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1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Kenneth W. Kemp

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Francisco Ayala and others have argued that recent genetic evidence shows that the origins of the human race cannot be monogenetic, as the Church hastraditionally taught. This paper replies to that objection, developing a distinction between biological and theological species first proposed by Andrew Alexanderin 1964.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Edward Feser

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The “existential inertia” thesis holds that, once in existence, the natural world tends to remain in existence without need of a divine conserving cause. Critics of the doctrine of divine conservation often allege that its defenders have not provided arguments in favor of it and against the rival doctrine of existential inertia. But in fact, when properly understood, the traditional theistic arguments summed up in Aquinas’s Five Ways can themselves be seen to be (or at least to imply) arguments against existential inertia and in favor of divine conservation. Moreover, they are challenging arguments, to which defenders of the existential inertia thesis have yet seriously to respond.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Peter Dillard

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I examine two arguments for the conclusion that thinking is not a physical process. James F. Ross argues that thinking is determinate in a manner that nopurely physical process can be. Peter Geach argues that thinking is a basic activity that, unlike basic physical processes, cannot be assigned a precise position in time. I present two objections to Ross’s argument. I then show that even if Geach’s argument avoids these objections, it is vulnerable to two other objections. I conclude that neither argument establishes the immateriality of thinking.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Shane Drefcinski

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In Politics VIII, Aristotle contends that music has some influence over character and the soul. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear what sort of influence music has. Does appropriate music cause someone to become virtuous, as Socrates seems to suggest (Rep. 401 d–402 a)? And if that is Aristotle’s claim, then is it noteasily refuted by examples of vicious lovers of excellent music, such as the Nazi soldiers who forced imprisoned Jewish musicians to perform Mozart concertos?But if appropriate music is not the principal cause of moral virtue, what sort of formative role does Aristotle think it has? In this paper, I investigate what Aristotlesays about music and the formation of character. I argue that, according to Aristotle, music is a universal, instrumental cause of moral virtue.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
D. C. Schindler

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This paper offers a philosophical argument for the “fittingness” of the unusual order in which Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Trilogy articulates the transcendentalproperties of being: first beauty, then goodness, then truth. It begins with a presentation of the order Aquinas gives in De veritate, qu. 1, art. 1, in which truthfollows upon being and then goodness follows upon truth insofar as cognition for Aquinas precedes desire. The paper then explains the significance of the primacy Balthasar gives to beauty, in contrast to Aquinas, and how this primacy entails an interpretation of truth as the final fruit of the soul’s engagement with reality under the aspect of goodness. It is precisely the conception of truth that emerges as the final transcendental, rather than the first, that serves to open the human horizon to biblical theology, which is one of the ultimate aims of the Trilogy.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Victor M. Salas, Jr.

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This essay considers Edith Stein’s account of “essential being” and finds therein a point of continuity with medieval metaphysics. Scholarly attention has already been given to this feature of Stein’s metaphysics; it has been argued that “essential being,” while serving as a crucial point of distinction between Stein andThomas Aquinas’s own metaphysics, functions as a point of similarity between Stein and Duns Scotus. However, I argue that, while there are certainly manypoints of congruence between Stein and Scotus on the topic of essential being, the position that Stein advances comes much closer to Henry of Ghent’s doctrineof esse essentiae. Finally, I show that the consequence of her adopting a position so similar to Henry of Ghent is that it opens Stein to a number of criticisms raised by Scotus himself against esse essentiae.

book reviews

7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Joshua Miller

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8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Trent Dougherty

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9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Jason T. Eberl

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10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Richard J. Fafara

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11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Andrew Jaspers

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12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Brendan Sweetman

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13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2

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