Philosophy and Theology

Matthew’s account of the journey of the magi to Jesus has been employed in historical theology to articulate the relation between reason and faith in four different ways: i) reason and faith forming a unity; ii) reason cooperating with faith; iii) reason being the tool of faith; iv) reason being superseded by faith. The paper considers each of these categories in turn, and thus progressively separates the two terms. It demonstrates that “faith” and “reason” are equivocal concepts, and that their relationship is itself a key determinant of their nature. A plurality of forms of reasoning enables the journey to be completed, with each form providing a distinct contribution to a shared faith.

This paper attempts to read Bonhoeffer’s work as a whole. I maintain that Bonhoeffer’s attempt to develop a distinctly Christian version of the Hegelian concept of objective spirit is the central concern of his Sanctorum Communio. I note the ways he continues to refine and clarify that concept in later works, even as it remainsunnamed. I then argue that by the time of the Letters and Papers from Prison, developing this concept has become Bonhoeffer’s overriding project. I conclude by suggesting ways that the earlier works already provide resources for answering the probing questions of the Letters and Papers.

This paper highlights certain features of the metamorphosis that the concept “the end of the world” has undergone from its origin in early Christian thought to the present day. This concept has, in recent decades, become increasingly prominent within Western European Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology. This paperdemonstrates that the notion of the end of the world popularized by Jürgen Moltmann and Karl Rahner, despite the traditional, biblical language in which it is couched, has more affinity with the philosophical concept “the end of history” developed by Hegel than it has with the ideas common in early Christianity.

Although the primary meaning of Max Weber’s concept of disenchantment is as a sociological condition (the retreat of magic and myth from social life through processes of secularization and rationalization), as Weber himself makes clear in his address, “Science as a Vocation,” disenchantment can also be a philosophical act: an unusual form of moral discourse that derives new ethical direction out of the very untenability of a previously robust moral tradition. The philosophical variant of disenchantment is significant both because it contradicts numerous elements of the sociological version and because it suggests there are forms of cognition unique to moral philosophy (insofar as the derivation of a moral teaching from the very absence of one is foreign to both a religious and ascientific mindset).

The present study asks the question whether Karl Rahner’s treatment of biological evolution holds merit for the dialogue between Catholic theology on the one hand and evolutionary biology on the other. Central to this evaluation will be an emphasis on two core tenets of modern evolutionary biology, namely emergence and the continuity of the evolutionary process. While the former bears relevance for our understanding of how life and anthropologically important phenomena such as “mind” and “consciousness” came to be, the latter plays a crucial role in how we view our existence within the earth’s fluid and changing biosphere. It comes to the conclusion that Rahner’s concept of active self-transcendence recovers the notion of biological evolution as an on-going process where indeed something new emerges, and therefore offers an extremely helpful tool in the interdisciplinary conversation. However, this essay challenges Rahner’s understanding of the directedness of the evolutionary process toward the human being as well as his view that in us nature comes to self-consciousness for the first time and suggests alternatives.

The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, God’s knowledge extends to the sum pattern of determinates for an act, rather than to contingent events.

Alvin Plantinga, in Warranted Christian Belief, offers a model for the rationality of a particular version of Christian theistic belief. After briefly summarizing Plantinga’s model, I argue that there are significant moral difficulties present within it. The Christian believer who gives assent to Plantinga’s model is vulnerable tocharges of irrationality and/or immorality when one considers the role and effects of original sin in the model. Similar difficulties arise when one considers a problem posed by religious pluralism for the model. I consider some possible responses to these difficulties, and conclude that these issues merit more attention than they are given in Warranted Christian Belief.

Through reading Kierkegaard and Derrida together I argue that deconstruction has its historical origin in, and goes no further than, biblical principles. I begin with an analysis of the complexities in Kierkegaard’s exposition of the biblical command to love the neighbor: in showing the command to express the deconstructionof originary presence, Kierkegaard appears to invoke as central to it the apparent binary opposition between divine and human being. I next turn to the Derridean deconstruction of binary opposites and particularly to Derrida’s insistence that deconstruction is justice and that it never proceeds without love. In then engaging Kierkegaard’s critical distinction between ancient Greek and biblical thought, as well as Derrida’s response to issues posed by such a distinction, I show that the deconstruction of Kierkegaard can proceed only on the basis of principles whose origin is biblical and, therefore, that ideas central to Derridean deconstruction, including différance and the supplement, presuppose and express the biblical concept of neighbor.

The aim of this study is to show that, because the single individual, to whom Kierkegaard dedicates his entire authorship, is no less secular than religious, the secular does not exist outside of the religious and the religious does not exist outside of the secular. To this end four concepts central to Kierkegaard are examined: (1) authority; (2) the either/or decision or choice and its relationship to the concepts of stages and history; (3) indirect communication and the claim that truth is subjectivity; and (4) metaphor as the language of spirit, both divine and human.

The criterion of 1 John for preferring John’s community over the secessionists is that the former love one another: John’s heart does not accuse him. Expressions in 1 John and Brown’s commentary suggest that knowledge by affective connaturality and recent neuroscience furnish exegetical access to this text. John’s appeal to the accusing heart is to social praxis as access to doxa. John’s community can know they love and are God’s children only intersubjectively, in the social. John’s heart should accuse him. Were his heart changed, love for the secessionists would not be burdensome. John’s community became a sect because their love never became love for their enemies.

“Faith” is a central theme in Karl Rahner’s theology. While Rahner dealt at length with what classical theology names fides qua and fides quae, discussion of the context in which people came to faith was also crucial to his exposition of the Christian life. This paper has three aims: to examine Rahner’s understanding of the relationship between context and the possibility of faith; to outline and evaluate Rahner’s assessment of the ways in which people might appropriate and articulate Christian faith in the modern world; and to explore whether Rahner’s approach to faith still offers a resource that the contemporary church might receive in a context that raises questions beyond those that confronted Rahner.

This essay responds to Richard Lennan, “Faith in Context: Rahner on the Possibility of Belief ” (Philosophy & Theology 17 [2005]: 233–58). It suggests that some of the ills of religious belief in the United States were not those for which Rahner had prescriptions. The essay utilizes the fiction of Graham Greene, born in the same year as Rahner, and who had read much of Rahner’s work, to mobilize a critique of Lennan’s (and Rahner’s) views.

This response to Richard Lennan’s presentation of Rahner’s call for a new understanding of faith raises questions about 1) the rationale behind Rahner’s “short formulas,” 2) how feminist challenges are understood, and 3) the place of “the ecclesial” in a secular milieu.