Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science

One of the main problems of Lewis' approach to the conventionality of language is the so-called "probLem of the meaning without we ". In this paper consider the possible solutions to this problem and conclude that in order to avoid this objection Lewis' proposal must be substantially modified.

In most of the proposals about metonymy it is argued that it is a figure of signification or trope that exploits a figurative or transferred meaning. These proposals lose sight of what the examples that we normally consider metonymy have in common, to wit, that they are understood if we complete the metonymic noun phrase and not if we substitute it by another. It is in this sense that we understand that referential metonymy is a case of ellipsis and, thus, a figure of language or scheme whose mechanism of interpretation is intimately related to the mechanism of retrieval of expressions.

Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: (i) the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; (ii) the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for (i), and argue that (ii) can oe blocked because of the existence of alternative accounts of the phenomenon.

The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the Implicature Theory for epistemic contexts, as an attempt to save the validity of the Principle of Substitution in those contexts. I defend that Recanati 's arguments against the Implicature Theory are not conclusive because they are based on inadequate examples and on unclear interpretations of Grice's writings. I then argue that the mixing up of theories of meaning and attitude ascription with the classical intuitions held by Fregeans against Russellians in these contexts does not give promising results.

Presuppositions are well known phenomena. One way of treating them is as partial 'meaning-functions '. There is an attractive argument that holds that in order to explain the contrast between such sentences as "John came into the room" and "That bastard John came into the room" it is required to make our semantic theory essentially more complex. This argument appeals to the fact that contrasts such as the ones just mentioned play a role in the validity of logical inferences. In this paper I argue that these contrasts can be accounted for by appealing to presuppositions. In order to defend this view we will have to offer a characterization of logical consequence that applies to sentences that involve presuppositions.

Peirce claims that there is but one primary logical relation, that of illation or logical consequence. The present paper is devoted to show the influence of this viewpoint in Peirce's conception of logic. After a brief presentation of Peirce's membership in the tradition of language as calculus, it examines his pioneering work in modal logic and other systems of logic. The last section attemps to summarize his doctrine of logic as a normative science.

Putnam's Model- Theoretic Argument has been generally held as invalid. In this work, attention is addressed to two broad facts understated by critics and commentators: (i) there are, at least, two different model-theoretic arguments. One is directed against realism and the other is directed to naturalistic semantics. The general rejection affects the former, but it is open to discussion if it affects the latter; (ii) on the other hand, the model-theoretic argument construed as a reductio argument has not - prima facia - ontological consequences, but only restrains our methodology to deal with the intentional realm.

Phil Dowe has argued persuasively for a reductivist theory of causality. Drawing on Wesley Salmon's mark transmission theory and David Fair's transferencetheory, Dowe proposes to reduce causality to the exchange of conserved quantities. Dowe's account has the virtue of being simple and offering a definite "visible" idea of causation. According to Dowe and Salmon, it is also virtuous in being localist. That a theory of causation is localist means that it does not need the aid of counterfactuals and/or laws to work. Moreover, it can become the means by which we explain counterfactuals and laws. In this paper, I will argue that the theory is not localist (and hence, that it is less simple than it seems). As far as I can see, the theory needs the aid of laws.