The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy

Múltiples son los puntos de contacto entre Nietzsche y Musil en lo referente al modo en que piensan la configuración de lo real, y a sus respectivos diagnósticos de la sociedad finisecular. Desarrollaré en este trabajo el tema de la forma del ejercicio del pensamiento como modo de constitución de lo real, aquello que en Nietzsche se puede caracterizar desde el término 'perspectivismo,' y en Musil alcanza su veradadero sentido desde la consideración del 'ensayismo,' en las consideraciones que realiza en El hombre sin atributos. Tanto en uno como en otro autor, esta noción ensayístico-perspectivista se halla en estrecha relación con la pérdida del centro ordenador último de la realidad, con las posibilidades del decir desde un yo sin atributos, y con el carácter erótico del ensayo mismo, como forma de tensión. Interpretando la Wille zur Macht nitzscheana como 'razón imaginativa,' como fuerza tensionante entre la unidad y la disgregación, es posible entender el carácter múltiple de las perspectivas que, de la misma forma que el amor, no se agotan en ninguna figura última del pensar.

In his essay "The Politics of Interpretation: Spinoza's Modernist Turn," Berel Lang attributes to Spinoza the view that interpretation presupposes or implies a political framework-in effect, that interpretation is itself a politics. The thrust of Spinoza's argument is against "interpretation from authority," i.e., against the view that the meaning of a text can be determined by an external authority. Understanding cannot be coerced, according to Spinoza. In my paper I attempt to make the relationship between reader and text even more direct and "free" than it is in Spinoza. I argue that any approach (such as Derrida's) which posits an interpretation between reader and text places constraints on the notion of a democracy of free readers. I argue that in a truly literate democracy readers have the right to claim that they have understood or grasped their texts without having any kind of intermediary placed between themselves and their texts, regardless of whether this intermediary takes the form of an external authority (in Spinoza's sense) or an interpretation (in Derrida's sense). In the course of the paper I draw upon Michael Dummett's philosophy of language in order to critique the "humpty-dymptyism" of the interpretationist school. I place myself firmly on the side of Alice in Through the Looking Glass, and spend some time discussing the significance of the difficulties which she experiences with the nonsense poem, "Jabberwocky."

El presente trabajo expone y problematiza las categorías de la filosofía de la interpretación, que Gianni Váttimo* reconoce como herencia del mensaje cristiano; por entender que el autor esclarece el fenómeno del ‘retorno del cristianismo,’ su sentido y alcance en la filosofía tardo-moderna. Se explicita la relación de continuidad entre la historia de la revelación cristiana y la historia del nihilismo, a partir del análisis especulativo del fenómeno religioso de la encarnación de Jesús. En consonancia con la interpretación del pensiero debole, el resurgimiento de la religión en los albores del tercer milenio, no puede ser comprendido desde un cuerpo doctrinal dogmático. Muy por el contrario, el Dios qu retorna en la época posmetafísica requiere ser pensado desde la categoría de debilitamiento, inscripta en la ontología de corte heideggeriano. La tarea del pensar que propone la hermeneútica desde una instancia ética se define en un doble proceso: a) el alejamiento del pensar violento de la metafísica, correspondiente en el plano religioso con el abandono de concepciones naturalistas, y b) La asunción de la Verwindung bajo la luz y el límite de la caritas. En este contexto, la conjunción nihilismo y encarnación, se transforma en la clave de interpretación del decurso de la filosofía occidental.

La tematización filosófica de la proximidad de razón y lenguaje desde el giro hermenéutico practicado por H-G. Gadamer permite repensar a la razón, núcleo de la filosofía occidental, en su posibilidad misma de universalidad y respeto de la diferencia. Razón y lenguaje están entretejidos en la idea misma de logos. El logos reside en esa disposición de las palabras para la unidad del sentido, y por ello, se ha llamado logos a la frase. Pero la frase, al igual que la palabra, es una fragmentación del lenguaje. En realidad el lenguaje es en la conversación. Cuando realmente hay conversación se llega a la elaboración de algo común y en ello consiste el entendimiento. En la praxis social y en el arte tiene lugar una conversación, un entenderse en algo con otro, una orientación hacia la unidad no supresora de la alteridad, que patentiza una universalidad no totalizadora en la misma filosofía occidental.

Two fundamental criticisms made by traditional hermeneutics against philosophical hermeneutics are that the latter deny the possibility of objectively true interpretation, as well as assert that all interpretations are possible on the basis that they cannot be measured. In my paper, I argue that the first criticism is well-founded, while the second is not. I contend that interpretations can be decided according to two relational criteria: (i) which interpretation has a more comprehensive horizon; and (ii) which one is derivable from the other.

One of the most difficult philosophical works ever written is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In the "Introduction" to this work, Hegel attempts to aid his readers by describing the project that he carries out. But like so many things written by Hegel, the "Introduction" itself is formidable and very difficult to understand. In this paper, I attempt to "make sense" of the "Introduction" and, thus, contribute to the understanding of the Phenomenology. To achieve this end, I take the great liberty of comparing philosophers with blind men and Reality with an elephant. I take a series of claims made by Hegel in the "Introduction" and show how they make sense of his project once they are seen in the context of John Godfred Saxe’s poem, "The Blind Men and the Elephant." In doing so, I explain the similarity of problems presented in the poem and the Phenomenology. Further, I show how the nature of both problems places the same kind of restrictions on anyone trying to overcome either. While Saxe’s poem urges an acceptance of the fact that total truth is always beyond your grasp, Hegel’s goal is to achieve such a truth. What you will see is that all the characteristics that would have stopped most philosophers and Saxe, become the means by which Hegel thinks he can ultimately achieve knowledge of the Elephant.

This paper examines the nature of freedom in Hang-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It focuses on the last section of Wahrheit und Methode advancing the hypothesis that Gadamer’s model of understanding is derived from his particular appropriation of the Platonic notion of the beautiful which poses a passive interpretative posture toward the object of understanding and deprives the activity of interpretation the essential creative quality of freedom. I argue that to the extent that the object of understanding presents itself as immediate revelation of truth, the interpreting subject is reduced to a mere acknowledger of truth as opposed to a creative producer.

This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections: (i) that it conflates meaning and significance; and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism.