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articles

1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Thomas Sherman, S.J.

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While Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics does not provide a guide for action in the form of rules for a decision process as deontological or consequentialistethical theories purport to do, he does present a description of the virtuous agent and the virtues that this agent exercises in his choices of action. In this paper Iargue that Aristotle’s mature virtuous agent characteristically exercises the virtue of wisdom (sophia) as well as the practical virtues of character and intelligence in his choices of action and that students of virtue (those sincerely interested in becoming virtuous by acting as the virtuous agent does) can derive certain action-guiding rules from a description of these three virtues and how they are exercised by the mature virtuous agent in any given choice of action.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Howard J. Curzer

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The article argues that Aristotle takes the mean to be relative neither to character nor to social role, but simply to the agent’s situation. The “character relativity” interpretation arises from the contemporary common-sense impulse to hold people who must overcome obstacles to a lower standard than people who easily act and feel rightly. However, character relativity vitiates Aristotle’s distinction between what moral people should do and what people should do to become moral. It also clashes with Aristotle’s principle that the virtuous person is the measure of which actions and passions are virtuous. The “role relativity” interpretation arisesfrom the contemporary common-sense impulse to hold people in different social roles to different standards. However, role relativity vitiates Aristotle’s distinctionbetween the good person, on the one hand, and the good ruler, subject, doctor, soldier, and citizen, on the other. It also clashes with his claim that children, natural slaves, and women are inferior to adult, naturally free men.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Andrew Cummings

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This article explores the relationship between religious and philosophical thought, taking the kindred approaches of Anselm and Hegel as illustrations of one particular approach to the issue. It is argued that both thinkers employ a “logic of unity” which tends to subordinate the religious to the philosophical. The most important result of this approach, for the purposes of this paper, is the blurring of the distinction between the human and the divine. The logic of unity, whichultimately implies the “unity” of the human and divine, renders the traditional understanding of God’s mystery problematic. Yet, while Hegel is comfortablewith this eradication of mystery, Anselm proceeds to offer a somewhat cryptic argument for divine mystery, which nevertheless respects the logic of unity towhich he adheres.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Andrej Krause

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This article analyzes one aspect of Bolzano’s metaphysics. It discusses the question of whether, according to Bolzano, substances are simple or not. In theopinion of some commentators, he accepts composed substances, that is, substances having substances as proper parts. However, it is easily possible to misinterpret his position. This paper first tries to reconstruct Bolzano’s definitions of the concept of substance and suggests that he should be able to agree with the following final definition: x is a substance if and only if x is real and not a property. After this, it is shown that, according to Bolzano, every substance is simple in a fourfold sense: No substance has (1) adherences as parts, (2) substances as proper parts, (3) spatially extended parts, and (4) temporal parts.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Paul Symington

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This article compares the accounts of psychical unity in Freud and Lonergan. Following a detailed account of Freud’s understanding of psychical structure andhis deterministic psycho-biological presuppositions, Lonergan’s understanding of psychical structure in relation to patterns of experience is discussed. As opposed to Freud’s theory, which is based on an imaginative synthesis of the classical laws of natural science, Lonergan considers psychical and organic function as concretely integrated in human functionality according to probabilistic schemes of recurrence. Consequently, Lonergan offers a theory of the psychological problems of repression and inhibition not primarily as functions of subverted organic desires, but more properly according to the functioning of intellectual bias. Lonergan thereby provides a more comprehensive understanding of the unity of the human self at the psychical level.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Lydia Jaeger

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In his recent book, The Empirical Stance (2002), Bas van Fraassen elaborates on earlier suggestions of a religious view that has striking parallels withhis constructive empiricism. A particularly salient feature consists in the way in which he keeps a critical distance from theoretical formulations both in scienceand religion, thus preferring a mystical approach to religious experience. As an alternative, I suggest a view based on mediation by the word, both in the structureof reality and the encounter between persons. Without falling prey to rationalist illusions, such an approach allows for true human knowledge as embedded intranscendent Wisdom. It implies a more radical break with the Enlightenment ideal of neutral and universal knowledge than van Fraassen’s program, as he stillmaintains a kind of immanent grounding of knowledge in the form of direct, unmediated experience, in spite of his rejection of classical foundationalism. Wecan thus overcome the antithetical ring that characterizes his notion of rationality understood as bridled irrationality and escape relativism without forgetting thelessons that we have learned from the collapse of positivism—lessons to which van Fraassen rightly draws our attention.

review article

7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Dennis L. Sepper

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This article offers a detailed review of Filosofi italiani contemporanei, a book that presents overviews of seven contemporary Italian philosophers and philosopher/theologians—Luigi Pareyson, Emanuele Severino, Italo Mancini, Gianni Vattimo, Vincenzo Vitiello, Massimo Cacciari, and theologian Bruno Forte. Not intended as a comprehensive survey of the contemporary Italian philosophical scene, the book presents thinkers influential during the last three decades who have focused on tradition, post-metaphysical conceptions of being, origin, and principle, and the openness of philosophy to religion. Although eccentric by Anglo-American standards, the selection does not misrepresent recent Italian philosophizing, which has been more thoroughgoingly shaped by neo-scholasticism, idealism, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and nihilism than most English-language work. Open to international philosophy as well as to its own traditions, Italian thinkers work within a complex ethos that has produced significant recent philosophizing and holds great promise for the future.

book reviews

8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Michael Ewbank

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9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Vincent Colapietro

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10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Julia Schneider

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11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Salman Bashier

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12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Janet E. Smith

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13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4
Cynthia R. Nielsen

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books received

14. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4

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contents of volume

15. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 4

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articles

16. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Gabriel Marcel

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17. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Thomas A. Michaud

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18. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Michael Novak

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This article originally appeared in The Commonweal (October 5, 1962): 31–3. Michael Novak, a graduate student at the time, met Marcel while he was at Harvard University to deliver the William James lectures in the fall of 1961. Those lectures were subsequently printed in the volume, The Existential Background ofHuman Dignity (1963). The article is reprinted here with the kind permission of Michael Novak and the Commonweal magazine.
19. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Peter A. Redpath

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In this paper, I take for granted that, today, something is radically wrong metaphysically with Western culture. I maintain that this problem arises, as Marcelsays, from the very depths of our being. This paper’s purpose is to consider some aspects of Marcel’s metaphysical teaching, especially about our need tostart philosophizing in the concrete, not the abstract, situation, to battle against the spirit of abstraction, and use these reflections for the practical purpose ofconsidering what sorts of steps we need to take at the present moment to recover philosophical practice in the postmodern age. Within the context of this paper,I argue that Marcel is a realist humanist in the tradition of Plato and Aquinas whose battle against the spirit of abstraction is fundamentally a fight againstnominalism and sophistry.
20. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 3
Thomas R. Flynn

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After reviewing how Jean Wahl interprets the early Marcel, specifically his Metaphysical Journal, in a seminal work whose title captured the philosophical spiritof the 1930s, Vers le concret (“Toward the Concrete”), I discuss the existentialist style of philosophizing, offer five criteria for judging a philosopher to be an existentialist and submit Marcel’s work to each. I turn to the appropriateness of calling him a neo-Socratic philosopher, an appellation he seemed to prefer, and conclude with some observations of how this mixture of the Socratic and the existentialist places Marcel in the lineage of those like Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot who speak of philosophy less as a doctrine and more as a way of life.