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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Brandon Absher,
Harry van der Linden
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Richard Schmitt
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Many socialists agree that socialism must be democratic, in the political as well as in the economic arena. But socialist democracy is very different from democracy in a capitalist country. Socialist democracy, it is widely believed, will be participatory: everyone will be a full participant in all decisions affecting his or her life. In this paper I argue that this conception of socialist democracy needs a lot more work. Not all decisions can be made by everybody affected by a decision. Many decisions that affect large numbers of persons must be made by representatives. But representation is subject to several serious weaknesses which are not products of capitalism. They will be obstacles to democracy also under socialism. Today we do not know what a socialist democracy would look like.
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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D. W. Haslett
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This essay challenges the belief in the superiority of capitalism as practiced today, and outlines an alternative economic system aimed at avoiding current capitalism’s main weaknesses. This alternative, built around employee ownership, is designed to result, over time, in a more equal distribution of income and wealth, while surpassing current capitalism’s main strength, its extraordinary economic productivity. It is an economic system that spreads economically beneficial incentives around more widely than today, and helps equalize opportunities. At its core is a buy-in and payoff scheme that avoids what are often said to be the major problems with employee ownership.
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Bonnie Mann
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This short discussion piece invites readers to consider two questions: What does “pluralism” mean in philosophy? and What should it mean? Brian Leiter’s assault on Linda Martin Alcoff and The Pluralist’s Guide to Philosophy is taken as an opportunity to reflect on several conceptions of philosophical pluralism: the “philosophical gourmet’s” conception, the “three white men” conception, and Scott Pratt’s epistemological pluralism. In each, there is a failure to come to terms with both history and power. What is at stake in philosophy’s pluralism debates is the aspiration to judgment, in the Arendtian sense, among philosophy’s others—this aspiration is both unsettling to the discipline and important for its future.
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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E. Das Janssen
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This paper explores practical application of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to lived human experience and practical concerns beyond those he addressed, specifically the phenomenon of gender. We are so committed to gender norms that we ostracize or even kill those who violate them, yet rarely question the reasonableness of our expectations. Gender needs to be examined from a phenomenological stance, a) because of the ubiquity of gendering, b) because presuppositions regarding gender go largely unquestioned in most Daseins’ everyday existence, and c) because cases in which actual fact contravenes our expectations offer insight into what it means to be human.
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Carlos Alberto Sánchez
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This paper considers the nature of Heidegger’s Eurocentrism in regard to philosophy. Focusing primarily on “A Dialogue on Language,” I argue, first, that Heidegger recognizes the limits of the Eurocentric idea of philosophy and proposes its overcoming. Secondly, I suggest that the proposal to overcome philosophy is made in an attempt to protect philosophy from the encroachment of an otherness that challenges its very identity. This leads me to the view, thirdly, that Heidegger’s Eurocentrism about philosophy is compromising insofar as he is willing, to a certain degree, to let go of philosophy’s European origin. This “thinning” out of Heidegger’s Eurocentrism, finally, opens the door to a consideration of the possibility for a non-Western, namely, a Latin American, or Mexican “philosophy.”
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Anatole Anton
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Thomas Klikauer
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Andrew Dunstall
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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V. Denise James
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Cynthia Kaufman
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Eric Lambert
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Linda Martín Alcoff
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Michael Reno
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Raphael Sassower
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Harry van der Linden
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Arnold L. Farr,
Douglas Kellner,
Andrew T. Lamas,
Charles Reitz
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Radical Philosophy Review:
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Issue: 2
Angela Y. Davis
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