Environmental Ethics

The occurrence of earthquakes is usually ignored or discounted as an environmental issue, but the environmental relevance of the science of earthquake prediction is demonstrable. The social consequences of such predictions, when they are accurate, and even (once a general pattern of accuracy has been achieved) when they fail, have implications of such varied environmental issues as land-use control, building codes, social and economic costs (for predictions made when no earthquake occurs or for failures to predict earthquakes which do occur). Lay members of the public are more directly involved in programs of earthquake prediction than in almost all other instances of scientific prediction, if only because the scientific findings require public participation in order to have any effect at all. Attention must be paid, accordingly, to the effect of specific public and social values on the practice of earthquake prediction-ranging from such broadly based ones as conceptions of the general relation between man and nature to narrower ones like the cost-benefit analysis of a program of earthquake prediction itself. Because of the close connection between the efficacy of earthquake prediction and public attitudes, moreover, certain questions concerning the social character of “normal” science and the deprofessionalization of scientific institutions are highlighted in this context.

Environmental philosophers often assurne that we lack metaethical concepts and normative criteria for environmental decisions, but that we have all the facts we need from the environmental sciences. This is contested in the case of our obligation to future generations as affected by current decisions regarding increased fossil fuel use, decisions which affect both the inlmediate and long-range future, and whichmust be made deliberately or by default before we know the long-term effects of increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Some suggestions are offered about decision making in the absence of sufficient factual information.

Current facts about soil erosion, groundwater “mining,” and impact of toxic substances suggest a resource crisis in our farming system. Yet traditional checks on the exploitation of farmland, capsulized in the “stewardship ethic,” proceed from too limited a viewpoint to adequately address the root of the exploitation and proffer an alternative. After briefly examining the stewardship ethic, I consider the developmentof a “partnership ethic” to guide the use of land for farming which builds its essential elements out of the reflections of feminist thinkers on the relationship between humankind and nature. Instead of using “rights” language to express the ethic, I develop a theory of appropriate use analogous to the appropriate use of another person’s capabilities-i.e., that such moral use should respect and not destroy the other and that it should return something of value to the other in exchange for the use. Finally, those principles are examined for their practical implications for farmland use and national farm policy.

Tom Regan has made a very important contribution to the debate on environmental ethics in his “On the Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic.” The debate can be brought out yet more clearly by contrasting Regan’s views with those of an eminent critic of environmental ethics in Regan’s sense, William K. Frankena. I argue that Regan’s position has much to recommend it, but has a fatal flaw whichwould render environmental ethics unjustifiable. I suggest this flaw can be remedied by divorcing an environmental ethic from a dubious ontological commitment. Reflection on metaethics, ontological commitments, and the nature of ethical justification leads to a conclusion favorable to an environmental ethic.

In Kant’s philosophy nonrational beings are denied moral standing. I argue that Kant's rational humanism is arbitrary and morally impoverished. In particular I show that Kant moves illegitimately from the first formulation of the categorical imperative (which makes no mention of a moral domain) to the second (which limits moral recognition to rational beings). The move to the second fonnulation relies on a new and unsupported principle introduced by Kant: rational nature and only rational nature exists as an end in itself.