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Henryk Piersa
Henryk Piersa
Moje studia i praca naukowa w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim
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Publikacje Prof. dra hab. Henryka Piersy
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Józef Życiński
Józef Życiński
Nauki przyrodnicze w procesie przemian kulturowych
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Przemiany kulturowe ostatniego okresu przyniosły głęboką zmianę wartościowań dotyczących społecznej roli nauk przyrodniczych. Podczas gdy w początkach XX wieku pozytywizm upatrywał w nauce jedyne źródło wartościowej poznawczo wiedzy, postmodernizm z początku obecnego stulecia traktuje teorie przyrodnicze przede wszystkim jako formę narracji literackiej. W antyintelektualnych nastrojach, wyrażających krytykę oświeceniowej afirmacji racjonalności, ceni się pragmatyczne zastosowania nauki, nie zaś jej funkcje poznawcze. Sytuacja taka stwarza pilną potrzebę interdyscyplinarnej współpracy między filozofami, teologami i przedstawicielami nauk przyrodniczych. W ostatnim okresie podjęto w wielu ośrodkach interdyscyplinarne programy badawcze, które dotyczą różnych aspektów teorii ewolucji, związków między przetwarzaniem informacji w komputerach a neurofizjologią, relacji między naturalizmem metodologicznym a różnorodnymi wersjami naturalizmu ontologicznego.Rozwijane badania stanowią nową jakość we wzajemnych relacjach nauk przyrodniczych z myślą chrześcijańską. Przezwyciężają one zarówno złudzenia scjentyzmu, jak i dominującą w pozytywizmie cząstkową koncepcję prawdy, w której brakuje odpowiedzi na pytania istotne dla całościowej wizji świata. Równocześnie stanowią one również odpowiedź na wizję interdyscyplinarnego dialogu, którą Jan Paweł II ukazał w encyklice Fides et ratio oraz w Liście do George’a Coyne’a SI, skierowanym z racji 300-lecia publikacji Principiów Newtona.
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Mieczysław Lubański
Mieczysław Lubański
From Information towards Wisdom
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The contemporary science can be defined in a cybernetic language as a self-organising system. The development of this system is guided and controlled by streams of information items produced by science. At present this development assumes more and more clearly the shape of the evolutionary variability. In its input there are data. Their united sets constitute information items which, owing to their bringing together, form the human knowledge. Integration process of the human knowledge results in the wisdom. In this way the post-industrial science has an evolutionary character coming in a form of a system “from information towards wisdom”.It is very important to state a simple sum of data not to give any information, and as well a simple sum of information items not to give any knowledge, and then a simple sum of items which constitute knowledge not to give any wisdom. Only the process of integration causes a conversion from a lower level of cognition to its higher one. The essence of this process seems to be inspired by a creative intuition of an explorer-researcher who executes the above mentioned integration.
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Marek Szydłowski, Adam Krawiec
Marek Szydłowski
The Relict Radiation as a Signature of Topology for Universe
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We consider the problem of possible topology for our Universe. It is shown that due to algebraic topology we can strictly define the shape of physical space whereas observations of anisotropy of microwave background radiation gives us an answer to the question whether our Universe is finite or not?
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Zygmunt Hajduk
Zygmunt Hajduk
The Inferential Function of Theoretical Constructs in Science
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The paper has an ordering character with regard to the current discussions on the issue formulated in its title, and it contains of three parts and conclusion. In the first part some standard functions of theoretical constructs have been presented, e.g. laws, hypotheses, and scientific theories. The most representative among them is the projective function (pro- and retro-gnosis) and the explanatory one. In the set of such functions we find also the inferential role, which is presented in the second part of the paper for traditionally comprehended theoretical constructs. The third part focuses on an alternative approach to the theoretical constructs of inference, i.e. inferences that are actually used in research practice. An important role is given to inconclusive forms of inference. Some schemes of heuristic inferences have been given here, a fact that does not belittle the role of formal logic in the theory of reasonings that occur in science.The methodological position presented in the paper is clearly combined with the epistemological version of scientific realism.
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Zenon E. Roskal
Zenon E. Roskal
Place, Vacuum and Space in Pre-Newtonian Philosophy of Nature
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Our aim in this article is to trace the evolution of the concepts of physical space in Western thought from the Greeks to the Newtonian philosophy of nature. Especially the article presents studies of ancient Greek theories of physical space and place, in particular those of the classical and Hellenistic period. These theories are explained primarily with reference to the general philosophical or methodological framework within which they took shape. Special attention is paid to the interrelations between various concepts of space and with Greek spatial terminology.The arguments of this paper can be summarized as follows: first, the concept of space itself has taken the central position in philosophy of nature; second, the debate about the nature of space has developed several different theories; third, the concept of space has several issues to overcome.
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Jerzy Kaczmarek
Jerzy Kaczmarek
L’idonéisme et la conception classique de la vérité cognitive
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L’article se compose de quatre parties: L’introduction, I. La conception idonéistique de la connaissance scientifique, II. La conception classique de la vérité cognitive, III. L’idonéité des affirmations de connaissance et l’accord aspectif d’objet avec le contenu de la connaissance.L’idonéisme (idoine) vient du mot latin idoneus qui signifie qui convient bien en situation donnée. Qui convient, qui est adapté à quelque chose: prendre les mesures idoines.Gonseth n’exige pas d’une théorie ou d’un schéma qu’ils soient vrais, qu’ils décrivent dans le moindre détail comment les choses sont ou comment tel événement se produit, mais qu’ils soient idoines. C’est-à-dire qu’ils permettent, dans un certain cadre et pour certains buts, une prévision et une action efficaces.L’auteur de l’article propose faire la différentiation entre les types des idonéités: l’idonéité cognitive qu’elle s’accorde avec la conception classique de la vérité, l’idonéité instrumentale de la théorie, l’idonéité de cohérence du système, l’idonéité d’explication, l’idonéité de prévisibilité du système, l’idonéité de modification du système.
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Dariusz Dąbek
Dariusz Dąbek
Edward A. Milne’s Approach to the Cosmological Principle
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At the first stage of setting up Kinematical Relativity, Milne modified Einstein’s Principle of Relativity and assumed that the Universe had to appear the same to all observers. He called this an “Extended Principle of Relativity”. In order to specify this postulate, Milne defined the notion of the “equivalence of observers,” and then formulated a new definition of the Principle of Relativity: all descriptions of the whole system made by equivalent observers must be identical. Under Freundlich’s influence he called it the “Cosmological Principle” (CP). The content of Milne’s CP was different from both Einstein’s Principles of Relativity and the uniformity postulate of Relativistic Cosmology. Notwithstanding this, the adherents of the latter adopted this name for the isotropy and homogeneity postulate. Initially, Milne treated CP as a hypothesis about matter distribution. But when he separated model constructing from verifying to what extent it corresponded with the actual Universe, he began to emphasize that CP is not a law of nature, but a definition of the research domain.
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Agnieszka Pyrzyńska
Agnieszka Pyrzyńska
Ascertaining the Causal Relationship in the Studies of the Effects of Weak Nonionizing Electromagnetic Fields on Embryogenesis of Man
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In a number of publications positive associations between the exposure to artificially generated nonionizing electromagnetic fields (EMF) and the reproductive risks in women were reported (abortion, birth defects, stillbirths). Yet, in another studies, claimed to be more careful, it has been shown that EMF should not be accounted for as a factor causing measurable increase in the above mentioned reproductive failures. In this context, of crucial importance is the determination whether the observed relationship between EMF and people is not of casual but of causal character.In epidemiology a simple checklist is often used to establish this type of relationship. However, in the case of weak association the causal relationship may be claimed with a high degree of uncertainty. Taking into account the fact that in situations that are of interest to epidemiology, EMF are one (sometimes seemingly the most important) of a number of factors. Therefore, the above mentioned bioeffects may come into effect only if other factors are also present. It should be also stressed that the intricacy of these relationships increases when the role of such circumstances, as: distribution in time of the expositions, accumulation of dose, different spans of latency periods, as well as possible stimulatory effects of weak EMF is taken into account.
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Stanisław Kiczuk
Stanisław Kiczuk
On Modal Logic
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The paper appreciates six conditions which, according to G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, must be respected by those formal systems which aspire to be systems of modal logic. There are few such systems. The sense of modal functors “it is necessary that,” “it is possible that,” in this type of systems is in no way made precise. The paper undermines the validity of some conditions shown by Hughes and Cresswell. It outlines the way by which to construct a system of modal logic in which the functor of logical necessity and logical possibility would be unambiguously characterised by methods of contemporary logic.
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Anna Modrzejewska
Anna Modrzejewska
On Causal Implication
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The first part of the paper characterises two new non-extensional functors: functor of counterfactual implication and functor of causal implication. The latter functor was used by Arthur W. Burks in his early considerations on the construction of a system of the logic of causal propositions, the formal inscription of conditional propositions in the colloquial language and the language of empirical sciences.The second part traces down the mutual relations between the functors of counterfactual implication, causal implication, material implication and strict implication. Special attention is paid to the fact that causal implication implies material implication (a converse relationship does not occur), and strict implication implies causal implication (a converse relationship does not occur).
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Adam Nowaczyk
Adam Nowaczyk
Has Analytical Philosophy Dug Out a Grave for Itself?
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Many contemporary philosophers, especially the “post-modern ones,” claim that analytical philosophy has committed self-destruction by undermining the position of cognitive realism and questioning its main pillars: theory of objective reference of expressions and correspondential theory of truth. One of such philosophers is Rorty, an indefatigable critic of the conception of “right representations,” a concept that – according to him – is “an empty compliment which we pay to helpful beliefs while realising our intentions.” In order to support his nihilistic position, Rorty many times refers to Quine. In my paper I seek to answer the question whether Rorty’s and the views of other post-modern philosophers can be supported by Quine’s philosophical conceptions. Analysing some selected trends of his philosophy, in particular the thesis about indeterminacy of reference (ontological relativity), I seek to prove that – contrary to Rorty’s claim – Quine did not devalue the idea of objective reference. I also prove that the semantic concept of truth as relativised to the model of language plays in Quine’s epistemology an equally essential role to the role of the immanent concept of truth as “disquotational.” The former is closer to the correspondential conception of truth. The conclusions which Rorty draws from the conception of Quine are rash, and sometimes they are an outcome of biased interpretation.
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Marek Osmański
Marek Osmański
The City of Soul in Philo of Alexandria
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The aim of this article is to analyze the Philonic notion of “the city of soul” which Philo uses in his commentary on the Septuagint, and especially in his two treatises: De confusione linguarum (107-109, 196) and De posteritate Caini (52-62). First the exegetic context and allegorical method are examined, including the biblical verses (Gen. 11,1-9; Ex. 4,17) and the way Philo interprets them. It can be seen how the biblical motives are modified by him and subordinated to the external conception of the city that he probably draws from the Greek or Hellenistic notions, in particular the conception of polis understood simultaneously as an actual city and as its legal constitution. Then the structure of the psychic or moral city is analyzed, including its “buildings” (and “walls”), “habitants” and “laws,” which are allegorical presentations for the moral function of language, virtues or vices and laws or constitution of the inner city. Although Philo’s allegorical interpretation is here succeeded only to a certain degree due to his difficulties in clear distinguishing the moral components of the soul, the pattern of the city appears to be a useful exegetical tool in bringing out important aspects of moral life. In the last place, the author reconstructs Philo’s ethical views present in his allegoric commentary. The “city of soul” should be regarded mainly as its moral state, taken in its dynamic or static dimension. The moral qualification of this state exclusively depends upon soul’s attitude towards God who is the source of every good, virtue and the freedom of choice. Therefore, main virtues of sage are knowledge coming from God and piety towards him; and his internal “laws” are God’s laws. A vicious man is standing on the opposite side; he is ruled by the pride and forgets God, deprives himself of freedom and lets the irrational mob of vices master him, submitting himself to the needs of his senses and the body.
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Piotr K. Szałek
Piotr K. Szałek
Psychologism versus Anti-psychologism
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The paper seeks to give an ontological account of idea as mental content in the philosophy of John Locke. The foundation on which to place and polarise philosophical standpoints with regard to this issue is the 17th-century controversy between J. Locke and N. Malebranche with respect to the genesis of human knowledge. Showing the foundation of this controversy, as expressed in the polemic work of Locke entitled An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, I shall outline two possible approaches to our mental contents, namely the psychologistic and anti-psychologistic ones. In this perspective Locke is a representative of the first standpoint, whereas Malebranche of the second. In the psychologistic approach, the content of our conscious acts (or according to 17th-century Cartesian philosophy ideas) is exclusively an internal element of this consciousness. On the contrary – in the case of the anti-psychologistic characteristation, the content of our consciousness is described as ontologically antonomous, i.e. as independent from thr knowing subject. Following the analyses of An Examination, I obtain additional arguments on behalf of the psychologistic interpretation of Locke’s conception of idea (expressed, among others, by J. Yolton and M. Ayers), contrary to the anti-psychologistic approaches (claimed by, among others, T. Reid, R. McRae, and N. Jolley).
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Robert Trypuz
Robert Trypuz
The Discussion about the Truth Value of Norms. Logic of Norms and Deontic Logic
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The main purpose of this paper was the trial to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Logic of Norms. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic Logic. The last one, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: ‘N exists’ or ‘N exists for the sake of set of norms’. The normative sentences are sentences in indicative mood and thereby are true or false.The whole consideration about two types aforementioned logic is preceded by some remarks about variety of the meanings of the word ‘norm’, the linguistic structures of norm and the views of the truth value of norms.
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Alvin Plantinga, Marcin Iwanicki
Alvin Plantinga
Argumenty za istnieniem Boga
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Derek Parfit, Marcin Iwanicki
Derek Parfit
Dlaczego cokolwiek istnieje? Dlaczego właśnie to?
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Richard Swinburne, Marcin Iwanicki
Richard Swinburne
Odpowiedź Derekowi Parfitowi
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Peter van Inwagen, Marcin Iwanicki, Marek Osmański
Peter van Inwagen
Księga Rodzaju a ewolucja
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