Roczniki Filozoficzne

This article discusses the problems of language in John Locke’s thought. In the present studies the dominating considerations focus on the history of epistemology and philosophy of language. This study takes into account a broader intellectual context of the philosophy of language pursued at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. First and foremost it places the problems of language in the context of changes in the teaching of logic and rhetoric. Locke inspired the then beliefs about the significance of language as the tool of science and public discourse, in the questions of education, morality, politics, and religion. The English philosopher emphasized how important was the duty to shape the activity of the human mind, one of which was to develop linguistic skills; such skills are the condition of the reliability of knowledge and argumentative efficacy in social communication.

Autor przedstawia tytułowy problem duszy, umysłu, ciała i nieśmiertelności oraz ich wzajemnych relacji w siedmiu częściach (poprzedzonych ogólnym wstępem): I. Kwestia antropologiczna i jej trudności; II. Droga materializmu i naturalizmu; III. Dusza, umysł, ciało; IV. Tomasz z Akwinu i Kartezjusz (i A.R. Damasio) o duszy; V. Mind-Body Problem: dwuznaczna kwestia; VI. Umysł a mózg; VII. Nieśmiertelność człowieka. Artykuł kończą obszerne wnioski.

The article presents the question of community in Jean-Luc Nancy’s work La communauté désoeuvrée (1983). Nancy’s writings on community are one of the most well known part of his work. That is why firstly that essay shows how Nancy redefined community and moved away from this word toward explicitly ontological terms such as being-in-common, being-together and being-with. Then we take up Nancy’s discussions of the relation between myth and community: between the interruption of myth, the unworked community (la communauté désoeuvrée), and “literary communism.” And, eventually, at the end we take a closer look at the relation between Nancy’s understanding of community and history in general to show what Nancy means by finitude.

The concept of creation in the tradition of human thought was investigated in the theological perspective—to explain the article of faith about the origin and God-world relation. Recently, the understanding of the issue has often been dominated by an ideologically based dispute between so called creationism and evolutionism.In his theory of creation (mostly contained in De Potentia, Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica), Thomas Aquinas uses strictly philosophical instruments to analyze the problem. It allows to treat the issue of creation as a detailed explanation of the metaphysical causation theory. Furthermore, it lets us define the nature of relation between the Creator as the First Cause and the world—the set of created beings.The concept of creation is therefore a metaphysical explanation of ontic pluralism and contingency, that is, the existence of many beings (more than one) which do not have the necessity of existence. Creation is a way of explanation how the First Cause acts, which results in the existence of numerous accidental beings. It is not a transformation or a creation of something on the basis of previous elements. It is a production in being with no previous conditions (creatio ex nihilo). Theformal end of the creative action is the act of existence of accidental beings.The creation of accidental beings generates a mutual relation of the Creator and the created beings. For the Creator (creatio activa), the creation is his own nature (Subsistent Existence) in its relation to the created beings. Such a connection has a feature of a mental relation, as practically it is not different from the nature of the Creator. For the created beings the creation (creatio passiva) is a real dependence in existence of the created beings on the Creator. This relation is a real accident, inherent in every created being, which means it is a predicable relation in the category of property (proprium).

Przedmiotem artykułu jest koncepcja „domniemania ateizmu” Antony’ego Flew. Flew twierdzi,że w punkcie wyjścia debaty na temat istnienia Boga powinniśmy przyjąć stanowisko ateizmu, a ciężar dowodu spoczywa na teiście. W artykule kwestionuję różne wymagania stawiane przez Flew reprezentantom teizmu i ateizmu. Odpowiadając na propozycję Flew, analizuję problem epistemologiczny, jak silne świadectwa na rzecz danego przekonania są potrzebne, by podmiot przyjął to przekonanie. Twierdzę, że zależne jest to od okoliczności, w jakich znajduje się dana osoba i jej indywidualnych uwarunkowań. Za pomocą tych analiz staram się wskazać, w jaki sposób różne osoby mogą racjonalnie wymagać od przekonania teistycznego innego stopnia prawdopodobieństwa niż od przekonania ateistycznego. Pokazuje to, jak sądzę, że propozycja Flew nie musi być racjonalna dla innych osób, choć może by taką dla samego Flew.