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Studia Philosophica:
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Bronislav Stupňánek
Bronislav Stupňánek
Anaximandrův πρηστῆρος αὐλός
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The word πρηστήρ creates confusion and controversy almost wherever it occurs. Its lexicon entry in LSJ has been revised several times but it is still not very helpful. Lack of clarity of the expression also lies in the fact that it describes tornadic, fiery, and luminous meteorological phenomena. A recent discussion about the term πρηστῆρος αὐλός in Anaximander raised this issue again. This study clarifies the meaning of πρηστῆρος αὐλός, as well as the word πρηστήρ, on the basis of examination of all known occurrences of this word. The study excludes the meaning “bellows”, the meaning “lightning” is confirmed rather for the late texts, the basic meaning “tornado” is typical especially for authors dealing with marine navigation and meteorology. Πρηστῆρος αὐλός is the funnel of a tornado. Based on current knowledge of meteorology (with regard to the Greek region), it is also explained why a tornado was often seen as fiery.
Slovo πρηστήρ vyvolává zmatek a spory, téměř kdekoli se objeví. Jeho slovníkové heslo bylo v LSJ několikrát významně přepracováno, problémy se však stále vyřešit nepodařilo. Nejasnost výrazu spočívá také v tom, že popisuje tornádové, ohnivé a zářící meteorologické jevy. Nedávná diskuze o výrazu πρηστῆρος αὐλός u Anaximandra tento problém opět nastolila. Tato studie objasňuje význam výrazu πρηστῆρος αὐλός stejně tak jako slova πρηστήρ na základě zkoumání veškerých známých výskytů tohoto slova. Studie vylučuje význam „měchy“, význam „blesk“ se potvrzuje spíše pro pozdní texty, základní význam „tornádo“ je typický zejména pro autory spojené s námořnictvím a meteorologií. Πρηστῆρος αὐλός je trychtýř tornáda. Na základě současných meteorologických znalostí (s ohledem na oblast Řecka) je také vysvětleno, proč bylo tornádo často vnímáno jako ohnivé.
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Ulrich Wollner
Ulrich Wollner
„Not Born of an Ork or a Rock“ (Apol. 34d3-4)
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Platónov Sókratés v záverečnom príhovore pred hlasovaním o svojej vine či nevine sudcom pripomína, že má rodinu, ktorá zahŕňa dospievajúceho syna a dvoch malých chlapcov. Pritom odkazuje na verše z Homérovej Odyssey, aby poukázal na skutočnosť, že sa nenarodil „ani z duba ani zo skaly“ (34d). Cieľom článku bude analyzovať a interpretovať zmysel uvedenej citácie v rámci Sókratovej argumentácie. V prvej časti sa autor sústredí na komparáciu Homérovho verša s jeho podobou v Platónovej Apológii. V druhej časti bude skúmať, akú stratégiu Sókratés sledoval tým, keď sa odvolal na uvedený verš. V záverečnej časti sa zameria na otázku, z akého dôvodu Platónov Sókratés cituje Homéra napriek svojmu predchádzajúcemu vyhláseniu, že básnici nedisponujú múdrosťou.
In the final speech before the vote on his guilt or innocence Plato´s Socrates reminds the judge that he has a family including a teenage son and two small boys. In this case he refers to the verse of Homer´s Odyssey to point out that he was not born „of an oak or a rock” (34d). The aim of the article is to analyze and interpret the meaning of that quote. The first part will focus on the comparison of Homer´s verse with its form in Plato’s Apology. In the second section I will examine what strategy Socrates followed when he made reference to that line. The final section will focus on the question why Plato´s Socrates quotes Homer despite his previous statement that poets do not have wisdom.
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Dušan Hruška
Dušan Hruška
Parmenides and the Disputeon the History of Metaphysics - Nietzsche's and Heidegger's Critique of Metaphysics
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Cieľom, ktorý premýšľa táto štúdia, je zápas o zmysel (deštrukcie) dejín metafyziky odohrávajúci sa na pozadí reflexie filozofického odkazu Parmenida. Leitmotív problému sa spája so zmyslom (deštrukcie) dejín metafyziky ako západnej ontológie (Heideggerova pozícia); identifikáciou platonskej (metafyzickej) tradície ako falošného vedenia nazerajúceho v pravde existujúce jestvujúcno, ktoré sa vo svetle tézy o neexistencii absolútnej pravdy a jej explikáciou stáva konkrétnym výkonom časového a konečného ľudského bytia (pozícia Nietzscheho). Nietzsche a Heidegger poukazujú na to, že prvým momentom, ktorý si musíme uvedomiť je, naša (metafyzická) schopnosť teoreticky fundovať zmysel sveta. Na tejto ambícii je následne vybudovaná celá naša duchovná tradícia. Nietzscheho kritika Parmenidovho spôsobu myslenia znamená skôr kritiku domyslenia jeho základných predpokladov v platonskom variante metafyziky. Takto koncipovaná kritika je prijateľná rovnako pre Heideggera. Spor nastane až vo finálnom zmysle dejín metafyziky – zatiaľ čo Nietzsche ich vidí ako zavŕšenie morálneho videnia sveta a teda ako problém kritiky metafyzikou maskovaného nihilistického rozmeru morálky, Heidegger vidí zavŕšenie dejín metafyziky ako bytostné zabudnutie (doslova zakrývanie) otázky bytia, teda ako problém ontologický. Čo ale Heidegger odmieta doviesť do dôsledkov, sú nihilistické konzekvencie svojej ontológie, odhalené a tematizované práve prostredníctvom Nietzscheho kritiky morálky, v ktorej je práve zabudnutosť bytia demaskovaná vo svojom (konečnom) nihilistickom rozmere.
The main theme of this article is the dispute on the meaning (destruction) of the history of metaphysics on the background of a reflection of Parmenides’ philosophical message. The leitmotif of the problem relates to the meaning (of destruction) of history of metaphysics considered as Western ontology (Heidegger’s position); with the identification of Platonic (metaphysical) tradition considered as a false knowledge perceiving being existing in truth, which, in the light of the thesis about nonexistence of absolute truth and its explication, becomes a concrete effort of temporal and endless human being (Nietzsche’s position). Nietzsche and Heidegger show that the first moment we must think about is our (metaphysical) ability to ground theoretically the meaning of the universe. This ambition then grounds whole spiritual tradition. Nietzsche’s critique of Parmenides’ thought means most probably his critique of the development of his basic assumptions in Platonic version of metaphysics. This form of critique is acceptable for Heidegger, too. A disagreement develops only concerning the final meaning of the history of metaphysics – while Nietzsche sees them as a completion of the moral perspective of universe and as a problem of critique of metaphysically masked nihilistic dimension of morality, Heidegger sees the completion of history of metaphysics as essential forgetting (more precisely masking) of the question of Being, therefore as an ontological problem. What Heidegger refuses to bring to consequences are the nihilistic consequences of his ontology, uncovered and thematised through Nietzsche’s critique of morality, in which the forgotteness of Being is unmasked in its (finally) nihilistic dimension.
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Róbert Stojka
Róbert Stojka
Heidegger's Turning in the Context of the Relationship of Man and Being
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Obrat (Kehre) v Heideggerovom myslení má dosah nielen na skúmanie otázky bytia (Seinsfrage), ale aj na zmenu postavenia človeka vo vzťahu k bytiu. Túto zmenu je možné ukázať aj prostredníctvom Heideggerovej interpretácie predsokratovskej filozofie. Pokým v období pred obratom je človek ako pobyt (Dasein) schopný porozumieť bytiu a je s ním spojený, po obrate sa tento vzťah zásadným spôsobom mení. Bytie sa Heideggera po obrate stáva Bytím, ktoré má charakter ne-časovosti či pred-časovosti a ako také má aj svoje vlastné dejiny. Poznanie pravdy Bytia už nie je záležitosťou človeka, ale závisí od toho, či sa Bytie samo človeku ukazuje, alebo skrýva.Turning (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thinking reaches not only his search of the question of Being (Seinsfrage) but also the change of the status of human being in relation to Being. This change can be displayed also through Heidegger’s interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy. While during the period before turning human being as being-there (Dasein) is able to understand Being and he is connected to it, in the period after turning this relationship changes completely. For Heidegger Being after turning becomes Being with the character of non-temporality or pre-temporality and it has its own history. Knowledge of the truth of Being happens not to be a matter of human being but it depends on the fact whether Being hides or unhides.
Turning (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thinking reaches not only his search of the question of Being (Seinsfrage) but also the change of the status of human being in relation to Being. This change can be displayed also through Heidegger’s interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy. While during the period before turning human being as being-there (Dasein) is able to understand Being and he is connected to it, in the period after turning this relationship changes completely. For Heidegger Being after turning becomes Being with the character of non-temporality or pre-temporality and it has its own history. Knowledge of the truth of Being happens not to be a matter of human being but it depends on the fact whether Being hides or unhides.
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Katarína Mayerová
Katarína Mayerová
Rorty's Ironic Reading of Heidegger
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Cieľom štúdie je analýza Rortyho hodnotenia Heideggera ako ironického teoretika. Rorty tvrdí, že úlohou filozofie je kritika filozofickej tradície, pričom Heidegger je mu v tomto zmysle inšpiráciou. Problémom však je, že Heideggerovi nejde o historicko-filozofickú interpretáciu dejín filozofie, ale len o filozofickú, a tú podriaďuje jedine vlastným filozofickým záujmom. Pre zodpovedné skúmanie hlavného problému je nevyhnutná Rortyho definícia a vymedzenie teoretického ironika, ktorý má pochybnosti o funkčnosti, zameranosti či privilegovanosti slovníkov, ale aj o existencii akéhosi konečného slovníka. Je nevyhnutné poukázať na antropologický a morálno-axiologický rozmer novopragmatistického myslenia, ktorý je vzdialený Heideggerovi po obrate a taktiež na problém sokratovskej spravodlivosti, ktorý mu je taktiež vzdialený, na rozdiel od rortyovského ironika. Dôležitou črtou teoretického ironika je odmietanie tradičnej metafyziky a sústredenie sa na metafyziku v úplne odlišnom slova zmysle, teda ide o snahu pochopiť metafyzické (teoretické) nutkanie natoľko, že sa ho človek zbaví. Avšak ani to pre Heideggera neplatí. Rortyho výzva k filozofii ako napĺňaniu ľudskosti je v absolútnom nesúlade s Heideggerovým Listom o humanizme, v ktorom humanizmus podriaďuje dejinám Bytia a vôbec mu nejde o človeka alebo ľudskú dôstojnosť, ale len o myslenie Bytia.
The goal of this study is to analyse Rorty’s classification of Heidegger as an ironical theoretic. Rorty claims that the main task of philosophy is its critique of its tradition, whereas Heidegger is his inspiration in this role. But the problem is that Heidegger is not concerned with historical-philosophical interpretation of history of philosophy but only with philosophical one and that he conforms to his own philosophical interests. For an accountable research of our main problem it is necessary to know Rorty’s definition and demarcation of theoretical ironic who has doubts about function, directivity and privileged status of vocabularies and about the existence of final vocabulary, too. It is necessary to show an anthropological and moral-axiological dimension of Neopragmatic thinking, which is far away from Heidegger after the turn, as well as the problem of Socratic justice, which is far away from rortyan ironic too. The important characteristic of a theoretical ironic is his rejection of traditional metaphysics and his concentration on metaphysics in different sense, thus comprehend the metaphysical (theoretical) urge so much that one eliminates it. But this does not hold for Heidegger, either. Rorty’s challenge to philosophy as fulfilment of humanity is in absolute contradiction to Heidegger’s Letter about humanism, in which he reduces humanism to the history of Being and he does not care about the man or human dignity, but only about the thought of Being.
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Pavel Spunar
Pavel Spunar
My J. B. Kozák
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Cílem této práce je připomenout odkaz J. B. Kozáka (1888–1974) a hodnotu jeho přednášek na Karlově univerzitě v letech 1949–1952, které měly hluboký význam v souvislosti s novou politickou situací po komunistickém puči v roce 1948. Život J. B. Kozáka byl hluboce ovlivněn jeho církevním vzděláním. Nakonec však získal post profesora filosofie na Karlově univerzitě v Praze. Jako prominentní zástupce Českého kulturního života se stal aktivním členem malého kroužku „pátečníků“ založeného spisovatelem K. Čapkem (1890–1938) a podporovaného T. G. Masarykem (1850–1937). J. B. Kozák obhajoval demokratické ideje, ale jeho sympatie zároveň patřily také sociálně orientovaným levicovým osobnostem (viz například jeho přátelství s profesorem Z. Nejedlým, 1878–1962). Před válkou J. B. Kozák opustil Prahu a začal přednášet filosofii na Oberlin College v Chicagu (USA). Na konci války se však do Prahy vrátil. V létě roku 1945 získal znovu univerzitní post s možností přednášet. Ve vášnivých debatách s marxisty hájil myšlenky humanismu a svobody. Získal si sympatie svých studentů a stal se jejich morální autoritou, kterou zůstal i v těžkých časech politických čistek, kdy byli mnozí jeho kolegové propuštěni. Skutečnost, že si udržel pozici na univerzitě, nijak jeho autoritu nepoškodila. Byl chráněn kvůli svým levicovým názorům před válkou. Navzdory respektu, kterého se mu dostávalo, byla jeho možnost přednášet značně omezena. Připojeny jsou také úryvky jeho „dějin filosofie“ jako volné záznamy jeho přednášek.
The aim of the essay is to commemorate J. B. Kozák (1888–1974) and to recall the value of his lectures given in the years 1949–1952 at the Charles-University in Prague. These lectures were important in connection with the new political situation after the communist putsch in 1948. The life of J. B. Kozák was deeply influenced by his clergyman education. Nevertheless he finally obtained the position of professor of philosophy at Charles-University in Prague. As a prominent representative of Czech cultural life he became an active member of a small circle founded by the writer K. Čapek (1890–1938) and supported by T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937). J. B. Kozák defended the democratic ideas but he was also sympathetic with the socially oriented leftists (see e. g. his friendship with professor Z. Nejedlý, 1878–1962). Before the war J. B. Kozák left Prague. He began to lecture philosophy at Oberlin College in Chicago (USA). The end of the war saw him back in Prague. In summer 1945 he got his chair with the possibility lecturing immediately. In the animated discussions with the Marxists he defended the ideas of humanity and freedom. He got the sympathy of students and became their moral authority. This esteem remained also in the hard times of political purges when many of his friends were discharged. Nevertheless his stay in the university employment did not harm his authority. He was protected because of his leftist views before the war. In spite of all the respect for him the authorities at university restrained his lecturing heavily. A small part of his „history of philosophy“ is enclosed as an exemplum of his university lessons.
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Tereza Kunešová, Josef Zumr
Tereza Kunešová
Not Only About Karel Kosík
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Dne 31. července 2013 poskytl dr. Josef Zumr rozhovor, zaměřující se na jeho dlouholetého přítele a spolupracovníka Karla Kosíka. Doktor Zumr zde představuje dobu 60. let, vzpomíná na to, jak se s Karlem Kosíkem potkal, co prožili. Popisuje Kosíkovo mládí, důvody, proč se rozhodl studovat filosofii. Líčí politickou situaci v Československu a různé nástroje a způsoby politické perzekuce, která postihla většinu pracovníků FÚ ČSAV (a nejen jich), a popisuje, jakým způsobem se s touto situací vyrovnával on sám i Karel Kosík. Dále se vyjadřuje k ohlasům na Dialektiku konkrétního i na jiné Kosíkovy stěžejní texty, které vzbudily pozornost společnosti.On 31st July 2013, dr. Josef Zumr gave an interview concerning his long-time friend and co-worker Karel Kosík. Dr. Zumr acquaints reader with the 60’s and recalls how he first met Karel Kosík and what they have experienced. He describes Kosík’s youth and reasons that have led Kosík to the decision to study philosophy. Political situation in former Czechoslovakia is described as well as different instruments of political persecution that affected many employees of the Department of Philosophy of Czechoslovak Academy of Science and many others. Dr. Zumr also recounts how he himself and Karel Kosík dealt with persecution. He also comments on different receptions that The Dialectics of the Concrete and other Kosík’s works have elicited.
On 31st July 2013, Dr. Josef Zumr gave an interview concerning his long-time friend and co-worker Karel Kosík. Dr. Zumr acquaints reader with the 60’s and recalls how he first met Karel Kosík and what they have experienced. He describes Kosík’s youth and reasons that have led Kosík to the decision to study philosophy. Political situation in former Czechoslovakia is described as well as different instruments of political persecution that affected many employees of the Department of Philosophy of Czechoslovak Academy of Science and many others. Dr. Zumr also recounts how he himself and Karel Kosík dealt with persecution. He also comments on different receptions that The Dialectics of the Concrete and other Kosík’s works have elicited.
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Tomáš Ulrich
Tomáš Ulrich
The Importance of Philosophy in the Work of Hans Urs von Balthasar
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Článek připomíná 110. výročí narození švýcarského katolického teologa a filosofa (metafyzika) Hanse Urse von Balthasara (1905 Luzern–1988 Basilej). Po studiích germanistiky ve Vídni, Berlíně a Curychu pokračoval ve studiu filosofie a teologie u jezuitů (E. Przywara, H. de Lubac). Před nadějnou akademickou dráhou dal přednost pastorační službě u studentů. V Basileji navázal úzké kontakty s K. Rahnerem a K. Barthem. S lékařkou a mystičkou Adriennou von Speyr založil sekulární institut Johannesgemeinschaft (1944) a nakladatelství, ve kterém vydával její díla. Roku 1950 jezuitský řád opouští. Před druhým vatikánským koncilem vystupoval jako katolický progresivista, po něm jako kritik katolického modernismu, v němž viděl ohrožení biblických tradic. S Henri de Lubacem a Josephem Ratzingerem roku 1972 spoluzakládal mezinárodní katolickou revui Communio. Svou rozsáhlou a rozmanitou publikační činnost završil trilogií Herrlichkeit–Theodramatik–Theologik (1961–1987), v níž uvažuje o Bohu v estetických souvislostech, v kategoriích transcendentálií pravdy, dobra a jejich ztělesnění – krásy.The article recalls the 110th anniversary of the birth of the Swiss Catholic theologian and philosopher (metaphysician) Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905 Luzern–1988 Basel). He studied German in Vienna, Berlin and Zurich and after that he continued his studies in philosophy and theology at the Jesuits (E. Przywara, H. de Lubac). He preferred pastoral ministry among students to a promising academic career. In Basel he established close contacts with K. Rahner and K. Barth. Together with the doctor and mystic Adrienne von Speyr he founded the secular institute Johannesgemeinschaft (1944) and a publishing house, in which he published her work. In 1950 he left the Jesuit order. Before the Second Vatican Council he acted as a progressive Catholic, afterwards as a critic of Catholic modernism, in which he saw the threat of biblical traditions. With Henri de Lubac and Joseph Ratzinger in 1972 he co-founded the International Catholic review Communio. His extensive and diverse publications he completed with trilogy The Glory of the Lord–Theo-Drama–Theo-Logic (1961–1987), in which he contemplates God within aesthetic contexts, within categories of transcendentals truth, goodness and their embodiment – beauty.
The article recalls the 110th anniversary of the birth of the Swiss Catholic theologian and philosopher (metaphysician) Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905 Luzern–1988 Basel). He studied German in Vienna, Berlin and Zurich and after that he continued his studies in philosophy and theology at the Jesuits (E. Przywara, H. de Lubac). He preferred pastoral ministry among students to a promising academic career. In Basel he established close contacts with K. Rahner and K. Barth. Together with the doctor and mystic Adrienne von Speyr he founded the secular institute Johannesgemeinschaft (1944) and a publishing house, in which he published her work. In 1950 he left the Jesuit order. Before the Second Vatican Council he acted as a progressive Catholic, afterwards as a critic of Catholic modernism, in which he saw the threat of biblical traditions. With Henri de Lubac and Joseph Ratzinger in 1972 he co-founded the International Catholic review Communio. His extensive and diverse publications he completed with trilogy The Glory of the Lord–Theo-Drama–Theo-Logic (1961–1987), in which he contemplates God within aesthetic contexts, within categories of transcendentals truth, goodness and their embodiment – beauty.
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Studia Philosophica:
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Jan Zouhar
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Studia Philosophica:
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Břetislav Horyna
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Studia Philosophica:
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Studia Philosophica:
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Michal Gondek
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Studia Philosophica:
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Ivana Holzbachová
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Studia Philosophica:
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Jiří Gabriel
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