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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2015 >
Issue: 49
王志輝
Zhi-Hue Wang
Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Division of the Soul
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亞理斯多德在《論靈魂》第三書第九章,對柏拉圖的靈魂劃分作出相當 嚴厲的批判。他指出,無論是柏拉圖的靈魂三分(「理性」、「意氣」、「慾 望」),還是柏拉圖主義者所抱持,一般流行的靈魂二分(擁有理性」與「缺 乏理性」兩部分),都有相當大的問題。因為,首先,按照柏拉圖的靈魂劃 分方式,靈魂可以是無限被劃分的。其次,柏拉圖的靈魂劃分,完全忽略了 「吸收養分」的能力,其實是一種獨立的靈魂能力,而不能與其它靈魂部分 或能力混為一談。再者,按照靈魂二分的方式,知覺該歸類為「擁有理性」還是「缺乏理性」的部分,也不清楚。最後,亞理斯多德認為,柏拉圖靈魂 劃分的最不合理之處,在於將原本單一的「欲求能力」分割開,以致於在理 性部分中出現了「希求」,在「缺乏理性」部分中又出現了「慾望」與「意 氣」等,以致於在靈魂三部份中,每一部份都會有欲求。本文打算依次檢視這些批判。此外,本文打算提出的一個觀點是,亞理 斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分之批判,符合他一般對柏拉圖哲學的批判方式:J. Annas 與G. Fine 皆指出,亞理斯多德在批評柏拉圖理型論時,通常會相當 嚴格地堅持柏拉圖文本上的文字意義,但不肯從柏拉圖的角度與哲學立場, 寬大、善意地解讀這些文字;反之,亞理斯多德經常會根據自己的一些預設 與哲學見解,嚴格地檢驗柏拉圖文本中的字句,有時他甚至會將柏拉圖的說 法脫離原有的脈絡來解讀。當然,亞理斯多德這麼作的理由,並非是為了刻 意刁難柏拉圖,而是為了從柏拉圖哲學中得出某些重要的哲學意涵,並藉此 顯示自身哲學立場的合理性。本文將顯示,亞理斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分的 批判,充分展現了這種批判方式的特點。
In De Anima III 9, Aristotle raises a series of criticisms against the Platonic division of the soul. He firstly indicates that the parts of the soul seem to be infinite, and not confined to the calculative, spirited, and the appetitive part, as Plato describes. Secondly, Plato’s tripartition of the soul almost neglects the nutritive part as an independent capacity of the soul. Moreover, although the Platonists simplifies Plato’s tripartition and transformed it into a bipartition, it is not easy to assign the perceptive part either to therational or the irrational part. Finally, Aristotle thinks that it is totally unreasonable for the Platonic soul-division to split the desiderative part up, which should be one and single capacity of the soul; for then there would be wish in the calculative, appetite and spirit in the irrational part, such that in each part of the soul there would be desire.In this article I shall explain these criticisms respectively. However, I will not treat them as though they were isolated, but will show that they belong to Aristotle’s overall criticism against Platonism. J. Annas and G. Fine have suggested that in criticizing Plato’s theory of forms, Aristotle usually finds fault with this theory in an uncharitable and even arrow way. Sometimes he takes an inexact and vague Platonic claim, and provides one literal and natural reading of it on which he then proceeds to attack. Sometimes he reads a Platonic claim not in a way Plato would accept, but in a way which derives from the assumptions of his own metaphysics or from his own understandings about Platonism. Sometimes he criticizes a Platonic argument even in isolation from the original context in Plato’s dialogues. In so doing, however, Aristotle does not intend to misinterpret Plato; his aim is not to record Plato’s arguments straightforwardly, but rather to reconstruct them in a way that will provide philosophical illumination, so that we can learnsomething important about Platonism and the plausibility of Aristotle’s alternative. This article will show that in principle, Aristotle’s criticisms of the Platonic soul-division are compatible with his general mode of criticism against Platonism.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2015 >
Issue: 49
Hua-kuei Ho
何畫瑰
理性的慾望:柏拉圖對慾望的看法 與《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯「愛的醫療」
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Confronted with the stereotype of a rationalistic Plato, the paper argues for the value of desire at its own right in Plato. To explore the relation between desire and rationality in Plato, I choose Eryximachus’ medicine in the Symposium as an object of comparison. Eryximachus’ τέχνη, representing the Hippocratic medical knowledge, is in conformity with Plato’s earlier requirement of knowledge, that is, giving a rational account. The medicine achieves the harmony by balancing the good and bad desires. Plato’s philosophy, however, goes beyond the epistemic model of rational science or τέχνη. On the treatment of desire, he does not follow the discrimination of good and bad desires in medicine, nor does he even out the different desire, because as the doctor. Plato’s philosophy needs the strength of desire, because—though desire sometimes becomes irrational—it is the vital strength of the soul to pursue philosophy.
面對一般對柏拉圖「理性主義」的刻板印象,這篇論文試圖論述:對柏 拉圖而言,「慾望」本身具有價值。為進一步探討柏拉圖哲學中慾望和理性 的關係,文中將以《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯的醫學談話,作為比較的對象。 厄律克希馬可斯的「技藝」(τέχνη),即,希波克拉底派的醫學,符合柏拉 圖早期對知識的要求,也就是:知識必須要能提出合理的說明;此外,當時 的醫學是在藉由好慾望與壞慾望之間的平衡,而使人內在各成分達致健康與 和諧。然而,這裡提出的解釋是:柏拉圖的哲學超出了理性科學或技藝的知 識範本;在對慾望的處理上,他不依循醫學對慾望好壞的區分,他的和諧概 念也保留了理性與非理性慾望並存的差異。柏拉圖哲學需要慾望的力量,慾望雖然可能變成非理性,卻也是靈魂追求哲學不可缺少的力量。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2015 >
Issue: 49
林明照
Ming-Chao Lin
The Ethical Meaning of “Helping Heaven” in Wang Chuanshan’s Interpretation
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船山透過詮解《莊子》,提出了許多深刻的哲學問題及理論。其中對《莊 子》「相天」說的詮解,尤其值得關注。原因大致有二:首先,船山認為內 篇最能直接表現莊子的思想,而其精髓正可歸結於《莊子》中的相天之說; 其次,船山在將《莊子》哲學的核心論點歸結為相天說時,又據之作為分判 《莊子》與儒、釋、玄等其他哲學家派理論優劣的標準。本文在於對船山《莊 子解》中「相天」說的倫理意義進行討論,全文的討論主要包括三個部分, 首先將指出在船山的理解下,《莊子》的「相天」說在於回答一根本問題:我們有什麼理由認為生比死更有價值?以及由此引生的另一個問題:為什麼 不是每一種人格品質或行為特質都具同等價值?其次,將從相天說所關涉的 生死形上意義,來說明在船山的詮解中,《莊子》透過相天說對於前述問題 的基本回答。接著,本文將對船山所詮解的相天說的倫理意義作出探討。
Chuanshan presents lots of philosophical questions and theories via his interpretation on Zhuangzi, and the one about the concept of “Helping Heaven” especially deserves our attention. There are at least two reasons for this. First, in Chuanshan’s mind, the Inner Chapters is the representative of Zhuangzi’s thought, and the core in it is the concept, “Helping Heaven”. Second, Chuanshan regards “Helping Heaven” not only as the core theory in Zhuangzi but also as the standard to evaluate different theories in ancient Chinese philosophy.The discussion of this paper is divided into three parts. First, in Chuanshan’s interptretation, Zhuangzi’s “Helping Heaven” tells us why living is more valuable than death. From this viewpoint, we can ask further why not all personalities or behaviors have the same value. In the second part, we according to Chuanshan’s interpretation, figure out the answer to the question above from the metaphysical meaning of Zhuangzi’s “Helping Heaven”. In the end, the paper discusses the ethical meaning of “Helping Heaven” in Chuanshan’s interpretation.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2015 >
Issue: 49
張忠宏
Chung-Hung Chang
On Zhu Xi’s Criticisms of Cheng Yi’s Understanding of the Book of Changes
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朱熹對程頤的批評表面上看起來駁雜而不一致,但深入分析他的論點,可以看出他的批評有一致而深刻的重要性。簡言之,朱熹認為《程氏易傳》 脫離了《易》之筮法與象數,不能說明做人做事的道理、天地自然之數、宇 宙及存有架構等天地之理,如何透過筮法及《易》的表象系統整合在六十四 卦的變化裏。《程氏易傳》之所以有這個問題,是因為程頤缺乏整合義理、 象數與筮法的問題意識,並且輕忽邵雍的先天易學的重要性。對朱熹來說, 唯有邵雍的先天易學可以統合象數、義理與筮法;程頤不能、也不應拒絕先 天易學。
Zhu Xi’s criticisms of Cheng-Shi-Yi-Zhuan seem to be diverse and inconsistent. Further analyses, however, show the contrary. To put it very briefly, Zhu Xi’s complaints were mainly due to Cheng Yi’s failure to bring about a coherent theory that can integrate xiang-shu, yi-li, and shi-fa, as well as his lack of awareness of the significance of such an integration. The reason why Cheng Yi failed in both regards was in turn due to his ignorance of the theoretical roles Shao Yong’s xian-tien-yi-xue can play. By demonstratingwhat those theoretical roles are and why they are so important to Zhu Xi, this paper explicates Zhu Xi’s own understanding of the Book of Changes.
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