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Displaying: 1-20 of 31 documents


part i: interventions
1. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Yuk Hui Introduction: Philosophy after Automation?
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2. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jean-Luc Nancy, Daniel Ross Automation, Alteration
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Is “philosophy after automation” a theme or a question? One might hesitate about this, because we may wonder whether or not it implies that philosophy could disappear after automation, or at least be subject to serious revision. Philosophy could be read as a historical movement towards self-determination [autodétermination] as well as the exposition of the limit of such a program of archi-autonomy. The Cartesian event (a prominent moment of the automation mutation) is essentially ambivalent, and man alone in the world is undoubtedly also the one who can but alter, in the long run, the sufficiency of the auto. This is what we can now begin to understand.
3. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bernard Stiegler, Daniel Ross Elements for a Neganthropology of Automatic Man
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Ours is an age of general automation. The factory that produced proletarians now extends to the biosphere; consequently, disautomatization is needed, which is the real meaning of autonomy. Autonomy and automatism must be reconceived as a composition rather than an opposition. Knowledge depends on hypomnesic automatisms that open up the possibility of what Socrates called “thinking for oneself”; digitalization thus requires a new epistemology that entails questions of political and libidinal economy. Today, automatization serves the autonomization of technics more than noetic autonomy, but reconceiving the latter necessarily involves reconsidering the meaning and character of desire. Greta Thunberg’s diagnosis of the irresponsibility of the generation before hers exposes the fact that the knowledge necessary to combat the consequences of contemporary technological development has been destroyed. The only possible counter to this irresponsibility lies in the reconstitution of knowledge, understood as the means by which humans struggle against entropy and anthropy.
4. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Michał Krzykawski Towards Idiodiversity: Retranslating Cybernetics
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This article discusses translation as a technique of doing philosophy and introduces the concept of idiodiversity as an alternative to the current model of automated translation machines. The dominant functionalist approach to technology has made these machines the agents of linguistic homogenisation, which constitutes a threat for the diversity of idiomatic open systems this article advocates for. However, as this article argues, the challenge is not merely to accuse automated translation technologies of impoverishing the knowledge of how to translate but, rather, to determine whether these technologies can be reappropriated for the purpose of preservation and revalorisation of translation and, more generally, as a conveyor of noodiversity. This challenge also involves the need to draw attention to the political significance of translation practices and to elaborate an alternative to the mechanistic approaches to translation, typical of computational linguistics and language engineering, through a heterodox approach to cybernetics.
5. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Anna Longo The Automation of Philosophy or the Game of Induction
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In order to think of philosophy after automation, we have to ask if there is more in philosophy than the process of learning what philosophy is by inducing, from actual inferential practices, the future possible moves that are believed to produce philosophical truths. In the same way as the production of scientific hypothesis has been automated like a self-updating process which entails schemas of decisions and actions, philosophy itself, once conceived as a game where the truth of the statements is measured with respect to the social reproduction of inferential moves, could be automated as well.
6. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Babette Babich On Necropolitics and Techno-Scotosis
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To talk about automation and invisibility in our digitally projected world, I argue the case for the “cancelled” or lost voices of postphenomenology such as, most notably, Günther Anders. Reflecting on Nietzsche as on the role of GPS for location and for dating services like Grindr, I take up Nietzschean humanism (all-too humanism) including the fragility of his portable brass typing ball, latterly not unlike daisy wheel printer technologies and the programmed death of ink jet printers. With a casual reflection on pocket robots and screen-intentionality, GPS, triangulating perambulation, and programmed addiction, I raise the necropolitical question of climate change as of technology and its scotosis.
7. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Howard Caygill Heidegger and the Automatic Earth Image
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The article reflects on Heidegger’s admission in the 1966 Spiegel Interview that he was shocked by images of the Earth taken from space. It asks what these images were and shows that far from testifying to the encounter of planetary technics and the modern human they evince the meeting between an improvised automated technology of image capture and contingency.
8. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Yuk Hui On the Limit of Artificial Intelligence
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This article asks how can we articulate the limit of artificial intelligence, which virtually has no limit? Or maybe the definition of AI already implies its limit, how Marvin Minsky once declared that there is no generally accepted theory of intelligence, and that AI is only one particular way of modelling it. This article revisits the debate between Minsky and Hubert Dreyfus and repositions them in terms of an opposition between mechanism and organism, in order to expose the limit of Dreyfus’s Heideggerian critique. It suggests reflecting on the relation between noodiversity and technodiversity to methodologically broaden the concept of intelligence, and on how different concepts of intelligence could be thought by introducing the Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Kant’s intellectual intuition.
9. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Katerina Kolozova The Artifact of Non-Humanity: A Materialist Account of the Signifying Automaton and Its Physical Support in a Fantasized Unity
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The scope of the paper is to present the concept of the radical dyad of the “non-human,” in an attempt to think radical humanity in terms of Marxian materialism, which is the product of approaching Marx’s writings on “the real” and “the physical” by way of François Laruelle’s non-philosophical method. Unlike posthumanism, inspired by critical theory and the method of poststructuralism, the theory of the non-human, as a radical dyad of technology in the generic sense of the word (ranging from the techné of speaking a natural language to AI technology) and the organic understood as physicality, does away with anthropocentrism. Moreover, it does away with any anthropomorphology of thought, that is, it does away with any theorizing or philosophy that is centered on the notion of (human) subjectivity or, to borrow a Laruellian term, any “posture of thought” that is molded according to the structure of subjectivity centered thinking,
part ii: dialogues
10. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Pieter Lemmens, Yuk Hui Landscapes of Technological Thoughts: A Dialogue between Pieter Lemmens and Yuk Hui
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In this dialogue with Yuk Hui, Pieter Lemmens explains the discipline called philosophy of technology and gives a concise overview of the most important contemporary approaches within this field. He also offers a critical evaluation of what are probably the two most salient characteristics of contemporary philosophy of technology, the so-called “empirical turn” and the “ethical turn,” which are deeply related and partly reflect the discipline’s on-going alignment with the global neoliberal agenda of exclusively profit-driven technological innovation. He also critically reflects on recent developments in the molecular and informational life sciences such as genomics, metabolomics, bioinformatics and synthetic biology.
11. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Yuk Hui For a Strategic Primitivism: A Dialogue between Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Yuk Hui
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In this dialogue with Yuk Hui, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro discusses his work on the Amerindian perspectivism, multinaturalism; the relation between nature, culture and technics in his ethnographic studies; as well as the necessity of a non-anthropocentric definition of technology. He also discusses a haunting futurism of ecological crisis and automation of the Anthropocene, and explores a “strategic primitivism” as survival tool.
12. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Hiroki Azuma, Yuk Hui Homo animalis, a Japanese Futurism: A Dialogue between Hiroki Azuma and Yuk Hui
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In this dialogue, Hiroki Azuma discusses with Yuk Hui about the perception of technology in Japan after the defeat in the Second World War, from the Kyoto School to the postmodern critics, and the ambivalent conflicts between the modern and the tradition. The postmodern culture has a different signification in Japan than in the West as well as in other parts of Asia. Azuma documents the rise of the Otaku culture in Japan, and calls them “database animals,” a thesis that he formulated through his reading of Alexandre Kojève’s end of man and the absorption of the human subject into the technological world.
book reviews
13. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Basile Jacques Derrida, Life Death
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14. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jeffrey Epstein John McCumber, The Philosophy Scare: The Politics of Reason in the Early Cold War
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15. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Miguel Gualdron Ramirez John E. Drabinski, Glissant and the Middle Passage
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book discussion
16. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jessica S. Elkayam Invitations to Multiplicity: Revisiting Travel in Response to Mariana Ortega’s In Between
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17. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jennifer Gammage Not-Being-at-Ease: Ortega on Heidegger’s Unheimlichkeit and Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue State
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18. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Mariana Ortega In-Between-Worlds and Re-membering: Latina Feminist Phenomenology and the Existential Analytic of Dasein
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special topic: thinking vulnerability, part ii
19. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 1
Ronald Olufemi Badru Distant Poverty, Human Vulnerability, and the African Ethics of Character
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This African moral framework discusses distant poverty as human vulnerability. Contextually, if vulnerability means human frailty, relative to some opposing facts of life, and that poverty makes the human person frail, relative to some largely unrealized/unrealizable desirables without assistance, then distant poverty as human vulnerability invariably connects, significantly, with poor dependency: poor people are vulnerable as dependent on the assisting other. Some fundamental questions arise: 1) What is the ontology of distant poverty as human vulnerability? 2) In what ways does the idea of poverty as human vulnerability essentially and morally connect with the idea of dependency? 3) Is the issue of addressing the problem of distant poverty as human vulnerability a question of perfect or imperfect moral duty or both? 4) In what ways do the perfect or imperfect moral duty (or both) connect to positive and negative moral duties? 5) What moral framework best accommodates, all things considered, moral duties? Considering these questions, this work advances that African ethics (AE) as character ethics, fundamentally serves as a better moral framework, compared to the Western ethics (WE) that has dominated the debates on addressing the questions for years.
20. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 1
Fabian Bernhardt Unseen Wounds: On the Epistemic Dimension of Vulnerability
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Philosophical interest in vulnerability focusses mainly on normative questions concerning its relevance for moral, political and legal theory. However, beneath these questions there lies another one which is epistemological: How do we gain clear knowledge about another person’s pain and suffering? How do we recognize a wounded life? Drawing primarily on the account of Elaine Scarry (1984), the article aims at showing that the difficulties to apprehend and recognize a life as injured are not only grounded in political and cultural frames, as Judith Butler contends, but also in the phenomenological and epistemic features of pain itself. Pain is epistemically fragile. Whereas it is almost impossible to ignore one’s own pain, it is very easy to overlook the pain of others. This epistemic slope has concrete effects on the social and political life. Regarding vulnerability, the normative question of recognition and the epistemic question of recognizability, thus, are closely intertwined.