Philosophy and Theology

Spinoza’s ideas on the eternity of the human mind have sparked much controversy. As opposed to most commentators, I argue that since substance is eternal, and the human mind can only be conceived in substance, the human mind must also be eternal. Only from a finite and partial view can the human mind be conceived of as having duration.

One argument that there cannot exist a being who creates all laws of nature was first outlined by J. L. Mackie, and further developed by Gilbert Fulmer. Fulmer’s version of the argument is examined, together with a recent neoCartesian counter-argument. The Menzel-Morris thesis holds that God’s power extends to creating his own nature. I argue that Fulmer’s argument is false, but that it can sustain counter-arguments of the type formulated by Menzel-Morris.

Bernard Lonergan contrasts his account of judgment with that of the relativist. This paper points out how Lonergan’s characterization of the relativist account of judgment closely resembles the account of judgment that F. H. Bradley had given. Furthermore, the paper points to areas of commonality between Lonergan and Bradley with regard to human knowing. Despite their similarities, however, Lonergan’s account of judgment clearly distinguishes his theory of knowing from anything Iike Bradley’s idealism.

In the 17th Discussion of his Tahafut al-Falasifah (“Incoherence of the Philosophers”), Ghazali presents two theories of causation which, he claims, accommodate belief in the possibility of miracles. The first of these, which is usually taken to represent Ghazali’s own position, is a form of occasionalism. In this paper I argue that Ghazali fails to prove that this theory is compatible with belief in the possibility of miracles.

I argue that, despite their extensive disagreements at the level of first-order ethics, there are equally extensive agreements between Sartre and Kant at the metaethical level. Following a brief exposition of the principal metaethical similarities, I offer a defense of Sartre’s general moral theory against the more rigid first-order consequences which Kant claims to be able to assert.