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editor’s introduction

1. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Dixon

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essays

2. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Alan Soble

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I begin by describing the hideous nature of sexuality, that which makes sexual desire and activity morally suspicious, or at least what we have been told about the moral foulness of sex by, in particular, Immanuel Kant, but also by some of his predecessors (e.g., Augustine) and by some contemporary philosophers. A problem arises because acting on sexual desire, given this Kantian account of sex, apparently conflicts with the Categorical Imperative. I then propose a typology of possible solutions to this sex problem and critically discuss recent philosophical ethics of sex that fall into the typology's various categories.
3. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Duncan J. Richter

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In a debate between tolerance and intolerance one is disinclined to side with intolerance. Nevertheless that, in a sense, is what I want to do in this paper. The particular debate I have in mind is the old one between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin about the legal enforcement of moral values. It should be noted, though, that the issue has by no means been settled in the minds of many people. The proposed repeal of the British law prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality (a law known as Section 28) “could destroy Scottish society,” according to Mazhar Malik of Glasgow’s Ethnic Community Resource Centre, echoing Devlin’s concern from the 1960s. In what follows I will first sketch and defend, partially, what I take to be Devlin’s communitarian argument and then attempt to explain what is wrong with it and how this should affect our estimation of the proper relation between law and morals. I will argue that at least some private ‘immorality’ can be defended without recourse to the liberal belief in a morally private sphere. In part I I look at the kind of communitarianism that can be found in Devlin’s work, in part II I support this reading of Devlin and expand on it by looking at some important passages from his work, and in part III I consider the reasons why his argument does not support legislation against gay sex, and, in fact, could be used to defend gay rights.
4. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Deirdre Golash

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Any sexual offer by a professor to a student is morally problematic. An explicit disclaimer about grading issues will not change the fact that the professor has power over the student’s grades, and no assurance that the student can offer can evade the communicative difficulties created by the power differential. It is possible that there will be a sufficient development of trust that these communication problems are superseded, but it is again extremely difficult to be sure that this is so. Given this difficulty, the criterion for whether the sexual offer is permissible should be whether it is in fact misinterpreted, and the risk that it will be is entirely assumed by the offeror. Even if a fully voluntary sexual relationship is possible, duties to third parties make it improper to enter into such a relationship where the professor has power over a student’s grades or career prospects.
5. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Yolanda Estes

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6. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Mark Cowling

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Philosophers have identified the harm involved in stranger rape in various ways. This article reviews these with a view to making sense of surveys on date and acquaintance rape and minor sexual assaults: how much should these be bracketed with stranger rape as a major and traumatic violation? Or are some of these incidents closer to bad manners? It concludes that rape is a violation of autonomy that should be condemned because of the extreme unhappiness caused to the victim. It is argued that this criterion can be used to make sense of lesser sexual assaults whereas some of the other criteria philosophers have used to condemn rape tend to bifurcate sexual experiences into acceptable on the one hand and seriously traumatic on the other, with little space in between.
7. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Andrew Mitchell

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book reviews

8. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nancy M. Williams

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9. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lee Pike

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10. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Emily C. M. Hondros

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11. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Michael Goodman

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12. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Robert Garmong

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13. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
H. Eugene Cline

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essay

14. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Duncan Pritchard

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Here is a common ‘intuition’ that you’ll often find expressed regarding the epistemological externalism/internalism distinction. It is the thought that epistemological internalism, whatever its other faults, at least leaves the possession of knowledge a transparent matter; whereas epistemological externalism, whatever its other merits, at least makes the possession of knowledge opaque. It is the status of this view of the externalism/internalism contrast that I wish to evaluate in this paper. In particular, I argue that on the most credible interpretation of this ‘transparency’ thesis it is in fact inconsistent with even a minimal version of epistemological internalism. I conclude that knowledge is opaque on any plausible construal of knowledge, and consider some implications that this result has for the contemporary epistemological debate.

book reviews

15. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
H. Benjamin Shaeffer

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16. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
David Guetter

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17. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
David Boersema

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