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1. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Gunnar Lund

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This paper examines two senses of the term “transgender:” transgender as across the gender binary and transgender as beyond the gender binary. Explored are the difficulties this ambiguity poses to transpeople. In short, using the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure and Richard Rorty, this paper argues that the meaning of “transgender” must simultaneously embrace both senses of the term, rather than one or the other.

2. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Kristianne C. Anor

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Thomas Kuhn argues that scientific advancements sometimes involve paradigm shifts between incommunsurable theories, thoughts, and concepts. I argue that the phenomenon Kuhn is attempting to describe is better explained as akin to a greatest integer function of punctuated equilibrium. I conclude that Kuhn is mistaken in thinking that science is an actively vigorous, cumulative discipline.

3. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Kyle Cavagnini

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The twentieth century saw extended development in the philosophy of science to incorporate contemporary expansions of scientific theory and investigation. Richard Rorty was a prominent and rather controversial thinker who maintained that all progress, from social change to scientific inquiry, was achieved through the redescription of existing vocabularies. However, this theory fails to describe revolutionary scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn’s theories of paradigm change, as first described in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, better portray this process. I attempt to show this by applying Kuhn’s and Rorty’s views to examples of scientific progress and comparing the results.

4. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Amanda Frankel

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While Feminism and Marxism each promote revolution in the name of equality, Feminist struggle is dismissed by Marxism. As workers, women face the capitalist narrative, but women’s alienation is deeper than mere Marxist alienation. Women face the additional narrative of the patriarchy. This paper seeks to show that true Marxist revolution is impossible unless it is preceded by a Feminist revolution that breaks gender and sexual stigmas.

5. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Garrett Allen

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Thomas Reid offers a powerful challenge to Hume and his skeptical system. In “Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles,” William Alston gives an explanation of that challenge and concludes in favor of a Reidian-inspired thesis. I argue, however, that Alston’s thesis is a diluted version of Reid’s radical position, one that Reid’s principles cannot accommodate. Thus, I conclude that, because Alston’s position is not available, we are left with Reid’s radical thesis, with which we are rightly uncomfortable.

6. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Phillip Curtsmith

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The following is a foundationalist exercise based upon a single observation or postulate distinguishing one’s knowledge of information versus one’s knowledge of one’s former unknowing of that information. This postulate is titled the “principle of implicit ignorance.” Utilizing this postulate, several theorems are constructed including the equivalence to Hume’s thesis regarding the absence of knowledge of a necessary connection. The postulate is then negated, demonstrating equivalence to Kant’s thesis regarding the presence of synthetic a priori statements. The final result is a single general epistemic postulate that brokers between the two respective positions. Because both systems are the result of this general principle, rejecting the results of one system necessarily forces one into the contrary position.

7. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Vincent Charles Sawaya

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With the rise of state sponsored standardized testing and curriculum alignment, it is important to consider the impact such practices may have on educational aims. In this paper, I argue that critical thinking ought to be the principle aim in every educational pursuit, and that practices such as “teaching to the test” may be detrimental to its development. I maintain these claims with a discussion of the philosophical works of Harvey Siegel, Israel Scheffler, and John Dewey. Operating from their definitions of critical thinking, rationality, and education respectively, I offer support for my conclusion based on one’s ability to challenge the soundness of claims, and the revisional quality of true belief. The issue of critical thinking as general or subject specific is also addressed. Using Siegel’s notion of a critical spirit, I propose that a universal quality of critical thinking lies in its normative as opposed to technical aspects.

8. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Debra Bellamy

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This work examines the structure of discourses on homosexuality, taking the nature-versus-nurture question as a case study, in order to display the incoherency that results from taking such questions for granted. This paper critically explores the alleged neutrality and objectivity of discourses on sexuality, and within this exploration, a breakdown of the categories of sexuality, sex, gender, and nature occurs. What is shown is that the breakdown of these categories renders the nature-versus-nurture Question itselfquite questionable.

9. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Hannah Laurens

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One of the main themes in Spinoza’s Ethics is the issue of human freedom: What does it consist in and how may it be attained? Spinoza’s ethical views crucially depend on his metaphysical theory, and this close connection provides the answer to several central questions concerning Spinoza’s conception of human freedom. Firstly, how can we accommodate human freedom within Spinoza’s necessitarianism—in the context of which Spinoza rejects the notion of a free will? Secondly, how can humans, as merely finite beings, genuinely attain freedom? Can Spinoza defend his claim that we may even attain blessedness? I will argue that these questions are answered by appeal to a twofold in human nature. According to Spinoza, we are finite in infinity.

10. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5
Peter Antich

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11. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 5

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