Roczniki Filozoficzne

The article presents Konrad Zacharias Lorenz’s views concerning man’s axiological space. According to Lorenz the origin of the cognitive apparatus is defined by the need to maintain orientation in the world. The apparatus is determined (ambiguously) by the biological and cultural factors. Also tendencies to accept a given type of values are dependent on inborn instincts. The harmony of mutual coexistence of biological and cultural norms is a manifestation of a ‘healthy functioning of the world of values’. In recognizing values an important role is attributed to emotions. The specificity of the act of valuation results from its subjectivity outside a direct control of acts of consciousness.

In the article the proposition is put forward that naturalism connected with evolutionism is an attitude involved in many problems, and the rationality of the naturalist attitude is not credible. The proposition is proven on the basis of the evolution argument against the form of naturalism that assumes that evolution theories are true, which was formulated by Alvin Plantinga. In the article it is shown that the naturalist explanation of human cognitive mechanisms is selfrefuting. The naturalist claims that man’s cognitive system originated by way of evolutionary processes, and the aim of these processes is man’s survival, and not the truth of his beliefs; hence – on the basis of such reasoning – one may doubt if all beliefs are true, including the naturalist one. Hence in the article it is shown that the naturalist’s all beliefs, and among them the belief that ‘God does not exist’, cannot be credible. An indirect aim of the evolution argument against naturalism is also intellectual defense of credibility of the theist image of the world.The starting point of the article is presentation of the argument that half a century earlier was formulated by Clive Staples Lewis. Next the details of Plantinga’s argumentation and controversies connected with it are shown. In the final part of the article the relation between naturalism and theism is discussed. In conclusion it is stated that the naturalist attitude does not attain what is required, so that a naturalist could state that it is the way he thinks; and this is why he is not able to threaten Christian theism.

The present article aims at presenting the place the Earth takes in the universe in Saint Thomas Aquinas’ cosmology. The author of the article is of the opinion that Aquinas’ writings, exceeding Aristotle’s commentary, were a comprehensive attempt at answering the question about the real structure of the universe. In the Dominican scholar’s methodology a creative aspect can be seen of the critical assessment of the knowledge available in those times. Such an attitude facilitated a further development of cosmology and is the basis of the value of Saint Thomas’ considerations. He still remained within the system of a geocentric world, but he prepared the data for building a new model of the universe.

In the initial part of the article texts of some authors are analyzed concerning material implication. In the further part of the article the proposition is justified that the operator of material implication differs in quality from other truth-functional operators. The final part of the article is devoted to considerations aiming at presenting what the thesis of the classical propositional calculus, in which the main operator is the operator of material implication, denote.

The article is an analysis of the discussion between Amartya Sen and John Rawls concerning the dispute about the proper space of justice. According to Rawls, the author of the theory of justice as impartiality, primary goods are the basis for defining the proper space of justice (he understands the space of justice as the space of primary goods). On the other hand, in Sen’s opinion, the basis is constituted by human capabilities (the space of justice as the space of human capabilities). The basic aim of the article is to analyze the charges made by Sen against the theory of justice as impartiality based on the category of primary goods.After having taken into consideration the difference in the perspectives accepted by the two authors with respect to the problem of justice (Sen is oriented to securing the fate of the poor, whereas Rawls, focusing on obtaining an impartial choice of principles of justice, is concerned about nobody having a privileged position), the approach proposed by Sen was assessed as the more convincing one. This approach allows considering all the information concerning a broadly understood human existence (health, income, climatic, social, political conditions, etc.) when defining just social relations.

In the article the assumptions are analyzed of V. S. Soloviov’s (1853-1900) metaphysics presented in his Criticism of Abstract Principles. When forming a metaphysics Soloviov considers and subjects to criticism two theories: Hegel’s extreme (in the Russian philosopher’s term – “abstract”) idealism, and the positivists’ radical empiricism. Soloviov perceives resolution of the difficulties seen in these theories in the conception of the so-called all-unity. According to this conception every being has its ontic foundation in the Absolute, which makes possible an inner connection between all things on the metaphysical and, respectively, epistemological level.In the present study it was found that Soloviov’s metaphysics is based on the following assumptions: (1) the thesis about the possibility of cognizing ‘a thing in itself’; (2) determining a close connection that occurs between the ontological and epistemological order; (3) the conviction that analysis of epistemological conception leads to the ontological ‘truth about the thing’. Acceptance of these propositions is connected with the Russian philosopher’s religious beliefs concerning the existence of an ultimate foundation of reality, and his detailed critical-historical analyses are completely subjected to the aspiration to create a theist metaphysics on the basis of this Absolute principle, that is of God.

The paper presents the stand of Henry Mehlberg on the nature of physical time. This is both an antirelational and relativistic outlook. It deals with the problem of ontological independence and physical reality of time, particularly in the context of discussion between relational and substantival theory of time, and criticism of the positivistic interpretation of relational theory. It outlines some arguments for reality of time, derived from the quantum physics. This conception is a philosophical basis of the causal theory of time, created by Henry Mehlberg.

The main purpose of this article is a presentation of one of the subtheories included in the so-called intelligent design theory – a concept of irreducible complexity of the biochemical systems. The concept says that some features of different biochemical structures indicate that they are designed. It is an alternative concept to naturalistic theories of evolution, and especially to the Neo-Darwinian theory of the development of the life forms that is currently the dominating theory in biology. I shortly discuss the logical and empirical point of the concept of irreducible complexity, whereas I give special attention to the most interesting, from the methodological point of view, part of the concept, namely the explanatory point. The explanatory point is concerned with the issue of design detection in natural sciences. I present also a response of the concept’s of irreducible complexity critics, in the form of a variety of proposals of the evolutionary scenarios of the irreducibly complex systems origins. Although some of these scenarios describe material processes that, theoretically, are capable of producing the irreducible complexity, I agree with a criticism of intelligent design theory proponents that a high degree of speculativity of the evolutionary explanations presently does not allow for examination if these explanations correspond to the real history of irreducibly complex systems origins. Because, so far, both the evolutionists and design theorists are developing only general approaches to the issue of irreducible complexity that need further detailed analyses, I recognize that the problem of irreducible complexity of the biochemical systems remains unsolved in the advantage of one of the proposed theories.

In the course of his lectures given in Como in 1927 Niels Bohr introduces a very important concept of complementarity. Two years later he publishes his first view of biological questions, which he includes in one series of lectures devoted to quantum mechanics and complementarity.In one of his later articles in the same series, explaining why he started publishing his opinions on biology, he states that this may help understand his interpretation of physics, and especially the category of complementarity. He can see a possibility of using the category of complementarity also outside physics. He hopes that epistemological implications of his category of complementarity can broaden the spectrum of recipients when they will refer to well-known problems, especially in the sphere of biology.Bohr directs his attention to biology hoping to shed new light on the old problem concerning the understanding of the concept of life. He has no doubts that the ‘epistemological lesson’ of quantum mechanics, by drawing attention to the observation conditions in biology, may be helpful in overcoming the controversy between “vitalism” and “mechanicism”. He rejects the vitalistic doctrine with its “vital force” or “entelechy”, as devoid of scientific valor. He also formulates arguments against “mechanicism”.Bohr developed his biological interests directed to philosophy to the end of his life. His last work was devoted to exactly biological questions. Unfortunately, sudden death stopped him from completing it.Because of the fact that in some places Bohr presented his views on biology in an obscure way, some biologists included him in the circle of supporters of vitalism. A more profound analysis of his views proves that this opinion is groundless.

The aim of this paper is to defend the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). I analyse various versions of this principle (and their structure) and various ways of justifying it. Then I present and attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR. One can distinguish three versions of the PSR: for each state of affairs there is a sufficient reason for its obtaining (PSR-O); for each true proposition there is a direct or indirect justification (PSR-E); for each state of affairs there exists an intellectual duty to search for a sufficient reason for obtaining of that state of affairs, and for each known true proposition – to search for its justification (PSR-M). There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can be only valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious (yet debatable) arguments against the possibility of such infinity. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand universal working is the existence of a necessary substance (thing): that substance would be a (free) reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be reasons for all other contingent state of affairs and things. (The principle does not require a necessary substance to have its own reason). Limiting the chain of reasons to contingent states of affairs ended with a necessary state (if this state is a reason by necessity) would lead to the paradox of universal necessarism. An ontological “cost” of holding the PSR-Onon-stand is a postulate of the existence of the necessary, supra-natural substance, i.e. God. However, there are serious advantages of the view which accepts that the PSR-Onon-stand is generally valid: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity.