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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2004 >
Issue: 27
何建 興
Ho, Chien-hsing
Śaṅkara on Saying the Unsayable
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對印度教吠檀多不二論的宗師商羯羅(Wavkara)而言，作為萬 有本體以及吾人真性的大梵或真我(梵我，brahman-ātman)，不具 有任何屬性，也超越一切思想與言詮，易言之，梵我是非語言思 議所能臻及的“不可說者”。問題是，以語言指涉終極真實一事 似乎無可避免，此外，商氏推崇的《奧義書》等聖典也於梵我多 所言說。如是，對商羯羅而言，我人應如何理解聖典語言的指涉 作用？我人還能否以任何方式言說那不可說者？在簡略介紹商羯羅的不二論哲學之後，本文探討《奧義書》 與商羯羅本人以梵我不可言詮的理由。其次，我們依序論述商氏 所採取，語言之於不可說者的三種表示法，亦即：(1)訴諸否定語的遮撥法。(2)訴諸間接肯定語辭的指示法。(3)訴諸明言的增益及其否定的隨說隨掃法。其後，本文參就「增益及其否定」一概念，討論這三種表示法的 異同關係。我們認為，商羯羅對於「如何言說不可說者」一課題 所提出的語言哲學進路頗具深意，也有極大的參考價值。
For Śaṅkara, the most renowned teacher of the Advaita Vedānta school of Hinduism, Brahman or Ātman as the sole ultimate reality underlying all beings is attribute-less, indivisible, unconceptualizable and unverbalizable. In other words, Brahman-Ātman is for him ineffable, well beyond the reach of human language. Yet, referring to the reality in words seems on many occasions inevitable, and the scriptures of the school do contain positive statements about the reality. How, then, should we understand the referring function of the scriptural language? How can one speak meaningfully of something that is unspeakable? In this paper I propose to expound Śaṅkara’s views on these issues.Śaṅkara, indeed, sets forth three methods by means of which one can make linguistic references to the unsayable: (1) the method of negation (netivāda), (2) the method of indication (lakṣaṇa-vṛtti), and (3) the method of imposition-cum-negation (adhyāropa-apavāda). The three methods will be closely examined in sequence with their mutual relationships exposed thereafter. The author is of the opinion that Śaṅkara’s linguistic approach toward ‘saying’ the unsayable is rather instructive and really worth our attention.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2004 >
Issue: 27
Hans Lenk
Hans Lenk
邁向技術取向的方法論和科學哲學
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For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives.
過去數十年來，諸如Hacking 和Giere 等哲學家在討論科學 哲學時，已不再專注於科學理論本身，而是從實驗操控和建造模 型等方面來進行論述。就催生實作和技術取向的科學哲學而言，不管是Hacking 的實驗主義或是Giere 的模型論都貢獻良多。本 文要論證的是，科學哲學和工程技術學科的方法論兩者之間其實 可以彼此借鏡而相互受益。此外，不同的方法論進路也有必要整 合成一個更普遍的詮釋架構理論，而實作-理解-認知乃是被詮釋 和觀點所形塑而成的。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2004 >
Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen
陳瑞 麟
透過可落實模型來檢驗科學理論
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How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.
像古典力學一類的科學理論如何被檢驗？這個問題有個長 遠的歷史。在本文中，我將提議一個檢驗理論，建基在吉爾關於 科學理論結構的研究上。但我的模型觀點與吉爾有些微不同。我 將從理論性和歷史性兩個不同角度來展示：科學理論總是可以被 理解為擁有一個分類的模型體系的理論，其中包括高層的模型與 可落實模型；而且科學家總是透過可落實模型來檢驗理論。但 是，透過可落實模型把檢驗的結果傳送到高層的模型或原理，乃 是一件非常複雜的機制。因此，就算有一些可落實模型被印證或 否證，整體理論完全被印證或否證實際上不太可能。最後，我將 以說明牛頓理論的檢驗史為例，來佐證本文提議的檢驗理論。以 拉卡托斯的話來說，這個檢驗理論在本質上也是個針對歷史的 「合理重建」。
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