the dialogue that has recently begun, perhaps bringing it to a deeper theoretical level.
7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Christopher J. Preston

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Debates over the existence of intrinsic value have long been central to professional environmental ethics. Holmes Rolston, III’s version of intrinsic value is, perhaps, the most well known. Recently, powerful critiques leveled by Bryan G. Norton and J. Baird Callicott have suggested that there is an epistemological problem with Rolston’s account. In this paper, I argue first that the debates over intrinsic value are as pertinent now as they have ever been. I then explain the objections that Norton and Callicott have raised against Rolston’s position. In the main body of the paper, I attempt to show that Rolston’s position can accommodate these objections. In this defense of Rolston’s position, I have two goals: first, to show that the notion of non-subjective intrinsic value in nature is coherent, and second, to illuminate the places where further philosophical work on intrinsic value remains to be done

book reviews

8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Timothy Casey

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Patrick Hayden

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Anna Peterson

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Gary E. Varner

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referees

12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4

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index

13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4

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14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4

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