Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents


articles

1. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Bernard Cooke

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, a sequel to “Prophetic Experience as Revelation,” I argue that history is the symbolic agency through which revelation occurs. Four issues are central to this claim: the action of God in history, the notion of universal history as revelation, the concept of Christian history as revelation, and the function of history as a symbol in the process of revelation itself.
2. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Tiina Allik

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The essay argues that narrative approaches to human personhood which conceptualize the goal of human personhood in terms of the fulfillment of a capacity for self-constitution by means of deliberate choices tend to make inordinate and inhuman claims for human agency. The narrative approaches of the psychoanalyst and psychoanalytic theorist, Roy Schafter, and of the theologian and ethicist, Stanley Hauerwas, illustrate this. Both thinkers implicitly deny the permanent vulnerability of human agency in the area of the appropriation of narratives. In the case of Hauerwas, this also implies a denial of theneed for God’s grace in the area of the appropriation of narratives. The work of the philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, serves as a contrast to Schafer and Hauerwas and demonstrates that a narrative approach to human persons does not need to make inordinate claims for an autonomous human capacity for self-constituion. The last part of the essay shows how the rejection of the need for God’s grace in the area of the appropriation of narratives is connected to a rejection of the idea of innocent suffering.
3. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Hendrik Hart

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kai Nielsen’s recent book Philosophy and Atheism is discussed here. The main point is that Nielsen’s arguments against Christianity can be turned against his own rationalist atheism with similar results, namely that the position seems incoherent from its own point of view. Christianity is unempirical and irrational by certain arguments, but the position assumed underneath those arguments does not survive treatment by those same arguments. Nielsen’s dependence on arguments that undermine the position assumed in these arguments should make him open to the suggestion that these arguments may not be relevant to the assessment of the validity of a religious position.
4. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
George H. Tavard

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Developments among Lutherans and Catholics since the Reformation have had positive as well as negative effects, as secularism has offered the same challenge to both. In their answers to this challenge, both have renovated their reading of the Scriptures and they have taken a new look at their specific traditions. But Catholic spirituality has accented aspects of anthropology and of ecclesiology which Lutherans find particularly hazardous. The ecumenical agreements arrived at over the last twenty years, on baptism, eucharist, ministry, and the Petrine office, have led to a recent agreement on justification. This has overcome in principle the dilemma of the 16th century. It remains to draw its implications for the piety of the faithful as well as for the Church’s life and theology in general. This is the second in a two-part study of justification, the earlier part of which was published in Vol. 1#3.
5. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Carol Caraway

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Feminists and gay liberationists condemn romantic love as an inherently sexist and heterosexist institution which requires sexist idealizations and heterosexual desire. I argue that although romantic love in contemporary Western societies often includes sexist idealizations and heterosexual desire, those elements are not necessary constituents of the concept of romantic love. The crucial elements in romantic love are concern, admiration, the desire for reciprocation, and the passion for union, none of which require either sexist idealizations or heterosexual sexual desire.
6. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Dana E. Bushnell

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This commentary argues that Caraway’s analysis of romantic love is incomplete, and that the concept of exclusivity may be in basic conflict with other components of her analysis.
7. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Alan Soble

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Romantic love is analyzed as including concern, admiration, the desire for reciprocity, exclusivity, and the passion for union. I argue that the passion for union is its central element. An analysis of “x admires y” which recognizes the intentionality of admiration is used to explain how romantic love practices turn out to be sexist . The analysis also shows that idealization is a special case of admiration, and is therefore not an essential part of romantic love.
8. Philosophy and Theology: Volume > 1 > Issue: 4
Andrew Tallon

view |  rights & permissions | cited by