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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4

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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Jane Duran

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This paper argues that Murdoch’s views possess a structured ontology. As some of her critics note, her philosophical stance is one that must be gleaned from close readings of both her novels and her more straightforward essays. Given the complexities of her novels, the addition of her other work makes for a challenging task, but one that the reader can use. Murdoch’s work is valuable for the range of moral options it displays.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Joshua R. Brotherton

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The so-called ontological argument has a complex and controverted history, rising to particular prominence in contemporary analytic philosophy. Against this backdrop I will present a non-analytic interpretation of ontological argumentation for God’s existence by attempting to fuse Anselmian and Gödelian perspectives. I defend ontological argumentation in a number of slightly variant forms as neither a priori nor a posteriori, but ab actu exercito. Kantian and especially Thomistic critiques are confronted in the course of explaining how ontological argumentation may be logically valid without depending on or yielding to subjectivist epistemologies. Hence, post-Gödelian ontological argumentation ought to be acceptable to realists.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Ignacio De Ribera-Martin

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According to Aristotle’s homonymy principle, when we use a common name to refer to wholes and parts that lack the capacity to carry out the function (ergon) signified by the name, we are using the name in a homonymous way. For example, pictures and statues of a man, or a dead eye, are called “man” and “eye” only homonymously because they cannot carry out their proper function, i.e., to live and to see. This principle serves well Aristotle’s purposes in natural philosophy, for it avoids a reduction of the essence of living bodies and their parts to their material composition and shape. This principle, however, leaves unexplained why we still use those names in common language, despite their homonymy. Using Aristotle’s own comments on homonymy, I will examine the role played by external figure (schêma), for it explains why such homonyms are not accidental. In fact, they are correct forms of linguistic usage in non-philosophical contexts.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Andrés Tutor

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The aim of this article is to provide a critical examination of Berlin’s treatment of positive freedom by offering a review of his standard arguments against this concept. Throughout his essays and particularly in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin connects the idea of positive freedom with such notions as monism, rationalism, and determinism. Each of these connections will be discussed separately. I will argue that most of Berlin’s arguments against positive liberty are somehow flawed. Although Berlin valued positive freedom as one of the ultimate ends of life, his critical view of the concept should be tempered and contextualized since it was mostly based not on logical or conceptual grounds but on historical and interpretative considerations.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Brian Kemple

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If the desire to see God in Himself belongs to human nature, but the attainment of that vision can be affected only by supernatural grace, how is it that this desire remaining unfulfilled is not a frustration of the nature? How is it that nature is aiming at a good in vain, at an object that it cannot achieve? Even though the elicited natural desire to see God is not fulfilled in this life, and even though there is no demonstrative proof that can be provided by natural reason alone of its being fulfilled after death, the natural human desire is nevertheless not frustrated by a natural deficiency. Rather than being contrary to human nature, this lack of fulfillment exists because of that nature, inasmuch as every human is by nature a limited intellector of being.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Roberto Di Ceglie

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Modern philosophical accounts of faith and reason have often been characterized by the idea that faith in God should be epistemically grounded in the belief that God exists. This idea only partially characterizes the Christian view of faith, at least if we consider Aquinas’s thought, which has often been taken as an exemplary way of handling the relationship between faith and reason. I argue that, even though evidence for God’s existence plays a significant role in Aquinas’s reflections, this is only part of his view of the relation between faith and reason. Unlike many modern interpreters of his works, Aquinas sees not only the role played by reason in arguing for faith, but also the autonomy of faith—the fact that faith stands by itself—and the influence that it can exert on the use of reason, including his discussion of the preambles of faith.

book reviews

8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Glenn B. Siniscalchi

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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Adam Tamas Tuboly

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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Peter N. Bwanali, S.J.

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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4

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13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4

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