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The Acorn

A Gandhian Review

Volume 14, Issue 1, Winter/Spring 2010

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1. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
b. l. g.

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2. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Robert L. Holmes

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3. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal

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Key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory can be understood by way of the framework provided by David Hume’s ethics. While respecting contextual differences as well as those in over all outlook between a Sanatani Hindu reformer and a Western empiricist, I show that Gandhi and Hume mutually illuminate each other’s thought on significant ethical matters. These matters are: (1) The inability of reason to produce action (2) The relationship of reason to the emotions (3) The importance of the commonality of moral sentiments among humans (4) Identification (a kind of sympathy) as the proper starting place for morality. I hope to show that a greater viability in each thinker’s views can be noticed by those schooled in traditions different from what each respectively represent.David Hume’s ethics provide a framework for understanding key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory. Indeed, for certain students of philosophy in the West, Gandhian ethics may gain status as a viable approach in moral philosophy when seen from a Humean standpoint. In what follows, I will examine four significant aspects of Gandhian ethics: (1) The limitations of reason to produce moral action. (2) The secondary status of reason in relation to the emotions in morality. (3) The importance of moral sentiments in the general population for devising a system of morality. (4) The place of identification (a kind of sympathy) for the origin of morality. I will show that all four are not only significant aspects of Humean ethics but that when understood from David Hume’s framework these parts of Gandhi’s philosophy should appear all the more plausible to those steeped in the analytic tradition.

4. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Robert Gould

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5. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Andrew Fitz-Gibbon

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6. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Wendy C. Hamblet

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7. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Rajmohan Ramanathapillai

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8. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1

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