Browse by:



Displaying: 1-20 of 1698 documents


monographic section
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Marc Artiga, Orcid-ID Javier González de Prado Orcid-ID Editors’ introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
James Woodward Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper discusses some procedures developed in recent work in machine learning for inferring causal direction from observational data. The role of independence and invariance assumptions is emphasized. Several familiar examples, including Hempel’s flagpole, problem are explored in the light of these ideas. The framework is then applied to problems having to do with explanatory direction in non-causal explanation.
Bookmark and Share
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Katrina Elliott, Orcid-ID Marc Lange Orcid-ID Running it up the flagpole to see if anyone salutes: A response to Woodward on causal and explanatory asymmetries
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Does smoke cause fire or does fire cause smoke? James Woodward’s “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries” argues that various statistical independence relations not only help us to uncover the directions of causal and explanatory relations in our world, but also are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions. We raise questions about Woodward’s envisioned epistemology, but our primary focus is on his metaphysics. We argue that any alleged connection between statistical (in)dependence and causal/explanatory direction is contingent, at best. The directions of causal/explanatory relations in our world seem not to depend on the statistical (in)dependence relations in our world (conceived of either as frequency patterns or as relations among chances). Thus, we doubt that statistical (in)dependence relations are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions.
Bookmark and Share
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Jiji Zhang Orcid-ID On the unity between observational and experimental causal discovery
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries”, James Woodward supplements his celebrated interventionist account of causation and explanation with a set of new ideas about causal and explanatory asymmetries, which he extracts from some cutting-edge methods for causal discovery from observational data. Among other things, Woodward draws interesting connections between observational causal discovery and interventionist themes that are inspired in the first place by experimental causal discovery, alluding to a sort of unity between observational and experimental causal discovery. In this paper, I make explicit what I take to be the implicated unity. Like experimental causal discovery, observational causal discovery also relies on interventions (or exogenous variations, to be more accurate), albeit interventions that are not carried out by investigators and hence need to be detected as part of the inference. The observational patterns appealed to in observational causal discovery are not only surrogates for would-be interventions, as Woodward sometimes puts it; they also serve to mark relevant interventions that actually happen in the data generating process.
Bookmark and Share
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Kun Zhang Orcid-ID Computational causal discovery: Advantages and assumptions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I would like to congratulate James Woodward for another landmark accomplishment, after publishing his Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Woodward, 2003). Makes Things Happens gives an elegant interventionist theory for understanding explanation and causation. The new contribution (Woodward, 2022) relies on that theory and further makes a big step towards empirical inference of causal relations from nonexperimental data. In this paper, I will focus on some of the emerging computational methods for finding causal relations from non-experimental data and attempt to complement Woodward’s contribution with discussions on 1) how these methods are connected to the interventionist theory of causality, 2) how informative the output of the methods is, including whether they output directed causal graphs and how they deal with confounders (unmeasured common causes of two measured variables), and 3) the assumptions underlying the asymptotic correctness of the output of the methods about causal relations. Different causal discovery methods may rely on different aspects of the joint distribution of the data, and this discussion aims to provide a technical account of the assumptions.
Bookmark and Share
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Porter Williams Orcid-ID The fate of causal structure under time reversal
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
What happens to the causal structure of a world when time is reversed? At first glance it seems there are two possible answers: the causal relations are reversed, or they are not. I argue that neither of these answers is correct: we should either deny that time-reversed worlds have causal relations at all, or deny that causal concepts developed in the actual world are reliable guides to the causal structure of time-reversed worlds. The first option is motivated by the instability under intervention of time-reversed dynamical evolutions. The second option is motivated by a recognition of how contingent structural features of the actual world shape, and license the application of, our causal concepts and reasoning strategies.
Bookmark and Share
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Fernanda Samaniego Orcid-ID Bi-directionality in causal relationships
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper aims to provide an answer to James Woodward’s article “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries”. It will be conjectured that, when causal directionality depends on the experimental design, it is because the variables involved are capable of producing changes in each other. This will be exemplified using the case of ideal gases as opposed to the flagpole-shadow scenario.
Bookmark and Share
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
James Woodward Responses
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Summary
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
articles
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Juan Redmond Orcid-ID A free dialogical logic for surrogate reasoning: generation of hypothesis without ontological commitments
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article aims to present a Free Dialogic Logic [FDL] as a general framework for hypothesis generation in the practice of modelling in science. Our proposal is based on the idea that the inferential function that models fulfil during the modelling process (surrogate reasoning) should be carried out without ontological commitments. The starting point to achieve our objective is that the scientific consideration of models without a target is a symptom that, on the one hand, the Applicability of Logic should be considered among the conditions of adequacy that should take into account all modeling process and, on the other, that the inferential apparatus at the base of the surrogate reasoning process must be rid of realistic assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions. In this sense, we propose as an alternative an ontologically neutral inferential system in the perspective of dialogical pragmatism.
Bookmark and Share
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
José Ramón Torices Orcid-ID Understanding dogwhistles politics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper aims to deepen our understanding of so-called covert dogwhistles. I discuss whether a covert dogwhistle is a specific sort of mechanism of manipulation or whether, on the contrary, it draws on other already familiar linguistic mechanisms such as implicatures or presuppositions. I put forward a series of arguments aimed at illustrating that implicatures and presuppositions, on the one hand, and covert dogwhistles, on the other, differ in their linguistic behaviour concerning plausible deniability, cancellability, calculability and mutual acceptance. I concluded this paper by outlining a simple theory for covert dogwhistles according to which they are attitude-foregrounders.
Bookmark and Share
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa Orcid-ID Predictive coding and the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I discuss the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability (CPs), to wit, th at the perceptual states (P) of a subject (S) are pervasively influenced, affected, or caused by cognitive factors (C) as expectations, memories, thoughts, goals, and so on, at all levels of perceptual processing. I argue that following the predictive coding models of perception (PC), the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability is to be expected.
Bookmark and Share
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Uku Tooming Orcid-ID Politics of Folk Psychology: Believing what Others Believe
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I argue that by attributing beliefs the attributer is pushed toward taking a stand on the content of those beliefs and that what stand they take partially depends on the relationship between the attributer and the attributee. In particular, if the attributee enjoys a higher social standing than the attributer, the latter is disposed to adopt the attributed belief, as long as certain other conditions are met. I will call this view the Adoption-by-Attribution model. Because of the non-epistemic influence that derives from the relation of inequality, belief attribution can reinforce the existing unequal power relations and contribute to epistemic injustice.
Bookmark and Share
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Bruno Borge, Orcid-ID Nicolás Lo Guercio Orcid-ID Learning from Scientific Disagreement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion by providing a normative argument in the same direction; if we are correct, typical reasons for conciliation are absent in this kind of scientific disagreements.
Bookmark and Share
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Javier Anta Orcid-ID The epistemic schism of statistical mechanics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I defend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel’s (1958) symmetry thesis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice versa.
Bookmark and Share
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Miguel Escribano Cabeza Orcid-ID La idea de epigénesis en la obra de W. Harvey. Una lectura organicista
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper takes an organicist perspective of W. Harvey’s conception of epigenesis in his work Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1651). In line with this reading, I provide a critical assessment of the different interpretations (mechanistic or vitalist) of Harvey’s idea of epigenesis. The English physician develops his conception of embryogenesis as a process that cannot be understood from the categories of human art, as is apparent in his criticisms towards his teacher, Fabricius. Nor is it accurate to say that his position is animistic. An immersion in this last question will show us his organic conception of the soul, as an extension of the Aristotelian-Galenic tradition.
Bookmark and Share
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Summary
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Contents of Volume 36
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
monographic section
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Valeriano Iranzo Orcid-ID Guest editor’s presentation
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Harold Kincaid Orcid-ID Mechanisms, good and bad
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal —between cause and effect— and mechanisms that are vertical —they realize in lower-level terms causal properties—: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not a priori and universal.
Bookmark and Share