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monographic section

1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Gabriel Uzquiano

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2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Mario Gómez-Torrente

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Taking as premises some reasonable principles about the essences of natural numbers, pluralities and sets, the paper offers two types of argument for the conclusions that the natural numbers could not be the Zermelo numbers, the von Neumann numbers, the “Kripke numbers”, or the positions in the ω-structure, among other things. These conclusions are thus Benacerrafian in form, but it is emphasized that the two kinds of argument offered in the paper are anti-Benacerrafian in substance, as they are perfectly compatible and in fact congenial with some views on which the numbers could be things of certain other kinds.Tomando como premisas algunos principios razonables sobre las esencias de los números naturales, las pluralidades y los conjuntos, el artículo ofrece dos tipos de argumentos para concluir que los números naturales no podrían ser ni los números de Zermelo, ni los números de von Neumann, ni los «números de Kripke», ni las posiciones en la estructura omega, entre otras cosas. Estas conclusiones son, por tanto, benacerrafianas en su forma, pero se enfatiza que los dos tipos de argumentos que se ofrecen en el artículo son anti-benacerrafianos en el fondo, puesto que son perfectamente compatibles con, y de hecho afines a, posiciones para las cuales los números podrían ser cosas de ciertos otros tipos.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
María José Frápolli

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This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150).I will argue for the following two theses: (i) that realism, in its standard characterization, is our default position, a position in agreement with our pre-theoretical intuitions and with the results of our best semantic theories, and (ii) that most of the metaphysical qualms usually related to it depends on a poor understanding of truth and existence as higher-order concepts.Este artículo es un intento de convencer a los antirrealistas de que sus correctas intuiciones en contra del inflacionismo metafísico derivado de algunas versiones del realismo matemático no les obligan a abrazar aproximaciones epistémicas no estándar a la verdad y la existencia. Es también un intento de convencer a los realistas matemáticos de que no necesitan aplicar sus intuiciones, perfectamente correctas y juiciosas, a los antiintuitivos desarrollos que hacen del realismo matemático pleno una visión que el propio Gödel consideró objetable (Gödel 1995, p. 150)Argumentaré a favor de las dos tesis siguientes: (i) que el realismo, en su caracterización estándar, es nuestra posición por defecto, una posición de acuerdo con nuestras intuiciones pre-teóricas y con los resultados de nuestras mejores teorías semánticas; y (ii) que la mayor parte de los escrúpulos metafísicos habitualmente relacionados con él dependen de una pobre comprensión de la verdad y la existencia en tanto que conceptos de orden superior.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Agustín Rayo

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I argue for a conception of essence that does not rely on distinctions of metaphysical fundamentality.Defiendo una concepción de la esencia que no depende de distinciones de fundamentalidad metafísica.
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Elia Zardini

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After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle but that the overall view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper also argues, against the BHK semantics, for the non- constructive character of the demonstrations envisaged by semantic anti-realism, and contends that, in such setting, one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic loses all its force.Tras presentar el anti-realismo semántico y la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo ofrece una reconstrucción del argumento anti-realista basado en la comprensión. La reconstrucción que se propone valida un principio irrestricto, del que se sigue que la verdad requiere la existencia de un determinado tipo de “demostración”. El artículo muestra que este principio no implica las instancias problemáticas del original principio irrestricto de la cognoscibilidad realizable, y que la concepción general que subyace al nuevo principio todavía tiene consecuencias epistémicas irrestrictas. Apelando precisamente a la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo argumenta además, en contra de la semántica BHK, a favor del carácter no constructivo de las demostraciones que contempla el anti-realismo semántico, y defiende que, en ese marco, uno de los argumentos más naturales a favor de una revisión a grandes rasgos intuicionista de la lógica clásica pierde toda su fuerza.

articles

6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Gustavo Adrián Bodanza

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El modelo de marcos argumentativos abstractos es actualmente la herramienta más utilizada para caracterizar la justificación de argumentos derrotables en Inteligencia Artificial. Las justificaciones se determinan en base a los ataques entre argumentos y se formalizan a través de semánticas de extensiones. Aquí sostenemos que, o bien algunos marcos argumentativos carecen de sentido bajo ciertas concepciones de ataque específicas, o bien las semánticas más usadas en la literatura, basadas en el concepto de defensa conocido como admisibilidad, no resultan adecuadas para justificar, en particular, argumentos para la toma de decisiones.The abstract argumentation frameworks model is currently the most used tool for characterizing the justification of defeasible arguments in Artificial Intelligence. Justifications are determined on a given attack relation among arguments and are formalized as extension semantics. In this work we argue that, contrariwise to the assumptions in that model, either some argumentation frameworks are meaningless under certain concrete definitions of the attack relation, or some of the most used extension semantics in the literature, based on the defense notion of admissibility, are not suitable in particular for the justification of arguments for decision making.
7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Russell Marcus

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The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question of how to determine what we should believe to exist. Indispensabilists claim that we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only objects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument present an intriguing attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion against some contemporary eleatics. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not decisive against the eleatic and then sketch a way to capture some of the important intuitions behind both views.El debate sobre si deberíamos creer en la existencia de los objetos matemáticos conduce rápidamente a la cuestión de cómo determinar lo que deberíamos creer que existe. Los indispensabilistas declaran que deberíamos creer en la existencia de los objetos matemáticos por sus funciones ineliminables en la teoría científica. Los eleáticos argumentan que sólo existen los objetos que tienen propiedades causales. La defensa reciente de Mark Colyvan del argumento de la indispensabilidad de Quine representa un interesante intento de proporcionar razones a favor del criterio indispensabilista, en contra de algunos eleáticos contemporáneos. Mostraré que el argumento de Colyvan en contra de los eleáticos no es decisivo y esbozaré a continuación una manera de capturar algunas de las importantes intuiciones que se encuentran tras ambos puntos de vista.
8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Randall Harp, Kareem Khalifa

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Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and decision-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community’s social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.Son muchos los que han defendido que deberían buscarse teorías unificadas siempre que sea posible. Nosotros lo negamos a partir de consideraciones socio-epistemológicas y de teoría de la decisión. En consecuencia, aquellos que busquen un papel más omnipresente para la unificación han de prestar un mayor grado de atención a la estructura social de la comunidad científica del que se le ha prestado, y/o revisar radicalmente su concepción de la unificación.
9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Jaana Eigi

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According to Helen Longino, objectivity is necessarily social as it depends on critical interactions in community. Justin Biddle argues that Longino’s account presupposes individuals that are completely open to any criticism; as such individuals are in principle able to criticise their beliefs on their own, Longino’s account is not really social. In the first part of my paper I argue that even for completely open individuals, criticism for maintaining objectivity is only possible in community. In the second part I question Biddle’s interpretation of Longino’s conception of the individual. I conclude that objectivity as Longino describes it is necessarily social.Según Helen Longino, la objetividad es necesariamente social puesto que depende de interacciones críticas en una comunidad. Justin Biddle defiende que la explicación de Longino presupone individuos que están enteramente abiertos a cualquier crítica; y, puesto que estos individuos son en principio capaces de someter a crítica sus creencias por sí mismos, la explicación de Longino no es realmente social. En la primera parte de mi artículo defiendo que incluso para individuos enteramente abiertos, la crítica para el mantenimiento de la objetividad solo es posible en una comunidad. En la segunda parte pongo en cuestión la interpretación de Biddle sobre la concepción del individuo de Longino. Concluyo que la objetividad, tal y como la describe Longino, es necesariamente social.

book reviews

10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Xavier de Donato Rodríguez

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11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3

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12. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3

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monographic section

13. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Allan Franklin, Slobodan Perovic

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14. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Nina A. Atanasova

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This paper responds to a recent challenge for the validity of extrapolation of neurobiological knowledge from laboratory animals to humans. According to this challenge, experimental neurobiology, and thus neuroscience, is in a state of crisis because the knowledge produced in different laboratories hardly generalizes from one laboratory to another. Presumably, this is so because neurobiological laboratories use simplified animal models of human conditions that differ across laboratories. By contrast, I argue that maintaining a multiplicity of experimental protocols and simple models is well justified. It fosters rather than precludes the validity of extrapolation of neurobiological knowledge. The discipline is thriving.
15. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Melinda Bonnie Fagan

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I have previously argued that stem cell experiments cannot demonstrate that a single cell is a stem cell (Fagan 2013a, b). Laplane and others dispute this claim, citing experiments that identify stem cells at the singlecell level. This paper rebuts the counterexample, arguing that the alleged ‘crucial stem cell experiments’ do not measure self-renewal for a single cell, do not establish a single cell’s differentiation potential, and, if interpreted as providing results about single cells, fall into epistemic circularity. I then discuss the source of the dispute, locating it in differences between philosophical and experimental perspectives.
16. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Spencer Phillips Hey

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What makes a high-quality biomarker experiment? The success of personalized medicine hinges on the answer to this question. In this paper, I argue that judgment about the quality of biomarker experiments is mediated by the problem of theoretical underdetermination. That is, the network of biological and pathophysiological theories motivating a biomarker experiment is sufficiently complicated that it often frustrates valid interpretation of the experimental results. Drawing on a case-study in biomarker diagnostic development from neurooncology, I argue that this problem of underdetermination can be overcome with greater coordination across the biomarker research trajectory. I then sketch an account for how coordination across a research trajectory can be evaluated. I ultimate conclude that what makes a high-quality biomarker experiment must be judged by the epistemic contribution it makes to this coordinated research effort.
17. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
John D. Norton

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The replicability of experiment is routinely offered as the gold standard of evidence. I argue that it is not supported by a universal principle of replicability in inductive logic. A failure of replication may not impugn a credible experimental result; and a successful replication can fail to vindicate an incredible experimental result. Rather, employing a material approach to inductive inference, the evidential import of successful replication of an experiment is determined by the prevailing background facts. Commonly, these background facts do support successful replication as a good evidential guide and this has fostered the illusion of a deeper, exceptionless principle.

articles

18. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Jon Altschul

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According to the Disjunction Problem, teleological theories of perceptual content are unable to explain why it is that a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without an adequate explanation these theories are stuckwithout an account of how non-veridical representation is possible, which would be an unsettling result. In this paper I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing what I call an error-prohibiting disjunctive property is incompatible with the truth of perceptual anti-individualism. And because perceptual anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.
19. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Mark Bauer

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Normative characterization is a commonplace feature of biological and cognitive explanation. Such language seems to commit the biological and cognitive sciences to the existence of natural norms, but it is also difficult to understand how such normativity fits into a natural world of physical causes and forces. I propose to map normativity onto systems stabilized by counteractive constraints. Such a mapping, I believe, can explain normativity’s causal-explanatory role in biological and cognitive inquiry. The common approach in the literature is to derive an account of natural normativity by way of a particular theory of function. I avoid that approach here and attempt to address directly the sort of physical systems that might satisfy naturalizing criteria for normativity. This has the advantages, I think, of allowing an account of normativity without first having to decide the correct theory of function as well as allowing for the theoretical possibility that normative and functional explanation might come apart within empirical explanation.
20. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Chuang Liu

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In this paper, we argue that symbols are conventional vehicles whose chief function is denotation, while models are epistemic vehicles, and their chief function is to show what their targets are like in the relevant aspects. And we explain why this is incompatible with the deflationary view on scientific modeling. Although the same object may serve both functions, the two vehicles are conceptually distinct and most models employ both elements. With the clarification of this point we offer an alternative account to the deflationary view – the Hybrid Account; and we defend our account in contrast with deflationism.