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1.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
David Boersema
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2.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Heidi Salaverria
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3.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Charbel Niño El-Hani,
Sami Pihlström
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The tradition of pragmatism has, especially since Dewey, been characterized by a commitment to nonreductive naturalism. The notion of emergence, popular in the early decades of the twentieth century and currently re-emerging as a central concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, may be useful in explicating that commitment. The present paper discusses the issue of the reality of emergent properties, drawing particular attention to a pragmatic way of approaching this issue. The reality of emergents can be defended as a pragmatically-useful ontological commitment; hence, pragmatism can be employed as a tool in the debate over the structure and reality of emergence. This strategy of justifying ontological commitments is examined through historical and systematic discussions of the pragmatist tradition. It turns out, among other things, that while classical pragmatists did not specify any technical notion of emergence in the contemporary sense, their non-reductively naturalist views are relevant to the more recent emergence discussions -- especially because they rejected the metaphysical realism typical of today’s ontologically-oriented emergence theories.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Hendrik R. Pieterse
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5.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Mark McEvoy
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6.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Gregory M. Fahey
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7.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Kevin Decker
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8.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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D. S. Clark
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Brian E. Butler
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10.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Steven Schroeder
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11.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert
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12.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Clancy W. Martin
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13.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Leo Zaibert
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14.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Lawrence Udell Fike Jr.
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15.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Zsolt Bátori
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16.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Susan Armstrong
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17.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 1
Yuriko Saito
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18.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 1
Steve Matthews
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The destruction and pollution of the natural environment poses two problems for philosophers. The first is political and pragmatic: which theory of the environment is best equipped to impact policymakers heading as we are toward a series of potential ecocatastrophes? The second is more central: On the environment philosophers tend to fall either side of an irreconcilable divide. Either our moral concerns are grounded directly in nature, or the appeal is made via an anthropocentric set of interests. The lack of a common ground is disturbing. In this paper I attempt to diagnose the reason for this lack. I shall agree that wild nature lacks features of intrinsic moral worth, and that leaves a puzzle: Why is it once we subtract the fact that there is such a lack, we are left with strong intuitions against the destruction and/or pollution of wild nature? Such intuitions can be grounded only in a strong sense of aesthetic concern combined with a common-sense regard for the interests of sentient life as it is indirectly affected by the quality of the environment. I suggest also that of the positions on offer, a hybrid theory of the environment is best suited to address our first problem, that of having an effective influence in the polity.
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19.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 1
Thomas Heyd
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20.
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Essays in Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: 1
Ken Cussen
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The human-centred notion of the “instrumental value of nature” and the eco-centred notion of the “intrinsic value of nature” both fail to provide satisfactory grounds for the preservation of wild nature. This paper seeks to identify some reasons for that failure and to suggest that the structure - though not the content - of the “aesthetic value” approach is the most promising alternative, though the notion of “the aesthetic value of nature”, as usually employed, also fails to capture the real motivation for such preservation. I argue that these problems arise because humans are, for good reasons, deeply ambivalent about their relation to nature. This ambivalence is explained in a Nietzschean context and I argue that an understanding of this ambivalence can be used to develop and illustrate a fuller and richer understanding of what we mean by “the value of nature” which does provide grounds for the preservation of wild nature.
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