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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 45
孫雲 平
Yun-Ping Sun
History and Life: Nietzsche’s Criticism of Historical Methodology and Teleology in Unfashionable Observations
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本文嘗試釐清尼采於〈歷史對人生之利弊〉一文中對於歷史的觀點以及 其對歷史跟人生關係的主張。其中主要說明尼采於本篇論文如何批判「歷史」 目的論及歷史書寫的方法論:尼采認為人類活動以及歷史本身沒有終極目 的、歷史書寫不可能達至客觀的要求。換言之,追求客觀性目標的歷史書寫 將因為作為純粹的理論性知識而成為人類生活與行動的阻礙、使人類的生命 萎縮與僵化。歷史知識以及記憶在尼采的眼中,成為人類生命之自主性創造 與實踐的絆腳石。藉此尼采展示人類個體的生命特徵:生命不僅不可能永恆 不朽、甚至並非實體性的存在、同時不必然是合乎理性、道德的與正義的。生命是必朽的、是一個不斷流變的、及難以理性掌握的現象。通過對歷史與歷史書寫態度的分析,尼采強調生命必須不斷地透過自主的抉擇、行動與實 踐來自我實現與自我超越。
This paper tries to elucidate what Nietzsche’s view of history and his thesis about the relationship between history and life would be in his essay On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for the Life. It is above all to explain how Nietzsche criticizes the teleology of history and the methodology of historiography in this article: Nietzsche claims that there would be no ultimate destination of human activities and the history itself, and that historical writing could not fulfill the objective standard. In another words, the historical writing which runs after the goal of objectivity would, as purely theoretical knowledge, become an obstacle of human life and action, and would then wither and ossify the human life. Historical knowledge and memory would be, in the sight of Nietzsche, a stone of stumbling to autonomous creativity and practice of human life. By this Nietzsche demonstrates the characteristics of human individual life: Neither can life be eternal and immortal, nor would it even be a substantial being; at the same time, it would not necessarily be rational, moral and just. Life is mortal and is a perpetually changing and unfathomable phenomenon. By analyzing the attitude toward history and historical writing, Nietzsche lays the emphasis that life would have to realize itself and surpass itself by the autonomous determination, action and practice.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2013 >
Issue: 45
沈享 民
Hsiang-Min Shen
Zhu Xi’s Critique of the Hu Xiang Scholars’ Understanding of “Humaneness”: An Analysis of How Zhu Xi’s View Differs from Hsieh Liang-Tso’s as Contrasted with Cheng Hao’s Interpretation
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本文研究朱熹與湖湘學者的兩個辯論:「觀過知仁」與「知覺為仁」,並 論證朱熹對謝良佐與湖湘諸學者的義理之理解並非無據。首先,本文檢視由 朱熹書信與相關文獻所保存下來的論辯內容,並討論朱熹之所以反對湖湘學 者以「知覺」定義「仁」的理據。朱熹認為仁不是一種高妙玄虛的知覺,仁 雖不是知覺本身,但有仁德的人必有知覺。依朱熹,仁專指心之德,即心靈 的卓越品質;有仁德的人以義理為知覺內容,而非只是知覺;知覺本身屬於 智而不是仁。進一步,本文論證:湖湘學者之所以認定知覺為仁,其理由在 於繼受了謝良佐所表述「仁」的內涵,後者遺落了程顥彰顯仁的生動明澈所 善用的類比或譬喻;相對地,謝良佐的表述幾乎接近以定義的方式呈現。是以,即便是朱熹錯解了湖湘學者的義理,在表述方式上,其實事出有因。
This paper focuses on two famous debates concerning “humaneness” between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars. Based on the survey of literature, this paper tries to justify, at least partly, what Zhu Xi comprehends about the philosophical position of Hu Xiang School. According to Zhu Xi’s philosophy, “humaneness” specifically labels the complete virtue of mind which exemplifies excellent qualities. On the one hand, Zhu Xi objects to the claim of those Hu Xiang scholars that“humaneness” can be defined as “vivid perception”; on the other hand, he argued that perception is by nature attributed to the intellectual virtue, although the humane person certainly possesses the competence of perception. As a matter of fact, the key point of the two debates between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars is how to treat Hsieh Liang-Tso’s interpretation of humaneness.Furthermore, this paper argues that Cheng Hao, Hsieh’s teacher, illustrated distinctively the concept of humaneness in his own analogical or metaphorical way, but Hsieh’s formulation of it is akin to definition of a certain kind. This missed link or the rhetorical nuance is the reason why the Hu Xiang scholars follow Hsieh’s approach to humaneness and Zhu Xi has to argue against their ideas of humaneness.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2013 >
Issue: 45
楊植 勝
Chih-Sheng Yang
Dialectic and Phenomenology: Reflections on the Methodology of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
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黑格爾的哲學方法向來說是辯證法,而辯證法則向來說是「正-反-合」 的形式。本文首先批評這兩種說法,接著依據《精神現象學》的文本,說明 黑格爾在作品裡明白表述的方法是現象學的方法,而不是辯證法的方法。本 文亦檢討其他的詮釋說法。至於辯證法,本文依據文本的分析,論證它並非 黑格爾使用的方法,而是他的形上學。
It is said that Hegel’s method is dialectic, while the dialectical method is said to be the form of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’. This paper argues that both these sayings are legends which lack support from the text. It then studies the text of Phenomenology of Spirit and advocates that what Hegel talks about in his work is the method of phenomenology. It also surveys and criticizes the other interpretations. As for dialectic, this paper proposes in accordance with the text to ascribe it to Hegel’s metaphysics rather than his method.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 45
王榮 麟
Rong-Lin Wang
On Rosenberg’s Darwinian Reductionism
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羅森堡(2006)主張生物學化約論。但他所鼓吹的化約論是「達爾文式 的」,這指的是達爾文所發現的天擇在決定生物學化約論應該採取什麼形 式,以及化約能夠進行到的最低層級為何等問題上,都發揮了舉足輕重的關 鍵作用。由於目前大多數的生物學哲學家皆為反化約論者,所以羅森堡在論 證時先針對他們的三項考量作出診斷:第一,內格爾(Nagel)的化約模型 無法應用在生物學上。第二,麥爾(Mayr)在臨近說明(proximate explanation) 和終極說明(ultimate explanation)之間所作出的區分。第三,杜布然斯基 (Dobzhansky)的名言:除非從演化來看,否則生物學中沒有任何一件事情 說得通。在這篇論文中,我將批判地檢視羅森堡的達爾文式化約論是否成立。我會先說明並且分析羅森堡如何藉著重新檢討上述的三項考量,而得出 達爾文式化約論的主張。之後,我將論證達爾文式的化約論隱含有內在的張 力:它既是達爾文式的,也是內格爾式的。在如此之張力的局限之下,第一、 它很難說服如同麥爾一樣主張生物學享有完全自主性與獨特性的生命科學 家們。第二、它也無法追求理想的內格爾式的科學化約圖像;它甚至也無法 交代為什麼在理化科學的所有定律之中,天擇原理會如此與眾不同。第三、 它會使得天擇原理無法與物理主義相吻合。我的結論會是:在探討生物學的 說明或化約模式時,不應該比照理化科學從定律取向來進行,而是應該更顧 及生物學之獨特的學科特性。
Rosenberg (2006) argues for reductionism in biology, and he has a special name for the position he adopts: Darwinian Reductionism (DR). The reason why it is dubbed Darwinian is that natural selection plays a key role in answering questions as to what form reductionism should take and what is the lowest level that biological explanations can be reduced to. Given that most contemporary philosophers of biology are anti-reductionists, Rosenberg begins his argument with a diagnosis of why they have been led to embrace the antireductionism: (1) the inapplicability of Nagelian account of reduction to biological sciences; (2) Mayr’s distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations; and (3) the literal truth of Dobzhansky’s dictum that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. In this paper, I will critically examine Rosenberg’s DR. I will begin with an analysis of how Rosenberg responds to the anti-reductionists’ considerations, and how he is led step by step to DR. Then I will argue that an internal intension is implicit in DR, for it turns out to be not only Darwinian, but also Nagelian. Such an intension, as I will argue, brings some troubles to DR: (1) DR has difficulties convincing biologists who agree with Mayr that biology, as a discipline, is unique and autonomous. (2) DR is forced to abandon the ideal unification of all physical sciences, based on the Nagelian account of reductionism. In addition, DR has difficulties explaining why the principle of natural selection, among all laws in the physical sciences, turns out to be the only one law in its kind. (3) Ironically and to Rosenberg’s surprise, DR has difficulties rendering the principle of natural selection compatible with the physicalism. The critical examination of DR leads me to the conclusion: if we aim to figure out how explanation and reduction in biology proceed, instead of confining ourselves to the law-based account, which is modeled on the physical sciences, we should pay more attention to how biology is distinct from the physical sciences.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 45
劉保 禧
Po Hei, Lau
Intellectual Intuition and Imagination: Mou Zongsan and Heidegger on Finitude
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牟宗三的康德詮釋重視「智的直覺」,海德格的康德詮釋則重視「想像 力」,兩者看似互不相干,其實隱藏著一場有限與無限的角力。海德格在《康 德與形而上學問題》指出認知一般之本質在於直觀,而感性直觀的接受性正 是人類認知有限性的根源。概括來說,就是以下兩個命題:(1)人只有感性 直觀;(2)人是有限的。牟宗三在《智的直覺與中國哲學》譯述了《康德書》 的相關內容,並且宣稱兩個對反於海德格的命題:(1)人可有智的直覺;(2) 人雖有限而可無限。牟宗三企圖突破海德格劃下的界線,肯定人有「智的直 覺」,可以創造「物自身」。在本文的分析下,這個看來沿襲康德術語的說法, 不過是說一種「心」與「物」的關係:心表現為覺潤之情,可以賦予事物以 價值。不過,即使如此,亦無法說明人有無限性,牟宗三的宣稱無疑是誇大其 辭。海德格會批評,牟宗三將存在論設置於「時間」範圍以外,企圖以一個 無限的本體為憑藉,活出不朽的意義,這注定是虛妄。海德格在《康德書》 標舉想像力,目的在於揭示人是感性與知性兼具的存在者,無時空性的概念 必須經過想像力的作用─「圖式化」─為概念注入時空元素,才具備認 牟宗三的康德詮釋重視「智的直覺」,海德格的康德詮釋則重視「想像 力」,兩者看似互不相干,其實隱藏著一場有限與無限的角力。海德格在《康德與形而上學問題》指出認知一般之本質在於直觀,而感性直觀的接受性正 是人類認知有限性的根源。概括來說,就是以下兩個命題:(1)人只有感性 直觀;(2)人是有限的。牟宗三在《智的直覺與中國哲學》譯述了《康德書》 的相關內容,並且宣稱兩個對反於海德格的命題:(1)人可有智的直覺;(2) 人雖有限而可無限。牟宗三企圖突破海德格劃下的界線,肯定人有「智的直 覺」,可以創造「物自身」。在本文的分析下,這個看來沿襲康德術語的說法,不過是說一種「心」與「物」的關係:心表現為覺潤之情,可以賦予事物以 價值。
At the first glance, Mou Zongsan's and Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant seem to be irrelevant to each other. The former focuses on “intellectual intuition” while the latter on “imagination”. In fact, the nexus between them may be more complicated. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the essence of cognition in general is intuition and the receptivity of sensible intuition is the root of human finitude. We can conclude his thought into the following theses: (1) Human beings have only sensible intuition; (2) Human beings are finite. In his Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhewue, Mou translates §16 and §25 of Kantbook and he claims the following theses in contrast to Heidegger: (1) Human beings can have intellectual intuition; (2) Human beings are finite and yet they can be infinite. Mou is determined to go beyond the line delimited by Heidegger. Therefore, Mou thinks that human beings should have “intellectual intuition” and thus they are able to create “thing-in-itself”. In this paper, I try to argue that Mou’s doctrine is not a reformulation of Kant’s philosophy, but an illustration of a relation between “heart-mind” and “thing”: Heart-mind is an ability to bestow value on other things.Despite Mou’s doctrine is not as radical as we may think, we can still consider that he exaggerates the status of human beings. Mou puts his ontology out of time and he regards an infinite noumenon as the ground of his ontology. In Heidegger’s opinion, this is doomed to failure. In Kantbook, Heidegger highlights the concept of imagination in order to show that human beings are both sensible and intellectual. Any concept is worth to be cognized only if it goes through a procedure by imagination─schematized─and then they have spatial-temporal elements. In this sense, there is not a separation between understanding and sensibility, spontaneity and receptivity. All in all, human capacity to reason cannot separated from finitude. Under Heidegger’s challenge, Mou’s radical claim on “infinite heart-mind” seems not possible to stand firm.
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