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1. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Derek Matravers, Alessandra Marino, Natalie Trevino

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This paper considers the argument that we have a duty to colonise other planets because we owe it to future generations. It puts forward the view that formulations of this argument in the current literature are confused. It distinguishes (at least) four versions of the argument and shows that none of them are compelling. It draws the conclusion that, should people put forward these arguments, they ought to be more precise in their formulations and more rigorous in their defence.
2. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Maurizio Balistreri

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The theme of human extinction is increasingly at the center of the current debate on moral philosophy and bioethics. We look at space missions and station construction projects capable of accommodating a large population and at the colonization of other planets with great hope. However, solutions are not excluded either, which for now certainly appear to be much more original. One of the most original projects involves launching a spacecraft containing cryopreserved human embryos, which, once they arrive at destination on another planet, must be thawed and birthed by intelligent machines through artificial wombs (ectogenesis). In this paper, I do not intend to analyze whether the embryo space colonization project is indeed feasible. Instead, I will focus on examining the primary moral questions raised by the embryo space colonization project to determine whether, at least prima facie, it can be deemed morally acceptable. I will begin by discussing the objection advanced by Konrad Szocik (2021), according to which any embryo space colonization project is doomed to failure because it cannot offer the hoped-for solution to the problem of the extinction of the human species (second paragraph). In the third paragraph, then, I will ask whether embryo space colonization is able to ensure the people it brings into the world an adequate or at least the morally appropriate quality of life. Finally, in the fourth and last paragraph, I will examine the question of the morality of human reproduction that passes through the guidance and choice of intelligent machines. I will argue that to evaluate the morality of this project we should consider not only the interests and quality of life of the first people who could be born but also the interests of all possible subsequent generations.
3. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Mirko Daniel Garasic

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Among the various ethical problems associated with the hype surrounding Space Colonization, one that has received little attention concerns the internal tension within the Posthumanist paradigm. While at the core of many of the hyper optimistic portrayals of the departure from Earth towards Outer Space there is the idea that this would represent a key component for humankind to evolve into a Posthuman, better, version of itself, other visions of Posthumanism might paint a direr picture. This paper wants to argue that such a clash would be particularly strong when applied to the different—and contrasting—narratives connected to Posthumanism and the Climate Crisis, deserving urgent attention.
4. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Steven Umbrello, Nathan G. Wood

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In his article, “Should Space Travel be Human or Robotic? Reasons for and against full automation for space missions,” Maurizio Balistreri explores the ongoing debate regarding whether space travel, exploration, and extra-terrestrial colonization should be the domain of humans or robots. Balistreri explores both technical and normative arguments for why extraterrestrial ventures ought to be wholly robotic or human, ultimately taking no explicit side in the debate. However, in this article we argue that by even posing the question in this binary fashion, Balistreri and others are making a mistake at the outset. We show that there are certain missions and aims which require humans and others that plausibly may be undertaken solely by robots, but for all missions and aims there is likely to be some degree of human-robot pairing. More than this, we show that the question should not be whether space travel, exploration, or extra-terrestrial colonization ought to be generally human-centric or robot-centric, but rather that each and every mission should be examined on its own, as the values and disadvantages of humans versus robots are apt to be highly specific to the realities of particular discrete missions.
5. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar

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Space warfare is warfare that takes place in outer space. It involves ground-to-space, space-to-ground, and space-to-space violence between nations or peoples. The violence can involve kinetic weapons, directed energy weapons, or electronic destruction. International law, specifically, the Outer Space Treaty and SALT I, currently bans weapons of mass destruction from being put into space, although one wonders if one country were to violate the ban whether others would follow suit. In this paper, I argue that that if there is a non-consequentialist morality of space war, then one country can unjustly attack a second country’s space vehicles. This in turn depends on property rights. But there is no adequate theory of property rights with regard to space war. Hence, there is no non-consequentialist morality of a space war.
6. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Duncan Macintosh

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How may nations protect their interests in space if its fragility makes military operations there self-defeating? This essay claims nations are in Prisoners Dilemmas on the matter, and applies David Gauthier’s theories about how it is rational to behave morally—cooperatively—in such dilemmas. Currently space-faring nations should i) enter into co-operative space sharing arrangements with other rational nations, ii) exclude—militarily, but with only terrestrial force—nations irrational or existentially opposed to other nations being in space, and iii) incentivize all nations into co-operation by redistributing some space-generated wealth to nations that might otherwise ruin space. Further, since all nations are rationally incentivized to ever greater dependence on space, and since each, by threatening space, can hold hostage its benefits to all, each can demand resolution of terrestrial discontents with other nations. So each has a rational interest in treating others morally both in space and on terrestrial issues.
7. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Mattia Pozzebon

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Given the vast distances separating astronomical objects, multi-generational space travel may eventually become a practicable option in the future. Such an expedition would most likely include companion animals as well. Especially since they are deemed important in assisting humans to cope with stress and anxiety. However, just as with humans, extended periods of confinement would be detrimental to companion animals as well, resulting in psychological, physiological, and behavioural disorders. Already occurring to animals locked up in terrestrial households, it would be an even bigger welfare problem during a life-long journey in a no-way-out confined spaceship. A conceivable solution could be to genetically enhance them to fit the spaceship environment. Assuming that companion animals will be part of future multi-generational space travels, this article aims at examining how such an experience would affect their welfare, even considering the implications of genetic adaptation.

symposium on the question of theodicy: is a good god logically possible? an exchange

8. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba

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9. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Linda Zagzebski

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10. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Bruce Russell

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11. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba

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about the contributors

12. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1

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symposium on work

13. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Benjamin Sachs - Cobbe

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The Living Wage Movement (LWM) should be evaluated on whether it enables more people, or people willing to work, to lead a decent life. But, first, to the extent that it succeeds in getting some workers up to that threshold it is likely to make it harder for other workers to do the same. Second, to the extent that it succeeds in getting some workers up to that threshold it is likely to make it harder for non-workers to do the same. The LWM is likely afflicted with these problems to a greater extent than is the Minimum Wage Movement.
14. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Lee Clarke

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The paper identifies a view of work that has become prominent in recent years: The view in question is that work is “split” into two main forms: “manual” and “intellectual.” These two forms of work are seen socially as being completely opposed to one another and stereotypes abound on both sides about the people who do them. The paper calls this view “The Manichean View of Work” after the Ancient Persian religion. It is argued that this view is based on an erroneous philosophical position of dualism, a split between mind and body, that derives from the Greeks and was formalised by such thinkers as Ibn Sina and Rene Descartes, which has filtered down into all of Western society. A new, more inclusive definition of work is offered, along with criticisms of the “Manichean View.” Lastly, as a counter to the Western view, an argument based on Zen Buddhist philosophy, which views manual work positively, is given before some practical ways by which the split can be healed as a conclusion.

symposium on economic justice and social welfare

15. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Ulrich Arnswald Orcid-ID

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The criticism of neoliberalism is omnipresent. The term is seemingly self-explanatory, but its original use in public has been forgotten. Its form originated in the international movement of ordoliberalism in the 1930s, which used neoliberalism to describe its distinction from laissez-faire capitalism. This conceptual confusion has created considerable consequential problems that overlay today’s debate on the future of the market economy. The fact that the neoliberalism of the ordoliberals is today equated by its critics with the capitalism of the libertarians raises questions. Since the economic dogma of Milton Friedman, who was the inspiration for the so-called Chicago Boys in Chile, whose economic policy was first captured by today’s negatively connoted term neoliberalism, this approach needs to be looked at more closely. Should the ideas of the Chicago school of thought substantially distinguish themselves from the other currents of economic liberalism, a solution to the confusion of terms could be possible, giving a new twist to the debate on the market economy. Such a clarifiation would be of fundamental importance for the ethical question of the social orientation of the economic order, since ordoliberalism was in turn the godfather of the social market economy. Furthermore, this would have consequences for applied political ethics in the context of political theories of justice, whose theoretical constructs reflect the existing economic order as a fact of experience.
16. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Julian Fink, Sophia Appl Scorza

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Suppose we morally ought to maximize social welfare. Suppose profit maxi­mization is a means to maximize social welfare. Does this imply that we morally ought to maximize profits? Many proponents of the view that we have a moral obligation to maximize profits (tacitly) assume the validity of this argument. In this paper, we critically assess this assumption. We show that the validity of this argument is far from trivial and requires a careful argumentative defence.

symposium on freedom and democracy

17. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jesper Ahlin Marceta

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Philosophers have said surprisingly little about academic freedom, considering how central it is to liberal societies. This article takes a holistic approach to the topic by developing a framework for philosophical analyses of academic freedom. It treats the definition, extent, and justification of academic freedom, arguing in favor of an individualist account thereof. The complete theory is constructed using the same methods and moral arguments as in analyses of other liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech and association, which means that the account is fully integrable in all liberal societies.
18. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jordy Rocheleau

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Just war theory has traditionally accepted revolutionary overthrow of an undemocratic government as a just cause but not foreign intervention for the same purpose. For many contemporary cosmopolitan theorists this asymmetry involves an indefensible inconsistency. For example, Ned Dobos argues that it is only a potential foreign intervener’s duty to its own citizens and soldiers, not any additional duty of non-intervention, that places additional restrictions upon the use of force across borders. I defend insurrection/intervention asymmetry, arguing that due to several intersecting practical difficulties, intervention has a higher threshold of just cause. I argue that interven­tion’s high costs and low likelihood of success, intervener’s limited ability to evaluate the validity of democratic intervention, and the effects of intervention on the international system, lead to a stronger presumption against intervention than revolution. In particular, democratization is a just cause for revolution but not humanitarian intervention.
19. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Thorian R. Harris

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As self-conscious curators and critics of moral history, the early Confucians are relevant to the contemporary debate over the fate of memorials dedicated to morally flawed individuals. They provide us with a pragmatic justification that is distinct from those utilized in the current debate, and in many respects superior to the alternatives. In addition to supplying this curative philosophic resource, the early Confucian practices of ancestral memorialization suggest preventative measures we might adopt to minimize the chances of establishing divisive and oppressive memorials in the future.

articles

20. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Alan Tapper

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The Golden Rule (“what you want done [or not done] to yourself, do [or don’t do] to others”) is the most widely accepted summary statement of human morality, and even today it continues to have philosophical supporters. This article argues that the Golden Rule suffers from four faults, the first two related to the ethics of justice and the second two related to the ethics of benevolence. One, it fails to explain how to deal with non-reciprocation. Two, it fails to make clear that my obligations are obligations regardless of how I would wish to be treated by others. Three, it lacks any special value in explaining the right occasions for benevolence. And, four, it has no power to motivate benevolence.