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editorial
1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Valentin A. Bazhanov Валентин Александрович Бажанов
Abstraction Through the Lens of Neuroscience
Абстрагирование и абстракции в оптике нейронауки

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The interpretation of the abstraction process and the use of various abstractions are consistent with the trends associated with the naturalistic turn in modern cognitive and neural studies. Logic of dealing with abstractions presupposes not only acts of digress from the insignificant details of the object, but also the replenishment of the image due to idealization, endowing the object with properties that are absent from it. Thus, abstraction expresses not only the activity of the subject but the fact of “locking” this activity on a certain kind of ontology as well. The latter, in the spirit of I. Kant’s apriorism, is a function of epistemological attitudes and the nature of the subject's activity. Therefore, in the context of modern neuroscience, we can mean the transcendentalism of activity type. An effective tool for comprehension of abstractions making and development is a metaphor, which, on the one hand, allows submerge the object of analysis into a more or less familiar context, and on the other hand, it may produce new abstractions. Naturalistic tendencies manifested in the fact that empirically established abstractions activate certain neural brain networks, and abstract and concrete concepts are "processed" by various parts of the brain. If we keep in mind the presence of different levels abstractions then not only neural networks but even individual neurons (called “conceptual”) can be excited. The excitation of neural networks is associated with understanding the meaning of some concepts, but at the same time, the activity of these networks presupposes the "dissection" of reality due to a certain angle, determined in the general case by goals, attitudes and concrete practices of the subject.
panel discussion
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Boris I. Pruzhinin, Tatiana G. Shchedrina Борис Исаевич Пружинин
Cultural-Historical Epistemology and Perspectives of the Philosophy of Science
Культурно-историческая эпистемология и перспективы философии науки

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The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the methodological effectiveness of one of the directions in developing the philosophy of science – cultural and historical epistemology. Cultural-historical epistemology does not pretend at all to be any radical epistemological originality but offers a general view of science as a part of intellectual culture, where both individual historical cases and broad sociological generalizations find their methodologically significant place. The authors believe that it is the development of methodological norms capable of determining the fundamental parameters and strategies of scientific research that is now the central task of the philosophy of science. One of the characteristic forms of organization of modern advanced science is interdisciplinary research programs that involve the joint activities of large research teams. This fact raises a critical question about the mutual understanding of specialists from different disciplines and, accordingly, about the development of methodological norms that can determine the generally accepted parameters of the reproducibility of cognition results. Thus, in the center of attention of the philosophy of science, epistemological plots are put forward, one way or another connected with a specific understanding of the phenomenon of communication in science. Moreover, according to the authors, in these philosophical and methodological searches, it is essential to overcome, on the one hand, the inclination to conceptual design that leads away from the real methodological needs of science and, on the other hand, straightforward sociologization and equally direct historicization of science. These approaches are fraught with relativization of the very idea of scientific knowledge as a rational phenomenon of culture. The authors of the article believe that in modern conceptual trends in the philosophy of science, it is necessary to accentuate quite traditional epistemological principles, which in their updated edition make it possible to activate, or, as it were, to revive the methodological functions of the philosophy of science that are partially lost today. Justifying this approach, the authors turn to the epistemological trend, which for two decades has been developed based on the traditions of Russian philosophy of the first half of the 20th century.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Natalia I. Kuznetsova Наталия Ивановна Кузнецова
Descriptive Turn in Epistemology: For Better or Worse?
Дескриптивный поворот в эпистемологии

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The article shows that cultural-historical epistemology erroneously puts forward the thesis of a global crisis in the sphere of modern epistemology and philosophy of science. The key error of such a diagnosis is rooted in the confusion of basic concepts. In the development of epistemological studies, the period of the last decades of the twentieth century, which was called the “descriptive turn”, is very important. In the philosophy of science, the task was set to reflect the real practice of scientific research. This has been successfully carried out in a number of works by Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Latour and others. The task of building universal norms of scientific research has faded into the background. In this regard, the subjects of "methodology of science", on the one hand, and "epistemology" and "philosophy of science", on the other hand, were distinguished. The formulation of norms and standards for scientific research has become the task of methodology. Describing scientific practice, including scientific revolutions, has become the task of the professional history of science. The philosophical understanding of the processes of historical evolution, the identification of the laws of the development of science has become the subject of the philosophy of science. Epistemology, in turn, is called upon to consider the phenomenon of knowledge not only in science, but also more broadly – in a variety of historical and cultural contexts. In modern studies in the field of epistemology and philosophy of science, case studies are important, as they provide invaluable empirical material for philosophical generalizations. As for the construction of universal standards for scientific work, such a task, as Feyerabend showed, seems to be impossible. Moreover, the universal methodological standard does not allow discovering the uniqueness of scientific research situations.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Vladimir N. Porus Владимир Натанович Порус
Towards the Reform of the System of Epistemological Goals and Values
На пути к реформе системы эпистемологических целей и ценностей

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Cultural and historical epistemology is not only a special branch of philosophical researches of science, but also the base of reform of a system of the epistemological categories expressing the purposes and values of scientific knowledge. Its need follows from the nature of development of modern science. Preservation of the traditional epistemological categories applied to the analysis of this development results in rough relativism. This danger can be eliminated, having developed the holistic system of epistemological values proceeding from the principle of historicism and “collective” understanding of the subject of scientific knowledge. Both of these bases allow to disclose historical and cultural conditionality of processes of scientific research and broadcast of their results. Such purposes and values of science as the truth and the objectivity of knowledge have historical measurement: they exist only in the course of continuous emergence and destruction, being affected by cultural factors. The collectivity of the subject of scientific knowledge is defined together with concepts of a “transcendental” and “individual and empirical” subject according to the principle of complementarity (N. Bohr) finding an epistemological transcription. The possibilities of political subjectivity of science in connection with the epistemological investigations from participation of scientific communities in political structures and movements are considered.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Valery V. Savchuk, Konstantin A. Ocheretyany Валерий Владимирович Савчук
Sociocultural Landmarks of Cognition and Problems of Scientific Creativity in the Media World
Социокультурные ориентиры познания и проблемы научного творчества в медиамире

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In the article the thoughts about science as a creative process are presented in the context of the historical-cultural epistemology, specificity of which is presented in the material by B.I. Pruzhinin and T.G. Shchedrina. Tendencies in the modern world’s development – social, economic, political, communication – do not give rise to doubts about the presence of a paradox: the more globalized the world becomes, the more science gravitates towards the status of applied – this determines its effectiveness. Nonetheless, what is lost when emphasizing efficiency? To answer this question is worth remembering that the intellectual revolution in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries was based not only on the works of Bacon, Descartes, and Newton but also on the radical position expressed in Machiavelli’s “Sovereign” who placed utility above virtue. As soon as science becomes a pragmatic business, prestige, fame, safety, and comfort begin to depend on its success. Knowledge is power, but in the new political and social realities, the main thing is practical, utilitarian, and effective. By becoming disciplinary, technical, science gains power – but is this power not limited to its own constructions? Paradoxically, science, performing a service function, begins to lose the status of an instance of meaning. Serving society, it, nevertheless, is not a connecting force in society – they resort to it for recipes and solutions, but they do not consider it as a common cause, and as a platform for social interaction, they expect a product from science, but not meanings and values, benefit, but not virtues. However, what is a product of science? How is its performance measured? And who determines the effectiveness? This article attempts to partially illuminate these issues, including in the field of their consideration existentially loaded aspects of the scientific community’s creativity – aesthetic, technical-digital, including computer games. Collective intuition as the acquisition of new experience, as the creation of previously nonexistent contexts in which new objects, events, and phenomena are placed – all these are key conditions for a world of uncertainty in which science is already required not only objective results but also involvement in the joint comprehension of existential projects. Truth there is not always the result, but rather a beginning, which requires, among other things, the derivation of all scientific consequences for which other forms of habitation of experience are open – aesthetic, playful, performative.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Natalia E. Kharlamenkova Наталья Евгеньевна Харламенкова
Criteria for Replication of Psychological Knowledge in the Context of the Cultural-Historical Epistemology
Критерии репликации психологического знания в контексте культурно-исторической эпистемологии

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The author considers some methodological problems of contemporary psychological research in the context of the concept of cultural-historical epistemology, as it is represented in the paper by B.I. Pruzhinin and T.G. Shchedrina. The author claims that the key problem of the modern science lies not in the question of how to conduct research correctly, but how to express the results so that another scientist can reproduce them. What are the criteria for their validity and reliability? With this problem in the background, it becomes obvious that there is a fundamental gap between the theoretical and methodological part of a particular study and the description of the selection and methods, the organizing procedure for empirical research, and the analysis of the results. Scientists’ attention is focused on the development and implementation of empirical research, while the actual production and reproduction of knowledge happen to be outside the scope of solving research problems. In the latter case, we mean the entire procedure for the reproduction of knowledge, including the theoretical and methodological substantiation of the novelty and relevance of the research, the empirical part of the scientific work itself, and, of course, the cultural-historical interpretation of the results, or, more correctly, their reasonable explanation. The problem of psychological knowledge replication is considered in the article. Also, the criteria for the replication of knowledge at various points of scientific and psychological research are discussed, in particular – the criteria of constancy and renewal of knowledge in experimental situations, which presuppose the conceptual setting of the studied phenomena, and of the facts’ correlation from different experiments (including the conceptualization of their continuity with the historical tradition of psychological science). Considerable attention is paid to the specific object field of psychological science and, thereby, to the analysis of such scientific procedures as description, interpretation and explanation. Especially, the methodological arguments are analyzed which make it possible to introduce the procedure for explaining scientific data into the criteria system for the replication of psychic phenomena.
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Irina O. Shchedrina Ирина Олеговна Щедрина
Cultural-Historical Epistemology and Individual Methodological Attitudes of a Scientist: (On the Autobiographical Narrative of A.A. Ukhtomsky)
Культурно-историческая эпистемология и индивидуальные методологические установки ученого

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In this article, the author proceeds from the conceptual reversal of cultural-historical epistemology to the personal, historical, and social experience of a representative of an intellectual culture (scientist, philosopher) and his understanding and rethinking of his methodological attitudes. The idea of the article is that cultural-historical epistemology makes it possible to present natural-scientific and philosophical individual reflection as a specific component of the development of special tools, which are capable of recording and assessing the methodological effectiveness of research activities taking into account individual cognitive experience. For this purpose, the author turns to the issue of an autobiographical narrative – a narrative containing the personal experience of working scientists rethinking their own methodological attitudes. The specific character of ego-documents, and moreover, ego-texts of a natural scientific kind in this case is corroborated by the ideas of cultural-histori - cal epistemology. A scientist is turned to Other, whether in himself or in the narrative. Here scientific methodology and autobiographical narrative are conceptually mixed. As the main material reveals the meaning of the above idea, ego-texts by A.A. Ukhtomsky (his notes in notebooks, correspondence, and memoirs) were selected. While comprehending the fate of domestic and foreign science and also perfectly imagining the further development of multiple “systems of knowledge”, Ukhtomsky still saw a living person – the Interlocutor – behind this process. The need to preserve this image in front of oneself, to preserve the Dominant on the face of Other, this internal orientation, are brought by Ukhtomsky to a conceptually higher level. In this case, the narrative is viewed as a type of reflection that allows one to explicate and give a personal assessment of the effectiveness of the methodological guidelines, based on which the scientist chooses certain areas of research.
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Boris I. Pruzhinin, Tatiana G. Shchedrina Борис Исаевич Пружинин
“There Is No Royal Way in Philosophy…”. Historical Reply to Critics
«В философии нет “королевского пути”…». Исторический ответ оппонентам

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epistemology & cognition
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Igor D. Nevvazhay Игорь Дмитриевич Невважай
Transcendentalism as a Program for the Development of Epistemology
Трансцендентализм как программа развития эпистемологии

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The author discusses some tensions between realism and constructivism in the theory of knowledge and the corresponding research programs in the philosophy of science. In this paper, he argues that the development of transcendentalism can help reduce these tensions. He considers the way for Kant’s transcendentalism development, which is connected with the semiotic interpretation proposed by K.-O. Apel. The author suggests the new interpretation of transcendentalism according to which the transcendental exists as a proto-norm, which is a spontaneous act that assigns the “given” object either the status of a sign reffering to a certain meaning, or the status of a meaning reffering to a certain expression (sign). The author develops G. Frege’s concept of meaning and argues that the existence of two kinds of meaning (meaning-1 and meaning-2), which corresponds with the two fundamental characteristics of consciousness: intensionality and responsiveness. Given this, a transcendental act generates either intensional or responsive meanings of the reality. The proposed symbolic interpretation of transcendentalism allows us explain the emergence of realism and constructivism as semiotic types of cultures and overcome the tensions between them. It is also shown that this version of symbolic transcendentalism is promising for explaining the nature of absolute existences in both classical and non-classical physical theories. The examples of such existences as absolute space and absolute time in Newtonian mechanics and absolute standards in G. Weil's theory of gauge fields are considered. These transcendental existences cannot be interpreted as real physical objects, and at the same time they are necessary for the interpretation of physical experiments. The author comes to the conclusion that transcendentalism is a promising program for the development of philosophy of science as an area for researches in normativity, sign-symbolic structures of cognitive processes, and the forms of knowledge.
language & mind
10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Pavel N. Baryshnikov Павел Николаевич Барышников
Difficult Points of Chess Metaphor in the Theoretical Questions of Language and Mind
Трудные места шахматной метафоры в учениях о языке и сознании

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This review article reveals the structural components of the chess metaphor, which represent in an unusual perspective the properties of a linguistic sign and its connection with mental processes. Strict rule-following and the conventionality of the material plane of expression turn chess into a convenient illustration of a universal linguistic structure. Particular attention is paid to the computer profile of the chess metaphor, since it reflects a whole complex of philosophical problems of computer science about mind, thinking and intelligence. In the proposed paper, the presentation of most of the material is based on the works of F. de Saussure, L. Hjelmslev, L. Wittgenstein and their interpreters, in whose texts an obvious important place is occupied by chess analogies and theoretical conclusions initiated by them. First we investigate chess metaphor in the context of language and speech structures. Next, we analyze the "chess track" in the problem of individual language and the rule-following problem. The final part is devoted to the technical elements of computer chess and the influence of this area of computer science on some of the points of cognitive theories of language and mind. The author of the article emphasizes a nontrivial transformation of the conceptual content of the chess metaphor, which indicates the evolution of computational tendencies in modern theories about language and mind. The article substantiates the thesis that the traditional chess metaphor used in the XX century in the philosophical investigation of language and mind, today it takes on a realization in the framework of computer models of the chess game. Machine deep learning can significantly expand the horizon of computability. Game interaction makes it possible to ascribe the elements of intentional content to machine functions. Nevertheless, all the argumentation in the work is aimed at proving that the rules governing language and mind are rules different from the rules of computer intelligence.
vista
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Evgeny V. Maslanov Евгений Валерьевич Масланов
Social Position of an Expert as a New Element of Science
Социальная позиция эксперта как новый элемент науки

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The article focuses on analyzing the changes that have occurred in the procedures for assessing scientific knowledge during the period of their massive introduction into the economy, politics and everyday life, as well as the formation of a new social position of the expert. Up to this point, the assessment of scientific knowledge often took place within the scientific community. In that case, a special role was played by “authority” able to evaluate projects basing on criteria intrinsic to the scientific ethos. The active introduction of scientific knowledge into the social life encouraged the emergence of a new expert’s social position differing from an intrascientific “authority”. In their work, they have to evaluate projects that involve large financial resources and contribute to changes in social and economic life, and therefore, in addition to scientific criteria, such experts consider any possible economic, political and social consequences of the project implementation. Along with it, the formation of the new expert’s social position and its active use by scientists leads to several problems. First, the expertise and expert practices are beginning to be used by scientists to legitimize their own position in science and fight rival groups. Second, these processes can provoke a decrease in diversity both within science itself and in the number of cognitive practices; also they can limit the emergence of new approaches to the analysis of technological, economic, political and social innovations.
case-studies – science studies
12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Irina N. Griftsova, Natalia Yu. Kozlova Ирина Николаевна Грифцова
Rhetoric of Science: The Problem of Status
Риторика науки

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This contribution examines the status of the rhetoric of science in two contexts. The first one is the effect that the changing interpretation of logic (the changing 'image of logic') has had on the status of the rhetoric of science. The second is the role that imagery has in scientific discourse. It is argued that the very possibility of a rhetorical interpretation of science depends on how the logic of science is understood. Informal logic, which acts here as a variant of argumentation theory or a logic of argumentation, is proposed as such a logic. This leads to a revision of the nature of justification in science in general, the substitution of apodictic logic for a logic of argumentation as a principal tool, and the consideration of strict formal ways of material implication-based justification as mere individual cases of a logic of argumentation. The role of imagery in scientific discourse is analysed. It is demonstrated that the situation of rhetoric and perception of imagery is paradoxical: although using rhetorical mechanisms in scientific communication is unavoidable, rhetoric has been criticised for many centuries. It is shown that the negative attitude to using rhetorical elements in scientific texts has long historical roots going back to ancient philosophical thought, namely, Socrates's criticism of eloquence and sophistic rhetoric. Analysis of the functions of imagery in scientific discourse suggests that imagery is an inalienable mechanism of both professional communication and the creation of theoretical models of knowledge.
interdisciplinary studies
13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Timur V. Khamdamov, Mikhail Yu. Voloshin Тимур Владимирович Хамдамов
Conceptualizing Computer Simulations in Philosophy of Science
Концептуализация компьютерных симуляций в философии науки

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In the modern Russian philosophy, discussions about the phenomenon of computer simulations in the scientific research practice of conducting experiments are just beginning to pass the stage of initiation in small interdisciplinary groups studying this new direction for the philosophy of science. At the same time, in Western philosophy by the current moment there have been formed entire directions for the study of computer simulations. Different groups of researchers in different ways form ideas about the basic characteristics of simulations: from skeptical views on their nature, which are of no philosophical interest, to extremely revolutionary attitudes that assign simulations to the main role in the next expected turn of philosophy, comparable in its power to the linguistic turn in early XX century. One of the main controversial issues in Western philosophical thought was the search for relevant criteria and signs of simulations that could create a solid basis for formulating a rigorous definition of this phenomenon. Thus, through the definition, researchers first of all try, on the one hand, to solve the taxonomic problem of the correlation and interconnection of simulations with other types of experiment: natural, laboratory, mental, mathematical. On the other hand, to reveal for philosophy ontological and epistemological foundations of simulations, which carry the potential of new philosophical knowledge. This article is devoted to a brief review of the existing concepts of representatives of Western schools of thought on the phenomenon of computer simulations in the context of the philosophy of science. The structure of the review is built on three basic conceptual directions: 1) definition of the term "computer simulation"; 2) computer simulations as an experiment; 3) the epistemic value of simulations. Such a review can become the subject of discussion for Russian researchers interested in the impact of computer simulations on science and philosophy.
archive
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Igor S. Dmitriev Игорь Сергеевич Дмитриев
From “Nomos” to “Physis” and Back: (The Concept of “Law of Nature” in the Philosophy of F. Bacon)
От «номоса» к «фюсису» и обратно

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The article focuses on the following three issues: the characteristic features of understanding and using the term “law of nature” before F. Bacon, the novelty of F. Bacon’s approach to the interpretation of this concept, theological and legal origins of the concept. It is shown that in works related to the Middle Ages the term “law of nature” had either a purely descriptive (descriptive-stating) or mixed prescriptive-descriptive character. It is shown that in the works of medieval authors the term “law of nature” had either a purely descriptive or mixed prescriptive-descriptive character. The novelty of the approach to understanding the law of nature in the works of F. Bacon lies primarily in the fact that in his interpretation the contours of the understanding of the “law of nature” as an expression of the causal relationship between facts and phenomena are clearly visible. Moreover, Bacon points to the “Latentis Processus et Latentis Schematismi” of bodies as the deepest causes of natural phenomena, that is, he refers to the micro-level of organization of matter. The article also examines the theological (in the context of the notion “God acts in the world only through secondary causes” and the Protestant doctrine of “cessation of miracles”) and legal (in the context of norms and practices of “common law”) sources of the Baconian understanding of the concept of “law of nature”.
new trends
15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Artem P. Besedin, Dmitry B. Volkov, Anton V. Kuznetsov, Evgeny V. Loginov, Andrey V. Mertsalov Артем Петрович Беседин
Introspection: Contemporary Problems and Approaches
Интроспекция

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The article is a review of the philosophical problems of introspection as a method of cognition that are actively discussed in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. The article is the result of discussions that were held during the Summer School “Consciousness and Introspection” organized in July 2020 by the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies and led by Professor D. Stoljar, one of the top experts in this field. The purpose of the article is to describe to readers the current state of affairs in the English language research in this area. Modern theories of introspection have been formed as a result of discussions in the philosophy of mind and epistemology in the XX century. One of them is S. Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of introspection and the related problem of self-blindness. Another topic is the transparency of experience (G.E. Moore, G. Evans). Finally, D. Dretske offered an influential critique of introspection in general. The discussion of these topics led to the arising of various modern theories: rationalistic (A. Byrne, D. Stoljar), acquaintance theories (B. Gertler, D. Chalmers), constitutive (S. Shoemaker), simple (D. Smithies), and others. An important area in which introspection finds their application is the philosophy of consciousness. The article considers the thesis of revelation, according to which the conscious state reveals its essence in introspection: the relation of this thesis to folk psychology is analyzed (D. Lewis, D. Stoljar), arguments against physicalism based on it are considered (P. Goff). Finally, the authors consider illusionist approaches to introspection based on the understanding of introspection as a representative system (D. Dennett, K. Frankish). Proponents of these approaches suggest the most acute criticism of introspection, pointing out its unreliability as a method of cognition, and, accordingly, the inapplicability of introspection in the philosophy of consciousness. Objections to this position are represented by M. Nida-Rumelin. This work does not pretend to consider all the existing theories of introspection and related problems. However, this review can give an idea of the main positions and problems in this area and assess the prospects for its development.
16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Vitaly G. Kosykhin, Svetlana M. Malkina Виталий Георгиевич Косыхин
Metaphysics and Realism: Contexts of Return
Метафизика и реализм

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The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
jubilee
17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 2
Jubilee of Alexander Yu. Antonovski
К 50-летию А.Ю. Антоновского

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editorial
18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Jubilee of L.A. Mikeshina
К юбилею Л.А. Микешиной

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19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Irina A. Gerasimova Ирина Алексеевна Герасимова
From Modernization to Greening: Geoecology and Geosociality
От модернизации к экологизации

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The article discusses the problem of complex relationships between the two leading areas of scientific, technical and socio-cultural development – modernization and greening. The emergence of new general scientific methodologies and interdisciplinary types of knowledge is largely due to the release of human demiurgic activity to the planetary level. A new interdisciplinary area of research is gaining momentum – geoecology. Natural and socio-humanitarian sciences are involved in the study of geoecological problems. In social epistemology, the problem of interaction between science, technology and society goes to the global level. Philosophical concepts of nature constitute the prerequisites for scientific paradigms, which in the era of global crisis and transformations of public consciousness are multiple and compete with each other. The ideas of scientific vitalism find expression in the life sciences and environmental sciences. Scientific and public discussions on the problems of the new climate regime, pandemic and other global challenges actively influence the formation of new modes of “collective thinking”, involving science, engineering, geopolitics, business, society and culture. Author makes a conclusion about the formation of the methodologies of the ecogeosystem approach, in which living beings, humans, natural environments, the planet as a whole and the surrounding space are considered as open, interacting systems. The common interests of the people of the Earth form a new type of community – geosociality. Humanity is facing a radical value choice – unlimited modernization or reasonable greening? Ideal of a common world or egoism of elites? A turn to an effective ecological worldview is possible only in the context of transformations of public consciousness, restoration of the rights of humanitarian culture and the advanced development o fenvironmentally friendly design.
panel discussion
20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 1
Alexander L. Nikiforov Александр Леонидович Никифоров
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism
Людвиг Витгенштейн и логический позитивизм

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The article examines the question of whether L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus had any influence on the formation and development of logical positivism. It is shown that the members of the Vienna Circle were familiar with the Tractatus, but practically did not accept anything from its content. Wittgenstein's reasoning about the world, about facts, about the structure of fact were rejected by them as a bad metaphysics, with which they fought. The denial of causality and the deprivation of the meaning of scientific laws could not be accepted by representatives of logical positivism, whose main task was the logical analysis of the language of science in order to cleanse it of metaphysical concepts and build a unified science on a solid empirical foundation. If the members of the Vienna Circle were even familiar with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, then representatives of the Berlin Group, the Lvov-Warsaw School, the Uppsala School and supporters of logical positivism in other countries hardly heard of it. This leads to the conclusion that Wittgenstein's Tractatus did not have any impact on the logical positivism.