Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion

Our aim is to give an idea of the Nyaya and Advaita theories of perception and to note metaphysical or ontological elements in them. We shall consider whether it is possible to sieve out features of the theories without such elements with a view to formulating a commonly acceptable platform for dialogue regarding a theory of perception. In recent times scholars have attempted to pick up common elements in the two theories. In our account we may, however, be allowed to use Sanskrit philosophical words in original. This is perhaps useful for philosophizing freely in a comparative setting.

Largely unnoticed in textbook accounts of classical Indian philosophic schools is Nyāya's advocacy of yoga and its alliance with teachings of the Yoga-sūtra. Yoga and Nyāya differ sharply in how nature is viewed, its components and causal laws. But on the side of subjectivity, purusa and atman, there is more convergence than difference. The two world views have distinct theories of action, cognition, and the body, but concerning the subject or self himself or herself, including God or the īsvara (and argumentation so directed), the conceptions advanced are surprisingly similar. Moreover, the traditions converge in the commen taries of the tenth-century philosopher Vācaspati Miśra who often shows influence from one or the other direction in his Yoga-sūtra and Nyāya-sūtra commentaries. The key bridge ideas are expressed in the Nyāya-sūtra literature under a substantial and remarkable stretch of sutras in the fourth chapter devoted to yoga practice and liberating self knowledge: NyS 4.2.38-51. Among other jewels, here we find an implicit assimilation of philosophic debate as a yoga practice.

The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological account of the concept of a point of view. To clear the ground for such an account, the following questions must be addressed: What are points of view? What roles or functions do points of view play in human thinking and information acquisition? Why do points of view have such roles or functions? The distinction between the different components of points of view helps us to identify, diagnose, and understand ways in which various points of view direct and define human thinking. The second part of the article tests the credibility and functionality of the concept of a point of view developed in the first part. The testing takes place by applying the concept in question to the analysis of a classical Indian text, The Law Code of Manu.

This article deals with the pros and cons of the Mādhva-Vaiṣṇava tradition of Hinduism. On the pros sideMadhva’s interpretations of the 3rd question of Naciketas to Yama in the KaṭhaUpaniṣad as well as his interpretation of the statement tattvamasi as atattvamasi in the ChāndogyaUpaniṣad are unique. On the cons side flaws are pointed out on the much marveled concept of viśeṣa the doctrine of the gradation of the gods and the Viṣṇusahasranāma.

This paper will analyze a specific stylistic issue in the Śrautasūtras, namely, the mark of quotation vijñāyate. In literature, a quotation is often introduced with a specific mark that shifts the attention of the reader to a specific work or paper from which the quotation originates. In the ancient manuals about ritual in Vedic culture we find a verb - vijñāyate. The ancient composers seem to use this verb to stress a connection to another text, i.e. to the maxima auctorictas in the Vedic world, the śruti. Our contention is that the link between the verb and what is being introduced by the verb is not always clear. Our survey covers a restricted selection of data; however, we believe that it may provide some interesting insights into one of the most important elements which served to build the concept of the Vedic and Hindū tradition.

This paper brings together two bodies of scholarly literature.It is a study in the nature and development of moral thought, but it is also an inquiry into the interpretation of the Mahabharata. The two subjects come together when we ask the question, “Do works like the Mahabharata contain within them the history of our ethical coming to awareness?”A philosophical archeology of the Mahabharata indicates that it was originally a war story or group of war stories that evolved over time into a moral and religious text. The Mahabharata is an excellent candidate for this kind of moral archaeology since it is a text that has developed over a long period of time, a long enough period of time to see the reenactment of different stages of ethical awareness.

In the Buddhist view there can be no affirmation without negation and positive universals that in the Nyaya view are independent and eternal common characters shared by all members of a natural class should be replaced by difference from others that is a negative entity and a non-entity, e.g. what is meant by a cow is not that it is possessed of cow-ness but that it is not a non-cow. Udayana points out that cognition of a negative entity presupposes cognition of what is negated, the negatum. Thus, cognition of cow if the same as not-not cow presupposes cognition of not-cow, but cognition of not-cow presupposes cognition of cow; hence the Buddhist view is open to the charge of mutual dependence. This difficulty does not arise in the Nyaya view. Even if there is no affirmation without negation, negation is not necessarily the content of affirmation. So far as common experience goes, cognition of positive entities does not always require cognition of negative entities, e.g. a cow may be recognized as a cow and possessed of cow-ness without reference to non-cows.